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Empty names are names which do not refer to anything. Apparently 
empty names are used in many different ways, and an analysis which 
looks good for one kind of use can look bad for another. I aim to get a 
wide enough angle on the issues that the solutions I propose won’t run 
into that problem. 
 
Chapter one is about names which are empty because they were 
introduced in the context of mistakes and lies. I see how we can assign 
truth values to utterances containing such names. I also look at how 
genuinely empty names could be meaningful at all, and examine how 
they could fit into a Davidsonian theory of meaning. 
 
Chapter two is about mental states corresponding to the names dealt 
with in chapter one. I try to give an account of how beliefs could be 
subject to rational norms without appealing to their propositional 
contents. I do this by showing that puzzles about co-referring names 
can motivate such an account independently, and that the empty name 
beliefs can fit into this framework easily. 
 
Chapter three is about attitude ascriptions and propositions. I consider 
different ways of responding to the problem of having propositions but 
no objects for the propositions to be about. I defend an account 
involving gappy Fregean propositions, and give a semantics for attitude 
ascriptions which incorporates them. 
 
Chapter four is about the names that occur in fiction. I argue that we 
should take these to be polysemous between a use referring to an 
artistic creation and a use primarily suited to pretence. For the first use, 
I survey proposals for ontologies of fictional characters, and suggest 
one of my own. To make sense of the second use, I use a two-
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Chapter 0 – Introduction 
 
Once upon a time, at least according to philosophical folklore, most 
people were descriptivists about names. This means they thought that 
names, like ‘Aristotle’, had the same meanings as definite descriptions, 
like ‘the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander’. Bertrand Russell 
[1905] gave a famous analysis of definite descriptions which still makes 
sense even if nothing fits the description, and thus we could be forgiven 
for thinking that we had solved any problems associated with names 
which don’t refer to anything, or empty names as we'll call them. 
Apparently empty names are words like ‘Apollo’ (for a god some Greeks 
thought existed), ‘Vulcan’ (for a planet some astronomers thought 
existed), and ‘Santa’ (for a jolly fellow some children think exists). 
 
The problem of empty names came back, so the story goes, when people 
like Ruth Barcan Marcus, Saul Kripke and David Kaplan started 
challenging the descriptivist consensus. They presented arguments that 
at least some of the time names behave very differently from definite 
descriptions. One view which gained some popularity was Millianism, 
named after John Stuart Mill, which says that the meaning of a name 
just is its referent. This immediately presents a problem for empty 
names, because it seems that a name without a referent won’t have a 
meaning. Even if we stop short of Millianism, we might still want to say 
that a name’s meaning is more intimately connected to its referent than 
a definite description’s meaning is to the thing (if any) fitting the 
description, and this makes empty names a problem. 
 
One response is to fall back on descriptivism. I don’t want to do that, 
and will mostly only consider it as either a last resort or way of treating 
special cases. Another response is Meinongianism, which in its extreme 
form says there are no empty names, and all apparently empty names 
refer to non-existent objects. I don’t want to do that either, but I will 
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leave the view on the table and give it a fair ride. The principal aim of 
this thesis is to see if we can make sense of the different ways we use 
apparently empty names without falling back on descriptivism. I will 
conclude that we can, a present my preferred way of doing so. 
 
Chapter one looks at the consequences of there being meaningful 
names which are genuinely empty. It begins by looking at a proposal of 
David Braun’s that utterances involving genuinely empty names 
express what he calls gappy propositions, which are entities structured 
like ordinary propositions but with gaps in one or more of the places 
where an ordinary proposition would have a constituent. Braun’s 
theory has us evaluate the truth values of these utterances, and the 
corresponding beliefs, according to a two-valued negative free logic. I 
also look at some other principled ways of assigning truth values to 
utterances containing genuinely empty names, and defend the view that 
for at least some classes of apparently empty names, we can follow 
Braun in assigning the utterances what I call pessimistic truth values. 
The main defining feature of pessimistic evaluations is that atomic 
sentences in extensional contexts cannot be true if they contain any 
empty names. I examine an objection due to Anthony Everett that 
Braun’s view does have enough to say about what ‘Santa doesn’t exist’ 
has in common with ‘Father Christmas does not exist’, but not with 
‘Hamlet does not exist’. I respond that we should see the difference not 
in what the sentences represent, but in how they try to represent, and 
link this to work by David Chalmers, Gillian Russell and Sam Cumming 
on what can be called metarepresentational content. After looking at the 
consequences of meaningful names being apparently empty, chapter 
one finishes by looking at how we can make sense of empty names 
being meaningful within a Davidsonian theory of meaning. I argue that 
empty names as I have treated them present a distinctive puzzle for the 
Davidsonian project, but that this puzzle can be solved in more than one 
way, and that this gives us a concrete proposal for how to understand 




While chapter one is about language, chapter two is about thought. 
Communicative practices involving genuinely empty names will give 
rise to systems of beliefs which suffer from intentional failure in the 
way the names suffer from referential failure. We can carry the 
pessimistic truth assignments over from the utterances to the beliefs, 
but a new problem arises: how to make sense of the notions of 
consistency and valid deduction when the beliefs have either no 
contents or gappy contents. Especially if the beliefs have no 
propositional contents, it will be problematic to account for rational 
relations between the beliefs by invoking logical relations between the 
contents. Even if they have gappy contents, the fact that atomic gappy 
propositions cannot be true makes it hard for there to be non-trivial 
logical relations between them, which could used to explain rational 
norms governing the beliefs.  
 
I argue that consideration of beliefs corresponding to co-referring 
names can motivate a framework which draws on work by Kit Fine to 
account for rational relations without reference to the beliefs’ actual 
propositional contents. Instead, we cash them out in terms of the 
beliefs’ potential contents or objects, as constrained by what Fine calls 
co-ordination relations between the beliefs. Beliefs suffering from 
intentional failure can fit into this framework without much trouble. 
 
Chapter three is about attitude ascriptions involving apparently empty 
names, like ‘Smith believes Vulcan is a planet’. These create a problem 
because ordinarily it is useful to take attitude ascriptions to involve 
reference to propositions, but where empty names are involved that 
will seem to mean referring to a proposition with some constituents 
missing. We can respond in any of three ways: reify the constituents, 
reject the propositions, or try to defend an ontology of propositions 
with constituents missing. David Braun’s theory from chapter one is a 
version of the third option, but I argue that its Russellian gappy 
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propositions are not fine grained enough, and that we would do best to 
look into the possibilities for an ontology of Fregean gappy 
propositions. I give a semantics for attitude ascriptions embodying this 
proposal, and show that it deals well with the problems we are trying to 
solve. This semantics is also presented more formally in an appendix. 
 
The treatments of the first three chapters, with their pessimistic truth-
value assignments in non-intentional contexts, are most plausible for 
names introduced in the context of a mistake or a lie. Sometimes, 
however, apparently names are introduced without anyone either being 
deceived or attempting to deceive, and the pessimistic truth value 
assignments seem less appropriate. Chapter three looks at fictional 
names, which include uses of names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Hercule 
Poirot’ as they appear within fiction, and also uses of the same names to 
talk about fiction as literary critics do. I argue that we should take the 
names as used to talk about fiction as referring to members of an 
ontology of fictional characters. I examine and evaluate some existing 
proposals for such an ontology, and sketch a proposal of my own which 
can solve the problems I identify. I argue for a separate analysis of uses 
of fictional names within fiction, and some derivative uses, which treats 
the fictional names as what I call semi-rigid designators. This analysis 
gives us a treatment of negative existential statements like ‘Holmes 
does not exist’ which takes them at face value and evaluates them as 
true. I also show how these treatments of fictional names fit in with my  









To begin with, we can set the problem up as a tension between these 
four theses: 
 
1. When a name makes a semantic contribution to a sentence in 
which it occurs, that contribution includes a referent. 
2. Some meaningful names do not have an existent referent. 
3. Everything exists. 
4. A meaningful name must make a semantic contribution to the 
sentences in which it occurs. 
 
These four theses are more or less contradictory. If (2) and (3) are true, 
there must be meaningful names without referents. If (4) is true, then 
this means there are names which make semantic contributions to 
sentences containing them but do not have referents. This contradicts 
(1). Now, there are a lot of different kinds of uses of apparently empty 
names, and while all of these uses give rise to the tension between these 
four theses, you don’t have to deny the same one each time. 
 
(1) is denied by descriptivism about names, for example that defended 
by Russell [1905] and followed by Quine [1948: 5-9]. If names are all 
just disguised definite descriptions, they have the same semantic 
content whatever satisfies the description, and whether the description 
is satisfied uniquely or not. Empty names are as such not a big problem 
for descriptivism. I will not be discussing descriptivism much though1, 
                                                          
1 Exceptions will be §2.11, where descriptivism is used as an illustrative 
example, and §3.22, where descriptivism is considered (and rejected) as a way 
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because a large part of this project is to see if non-descriptivist theories 
can be made to work in the face of the problems of empty names. There 
are other ways of denying (1) besides descriptivism, and later on I will 
suggest that denying it is appropriate in at least some non-extensional 
contexts. (2) can be plausibly denied in some cases too, and in chapter 
four I will argue that fictional names as used in discourse about (rather 
than within) fiction can be treated that way. It is difficult to deny (2) 
across the board though, if for no other reason then because of the 
problem of negative existentials: ‘n does not exist’ would never be both 
meaningful and false. Denying (3) is Meinongianism: the view that there 
are non-existent objects, as defended notoriously by Meinong [1960] 
and more recently by Terence Parsons [1980] and Ed Zalta [1983]. I’m 
going to consider Meinongianism seriously in chapter three and 
particularly chapter four, but as it happens I will always end up 
supporting non-Meinongian solutions. 
 
This chapter is mostly about what happens when we deny (4), and say 
that sometimes names can be meaningful without making any semantic 
contribution at all. It might seem hard to make sense of this: isn’t 
making a semantic contribution just what it is to be meaningful? 
Nonetheless, it seems that sometimes speakers could be in a situation 
where they blithely talk to each other, and appear to understand each 
other, even though the mechanisms for names making a semantic 
contribution, whatever they are, have broken down. Alternatively, 
maybe only the referential mechanisms have broken down: the names 
make a semantic contribution but no referential contribution, even 
though they are expressions for referring (rather than e.g. 
quantificational expressions). This can be seen as a kind of non-
descriptivist denial of (1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
of analysing names as used in fiction, while keeping a non-descriptivist 
analysis of most names. 
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These kinds of case are the worst sort of empty name use, from the 
point of view of the speaker. Sometimes apparently empty names are 
introduced as part of fiction or make-believe, and while they may not 
have referents, nobody has to be making a mistake. Sometimes, on the 
other hand, names are introduced either because someone is making a 
mistake, or to induce a mistake in others. An example of the first kind is 
the name ‘Vulcan’, which (so the story goes) was introduced by Urbain 
Leverrier to name a planet he believed was closer to the sun the 
Mercury, and whose gravitational pull he thought caused some 
otherwise unexplained irregularities in Mercury’s orbit. But there isn’t a 
planet there for ‘Vulcan’ to refer to. An example of the second kind 
could be ‘Santa’, which adults use when telling tall tales to children 
around Christmastime. This time the introducers of the name aren’t 
making a mistake, but the children who use it are as much in the dark as 
Leverrier. We can call names which really have no referents, instead of 
just appearing to have no referent, genuinely empty names, to contrast 
with apparently empty names, which would also include names we end 
up understanding as referring to a non-existent object, an abstract 
fictional character or something of that kind. 
 
§1.1 approaches the problem of meaningful names without semantic 
contributions via a set of problems identified by David Braun [2005]. 
We can approach the problem via Braun because he proposes a solution 
which is fairly describable as taking empty names as being meaningful 
while making no semantic contribution. First we look at his problems, 
and then we look at his solutions, which involve a kind of propositional 
content he calls gappy propositions. Next we see if there are other ways 
of justifying assigning the same truth values to utterances containing 
genuinely empty names that Braun assigns them. If we can’t, we look at 
what truth values we should assign them instead. I will end up arguing, 
with Braun, that we should assign truth values according to a two value 
negative free logic, at least in the non-intentional contexts under 




§1.2 looks at an objection to Braun’s view due to Anthony Everett 
[2003]. This objection is that Braun can’t explain what the contents of 
‘Santa doesn’t exist’ and ‘Father Christmas doesn’t exist’ have in 
common with each other, but not with ‘Hamlet doesn’t exist’. This 
problem arises for Braun because he thinks they all express the same 
GP. It is also a threat to any proposal denying that genuinely empty 
names make a semantic contribution, because if two names don’t make 
contributions at all, they don’t make different contributions. We 
consider three possible solutions: a Millian solution similar to the one 
Braun adopts, a metalinguistic solution based on an idea from Keith 
Donnellan [1974], and a Fregean solution which only denies that 
genuinely empty names make a referential contribution. I also suggest 
how the Fregean and metalinguistic solutions can be combined, 
drawing on some work by Sam Cumming [2007, 2008], Gillian Russell 
[2008] and David Chalmers [2011, forthcoming]. This allows that empty 
names can have a kind of metarepresentational content. This is 
ultimately the view I prefer. 
 
§1.3 looks a bit harder at the idea that genuinely empty names could be 
meaningful. It is one thing to say what truth values the sentences in 
question should have if there are meaningful genuinely empty names, 
and another to say how there could be such names. I approach the 
problem in the context of Donald Davidson’s [1965, 1984] idea of using 
truth theories for languages as theories of meaning. This bears on the 
present project in two ways. First, it would be good if the present 
treatment of empty names was compatible with the Davidsonian 
project. Second, getting the two projects to fit together gives us a 
concrete way of understanding linguistic knowledge involving empty 
names. I show how genuinely empty names pose a distinctive problem 
for Davdidson’s approach, and consider two solutions, one involving 
some semantic blindness, and another which modifies the shape of the 
truth theories in a way proposed by Mark Sainsbury [2005]. 
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1.1 Meaningful names without semantic contributions 
 
 1.11 Braun’s problems 
 
Denying (4) means holding that a meaningful name need not make a 
semantic contribution to sentences in which it occurs. This 
uncomfortable-looking piece of logical space is defended by David 
Braun [1993, 2005]. He identifies five related problems that his 
proposal will need to address [2005: §1]: 
 
 Meaningfulness for names: if a name’s meaning is its referent, 
how can there be meaningful names without referents? This is 
the problem which arises most directly from denying (4). 
 Meaningfulness for sentences: how can meaningful sentences 
have empty names in them, if the name leaves a gap in the 
semantics? 
 Truth value: what are the truth values of (the contents of) these 
sentences? How can sentences without semantic contents have 
truth values, when the truth value of a sentence is meant to be 
the same as that of its content? 
 Attitude ascriptions: if ‘Vulcan is a planet’ has no content, then 
‘that Vulcan is a planet’ should fail to refer, so ‘Leverrier believes 
that Vulcan is a planet’ cannot be true. 
 Belief and sincere assertive utterance: how can people sincerely 
assert ‘Vulcan does not exist’ if the assertion has no content for 
them to believe? 
 
Braun puts forward his theory of gappy propositions (hereafter GPs) to 
solve all these problems. In this chapter I will only look at it as a 
potential solution to the first three. The problems of attitude ascriptions 
and belief and sincere assertive utterance will be dealt with in chapter 
three, with Braun’s own solution examined in §3.42. Other issues about 
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beliefs corresponding to genuinely empty names will be dealt with in 
chapter two.  
 
 1.12 Braun’s Solutions 
 
Millians famously take the semantic value of a name to be just its 
referent, and this notoriously means co-referential names have the 
same semantic value. It also seems to mean that if a name has no 
referent, it has no semantic value, and so will leave a gap in the 
proposition the sentence expresses where a referring name would put a 
referent. Braun takes this in the most straightforward way possible, 
saying that the sentence will express a GP. 
 
‘Mars is a planet’ and ‘Vulcan is a planet’ are both of the form 
[name]^[predicate], and (on Braun’s Russellian view of propositions) 
this makes them express proposition with the structure represented by 
the ordered pair schema <object, property>. In ‘Mars is a planet’, the 
name refers to Mars, so the proposition is the one we can represent as 
<Mars, being a planet>. In ‘Vulcan is a planet’, the name does not refer, 
so the proposition is the GP we can represent as <___, being a planet>. 
Braun is clear that this is only meant as a way of representing the GPs: 
he is not identifying them with ordered pairs of blanks and properties, 
and has no declared interest in reducing structured propositions to 
ordered sets.2 For Braun, GPs are propositional structures with gaps in, 
                                                          
2 He emphasises [2005: n.6] that while ordered pairs can represent 
propositions, they need not be identical with them. Presumably some people 
will be less comfortable with an ontology of structured propositions which 
does not reduce in any natural way to one of sets. A fairly natural reduction 
can be effected if one is wanted, however. The proposition that a is F could be 
<{a}, {F}> and the corresponding GP could be <{}, {F}>. This is what Braun 
calls Convention 2. It could also be extended to allow the proposition that a 
and b were collectively F to be <{a,b}, {F}>, at least if we ignore propositions 
collectively ascribing a property to the members of a proper class. 
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and still count as propositions. If a gapless proposition is a 
propositional structure with all the gaps filled in, then a GP is a 
propositional structure without all the gaps filled in. 
 
At this point we might want to ask for some clarification. What is a 
propositional structure? Is it the sort of thing that can have a gap in? It 
would be disingenuous to say that if you’re committed to propositions 
then you’re committed to propositional structures, and since you’re 
committed to the structures you’re committed to gappy instances of 
them. Some structures can have gappy instances and some can’t. We 
know what it is for a car to have a wheel missing, but we don’t know 
what it is for a set or n-tuple to have a member missing. Of course, 
Braun says that the propositions need not be identified with sets or n-
tuples, so GPs don’t commit us to gappy sets, but sets still provide a 
counterexample to the move from a commitment to structured entities 
to a commitment to gappy instances of their structure. Accepting GPs 
would thus be an additional theoretical commitment of some kind. 
Whether this addition is problematic will depend on the role we want 
propositions to have. If they are just for describing what utterances are 
about, GPs are probably alright. If propositions are supposed to play a 
robust explanatory role, then GPs may be more problematic. At this 
stage we can just note that they are an additional theoretical 
commitment, and they will have whatever properties they need to play 
the role Braun assigns to them. 
 
Now we have some idea what Braun has in mind when he talks about 
GPs, we can see how they help with the problems set out in §1.11. First, 
consider the problems of meaningfulness for names and for sentences. 
Braun notes [2005: 600] that we do not judge empty names to be 
meaningless because we stand in significant cognitive relations to them 
which we do not stand in to nonsense strings like ‘thoodrupqua’. We 
judge them meaningful whether they have a semantic content or not. 
This is true: we certainly think that empty names are meaningful, 
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especially when we do not know they are empty, but also when we do. 
‘Zeus’ doesn’t seem meaningless the way ‘thoodrupqua’ does. 
 
Can we make anything of meaningfulness without semantic content? 
Let’s see how a view like that might go. We can start by considering the 
distinction between semantics and syntax. We can say that ‘Vulcan’ is 
syntactically a name, so it makes a syntactic contribution to the 
sentence by helping to determine its syntactic structure, which in turn 
determines the structure of the proposition it expresses. Combined 
with the view that ‘Vulcan’ does not refer, we can say that the name is 
syntactically meaningful but has no semantic value. The sentence is 
syntactically meaningful too, and if we have GPs then we can say it 
expresses a proposition, which could be enough to give it a semantic 
value when it appears embedded in an attitude context. What about 
when it appears by itself? Then its semantic value, if it has one, is its 
truth value. The truth value of a sentence expressing a proposition is 
generally taken to be the same as the value of the proposition. So to find 
the sentence’s truth value, if it has one, we need to find the truth value 
of the proposition it expresses, if it has one. 
 
Braun says the GP expressed by ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is false, because it is 
atomic and has a gap where the object should be, and that makes it 
false. For Braun, all atomic GPs are false, including that represented by 
<__, existence>, and they compose truth-functionally just like gapless 
propositions. So the negation of an atomic GP is true, the disjunction of 
an atomic GP with another proposition is true iff the other is true 
(because the gappy disjunct is false), and so on. This gives us what is 
called a two-valued negative free logic for the language containing the 
empty names, with a standard syntax for predicate logic, and the 
semantics below: 
 
 VA(x) = A(x), where A is an assignment of members of the 
domain to variables. 
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 VA(a) = V(a), where V maps some names to members of the 
domain and is undefined for the others. 
 VA(F) = V(F), where V maps predicates onto sets of ordered n-
tuples of members of the domain. 
 VA(Ft1…tn) = T iff VA(t1),…,VA(tn) are all defined, and 
<VA(t1),…,VA(tn)> ∊ VA(F); otherwise VA(Ft1…tn) = F. 
 VA(¬φ) = T iff VA(φ) = F; otherwise VA(¬φ) = F. 
 VA(φ&ψ) = T iff VA(φ) = VA(ψ) = T; otherwise VA(φ&ψ) = F 
 VA(φvψ) = T iff VA(φ) = T or VA(ψ) = T or both; otherwise 
VA(φ&ψ) = F 
 VA(∃xφ) = T iff VB(φ) = T on some assignment B such that B(y) = 
A(y) for all variables y: y≠x. 
 V(φ) = T iff VA(φ) = T for all assignments A. 
 
This gives us some reasonably intuitive results. ‘Vulcan is a planet’ will 
be false, ‘Vulcan is not a planet’ will be true, and ‘Vulcan is not a planet’ 
will not entail ‘something is not a planet’. Perhaps you don’t think the 
second of these is so intuitive, but Braun can mitigate this by identifying 
two readings of ‘Vulcan is a planet’, one true and one false. We can cash 
this out formally using lambda predicates, where [λx1…xn.φ] is true of 
some things when they satisfy a predicate determined by the open 
formula φ: 
 
 VA([λx1…xn.φ]t1,…tn) = T iff A(ti) is defined for all i: 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and 
VB(φ) = T, where B(xi) = A(ti) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and B(x) = A(x) for 
other variables x. Otherwise VA([λx1…xn.φ]t1,…tn) = F. 
 
This allows us to analyse ‘Vulcan is not a planet’ as ¬Planet(Vulcan), 
which is true, or as [λx.¬Planet(x)](Vulcan), which is false. This strategy 
of disambiguation using lambda expressions is always available, so if 
we think there is a false reading of ‘either Vulcan is a planet or grass is 
green’, we can take that as false too. Perhaps an unnatural-sounding 
natural-language paraphrase of this would be ‘Vulcan has the property 
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of being such that either it is a planet or grass is green’. If you think this 
reading is never available, then don’t analyse people’s utterances of 
‘either Vulcan is a planet or grass is green’ that way. Once we already 
have some GPs, however, it is not an obvious cost to admit such 
propositions and to be able to express them, even if in practice people 
usually don’t. 
 
The idea that sentences containing empty names could exhibit such 
scope ambiguities and that our analyses should accommodate them is 
not new. Russell [1905] held that names should be analysed as definite 
descriptions, and definite descriptions included an assertion that some 
unique thing satisfied the description. He also held that there is always 
a reading which gives this existential assertion wide scope. ‘Either 
Vulcan is a planet or grass is green’ can be understood as ‘There is 
exactly one [insert description corresponding to ‘Vulcan’] and either it 
is a planet or grass is green’, which is false. Here is Russell talking about 
wide scope readings of the existential quantification in definite 
descriptions: 
 
...when we say “George IV wished to know whether Scott was the 
author of Waverley,” we normally mean “George IV wished to 
know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott 
was that man”; but we may also mean: “One and only one man 
wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to know whether Scott 
was that man”. [Russell 1905: 489] 
 
He goes on to say explicitly that sentences containing empty names like 
‘Apollo’ will be false when the quantifier has wide scope, which he calls 
a primary occurrence of the name: 
 
A proposition about Apollo means what we get by substituting 
what the classical dictionary tells us is meant by Apollo, say “the 
sun-god”. All propositions in which Apollo occurs are to be 
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interpreted by the above rules for denoting phrases. If “Apollo” 
has a primary occurrence, the proposition containing the 
occurrence is false; if the occurrence is secondary, the 
proposition may be true. [Russell 1905: 491] 
 
Likewise, Grice [1969: §3] held that names were subject to scope 
ambiguities in this way. He used a system of subscripts representing the 
orders in which the syntactic formation rules for sentences could be 
applied, and then used the subscripts in the semantics to get the 
different readings with their different truth values. The lambda 
predicates get equivalent results. Provided we allow a plenitude of GPs, 
including ones like <___, not being a planet> and <___, being such that 
either you’re a planet or grass is green>, we can explain why utterances 
have their different readings and these readings have the truth values 
assigned by the negative free logical semantics given. At least, we can 
explain this if we can explain why atomic GPs are all false. Braun’s 
argument [2005: §4] for this is the most tentative part of his proposal, 
and in §5 he argues that it would not matter much if atomic GPs lacked 
truth values, because we could still rationally believe or disbelieve 
them. However, let’s consider his argument that they are false. 
 
Braun’s argument is essentially based on bivalence for propositions, 
combined with the claim that GPs are propositions. These GPs are not 
true, and since they are propositions they are therefore false, at least in 
some sense of ‘false’3. He takes as his foil an argument he extracts from 
a footnote in Salmon [1998: n.54]. In fairness to Salmon, he was not 
                                                          
3 It has been pointed out that bivalence does not entail that every proposition 
is either determinately true or determinately false (see e.g. Barnes and 
Williams [2011]). This distinction is worth mentioning because one might 
think that empty names were a candidate case for indeterminacy. However, 
Braun only needs bivalence, not determinate bivalence, because his argument 
is that atomic GPs are true or false, and not true, therefore false. Determinacy 
does not come into it. 
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arguing but explicitly assuming that GPs, which he calls structurally 
challenged propositions, are neither true nor false. Salmon says that the 
position is intuitive, and points out that if we enumerated the things 
that are bald and the things that at are not bald we would not find 
Nappy (‘Nappy’ is the empty name Salmon uses) in either list. We have 
already seen how we can use lambda predicates to give a false reading 
of ‘Nappy is not bald’, corresponding to the fact he is not among the 
non-bald. With that in mind, here is Braun: 
 
Salmon seems to assume that atomic gappy propositions are 
false only if all untrue things are false. But if all untrue things are 
false, then Piccadilly Circus and Russell’s singleton set are false. 
The latter are not false, so atomic gappy propositions are not 
false. The weak link in this argument is the premise that atomic 
gappy propositions are false only if all untrue things are false. On 
the Gappy Proposition Theory, atomic gappy propositions are 
distinctive because they are objects of belief and assertion, and 
so are propositions. Only propositions, or items that express 
propositions, can bear truth values. Piccadilly Circus and 
Russell’s singleton set are not propositions, and do not express 
propositions. So atomic gappy propositions are false, though 
Piccadilly Circus and Russell’s singleton are not. [Braun 2005: 
§4.1; his emphasis] 
 
Braun thinks that GPs must be propositions because they are the 
objects of belief and assertion. We can probably grant this, if we grant 
GPs at all. The whole point of introducing GPs was to have something to 
assign as the propositional contents of assertions involving empty 
names and the beliefs they express. On the other hand, admitting that 
GPs are propositions widens the category of propositions, which in turn 
makes unrestricted bivalence for propositions less appealing. We need 
an argument for the claim that all objects of belief and assertion are 
true or false, and that is a strong claim, particularly if we allow that 
 25 
 
assertions containing empty names have objects. The dialectic is 
moving in a fairly tight circle here. We’ll try to break out of it §1.13. 
Braun’s proposal has an internal coherence but it would be good if we 
could get similar results by an alternative and perhaps less 
controversial route. 
 
First, however, it is worth looking at Braun’s response to an objection to 
his truth values which he attributes to Fred Adams and Robert Stecker 
[1994]. If GPs are the semantic values of open formulas, and the 
semantic values of open formulas lack truth values, then GPs will too. 
Braun’s reply is that GPs are simply not the semantic values of open 
formulas, and he points to some differences, in particular that the 
semantic values of open formulas vary with respect to assignments and 
that of ‘Vulcan is a planet’ does not. This response seems fair enough: 
nothing forces us to say that GPs are the semantic values of open 
formulas; indeed, there is no obvious reason to say that open formulas 
have contents except relative to assignments, and relative to 
assignments their contents will not have gaps corresponding to the 
variables. So I don’t think this objection needs to worry Braun, or 
another GP theorist, but considering it may help clarify what GPs are 
supposed to be. The gaps aren’t waiting to be filled, or sometimes filled 
by some things and sometimes by others. The gaps in GPs are as stable 
as the constituents of ordinary propositions. 
 
 1.13 Other routes to pessimistic truth values 
 
The truth values assigned by the negative free logic are what we can call 
pessimistic. They are no kinder to people who say ‘Vulcan is a planet’ 
than to people who say ‘Vulcan is an ostrich’. We could have what is 
called a positive free logic, where atomic sentences containing empty 
names can be true, and that could say that ‘Vulcan is a planet’ was true 
and ‘Vulcan is an ostrich’ was still false. Andrew Bacon [2013] defends a 
positive free logic for empty names, although he is more concerned to 
 26 
 
give optimistic truth values to sentences ascribing intentional or 
referential relations than to make ‘Vulcan is a planet’ come out true. A 
different positive free logic could be optimistic about ‘Vulcan is a 
planet’, though. 
 
A two-valued negative free logic is not the only way of assigning 
pessimistic truth values, however. We could say that while atomic 
sentences containing empty names were neither true nor false, a 
disjunction of something neither true nor false with something true is 
itself true. This would correspond to the strong Kleene three valued 
logic K3. Alternatively, we could say that sentences containing 
genuinely empty names were never true or false, using the weak Kleene 
logic. Finally, we could say that they were always false, using the weak 
Kleene logic but interpreting both value 0 and ½ as kinds of falsity.4 All 
of these assignments of truth values are distinguished by having the 
values insensitive to which empty name appears in a sentence: they can 
all be substituted for one another without changing the truth value. 
 
Braun’s argument for GPs having the pessimistic truth values he takes 
them to have can be seen as metaphysical: he argues that GPs are 
propositions and then argues for their nature by analogy with other 
propositions. We can argue for pessimistic truth values, and ideally for 
the two-valued negative free logic, in a different way. We see what truth 
values we ought to assign the utterances and beliefs in question, and 
then argue that the GPs should be assigned these values because those 
are the values of the utterances and beliefs whose contents they are. 
This reasoning can either take the utterances and beliefs to be the 
primary truth-bearers and say the GPs have those values derivatively, 
                                                          
4 K3 extends the classical truth tables by saying that the negation of a sentence 
taking value ½ has value ½, a disjunction has the maximum value of its 
disjuncts and a conjunction has the minimum value of its conjuncts. Weak 
Kleene extends the classical tables by saying that any compound including a 
sentence taking value ½ gets value ½. Both are from [Kleene 1952: §64] 
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or it can take the GPs as the primary truth bearers and assign them 
these truth values to explain why the utterances and beliefs have the 
truth values they do. How exactly that goes will depend on what you 
think propositions are for. 
 
A big part of the defence of pessimism ultimately relies on the material 
in chapters three and four. These give alternative analyses of a lot of the 
uses of apparently empty names which we would be most tempted to 
assign optimistic truth values. If pessimism only applies to names 
introduced in the context of mistakes and lies, then it is more plausible. 
We will also have the option of giving optimistic truth values for 
sentences including even mistaken or mendacious names when they are 
used in attitude ascriptions. This strategy removes a lot of the data 
which the optimist might have used to support their case. 
 
With the stakes thus lowered, we can look for alternative arguments to 
Braun’s metaphysical argument. We could use a different metaphysical 
argument: sentences with empty names in them don’t express 
propositions, so they don’t have truth values, so the proper logic is 
weak Kleene, with ½ interpreted as ‘neither true nor false’. If however 
we want to argue via the truth values of the utterances and beliefs, then 
one place to start is to think about what people are trying to do when 
they assert and believe. 
 
Primarily, speakers and believers are trying to represent things 
accurately. The accuracy or inaccuracy of their representations is what 
truth-value assignments are supposed to track. Now, when someone 
says ‘Santa is coming’, they are representing just as inaccurately as 
someone who says ‘the Taj Mahal is coming’. Furthermore, when 
someone says ‘Santa isn’t coming’, knowing that ‘Santa’ doesn’t refer, 
they are representing things correctly. They know how things are, and 
they use their utterance to spread their knowledge to others. Now, if a 
child says ‘Santa isn’t coming’, maybe they aren’t representing things 
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correctly: they are trying to represent Santa staying away. This could 
motivate analysing it as [λx.¬Cx]s, rather than ¬[λx.Cx]s or ¬Cs. But in 
all these cases, the fact that the names don’t refer does not put a middle 
ground between successful and unsuccessful representation. This can 
motivate the negative free logic, which in turn can motivate assigning 
GPs the truth values Braun assigns them, to either describe or explain 
the truth values of the utterances. 
 
Is there a way to motivate the strong Kleene truth values? There may 
be, based partly on the nature of propositions and partly on the nature 
of utterances. The idea is that atomic utterances are meant to express 
atomic propositions, and get the atomic propositions’ truth values, but 
compound utterances express something different about the atomic 
propositions of their atomic sentential constituents. So if I say ‘either 
Vulcan is a planet or grass is green’, that is true if one of the disjuncts 
expresses a true proposition, false if both express false propositions, 
and truth-valueless otherwise. If I say ‘Vulcan is not a planet’, taken as a 
negation, this is true if ‘Vulcan is a planet’ expresses a false proposition, 
false if it expresses a true proposition, and truth-valueless otherwise. 
This way we don’t have to commit to GPs, but we can still have ‘either 
Vulcan is a planet or grass is green’ come out true. 
 
Another way getting truth values for the utterances without committing 
to GPs is tentatively suggested by Kripke [2013: 156-60]. The idea is to 
take some sentences, like ‘Vulcan is red’ or ‘There are no 
bandersnatches in the Arctic’ as saying that there is no true proposition 
that Vulcan exists, or no true proposition that there are bandersnatches 
in the Arctic. He doesn’t want to view this analysis as metalinguistic, 
saying that this reading would be ‘subject to the same kind of 
difficulties as the metalinguistic analysis is elsewhere’ [2013: 157]. If 
we do take it as metalinguistic – saying that ‘Vulcan is red’ does not 
express a true proposition – then it will indeed be subject to problems 
like Alonzo Church’s [1950] translation test. (The analysis makes the 
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statement about an English sentence, and so becomes implausible when 
translated into another language, since the e.g. German for “‘Vulcan is 
red’” is “‘Vulcan is red’”.) If we do not understand it that way, however, 
it seems that the new analysis won’t express a proposition either. If 
there is no proposition that bandernatches exist because there is no 
such kind of thing as a bandersnatch, then it seems there will be no 
proposition that true propositions that bandersnatches exist exist, 
because there is no such kind of thing as a true proposition that 
bandersnatches exist. Basically Kripke’s proposal assimilates all the 
problematic statements to existential statements, but the new 
existential statements are themselves just as problematic. As such, I 
don’t think Kripke’s proposal works as it stands, and we would be 
better off with one of the others. 
 
We still have a range of options, some of which involve commitment to 
GPs, and some of which don’t. Ultimately I will argue in §4.42 that a 
Fregean ontology of GPs more fine-grained than Braun’s can be well 
motivated, and this fits well with a two-valued negative free logic. 
However, we don’t have to rely on that to get pessimistic truth values 
for sentences containing genuinely empty names. Which option we go 
for will depend on how willing we are to commit to an ontology of GPs, 
and what exactly we think the relationship is between a sentence’s 
truth value and the proposition if any that it expresses. None of the 
options undermines the possibility that empty names and the sentences 
containing them can be syntactically meaningful while being 
semantically, or at least referentially, defective. We will look more at 
what the meaningfulness could amount to in §1.3. 
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1.2 Everett’s objection 
 
Anthony Everett [2003] makes the point that these three are not 
sufficiently differentiated by Braun’s theory: 
 
1. Santa Claus does not exist. 
2. Father Christmas does not exist. 
3. Hamlet does not exist. 
 
Everett says that (1) and (2) say the same thing and (3) says something 
else, or at least if this is wrong then the intuition needs explanation. 
This objection is reasonable, but it can be met, and in more than one 
way. Examining the different ways of meeting the objection will help us 
understand what is going on when people use genuinely empty names. 
 
 1.21:  A Millian solution 
 
Forgetting about empty names for a moment, consider these three 
sentences: 
 
A. New York does not exist. 
B. The Big Apple does not exist. 
C. Chicago does not exist. 
 
Here we have an analogous situation with referring names instead of 
empty ones. There is an intuition that (A) and (B) must say different 
things from each other because one could rationally believe one and not 
the other, if they thought that ‘the Big Apple’ was the English translation 
of ‘El Dorado’, for example. (C) must say something else, because it 
could be true (or truth-valueless) while the others were false. The 
intuition that (A) and (B) say different things is related to Frege’s 
[1952] argument that ‘Phosphorus is Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus is 
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Phosphorus’ must have different contents because one is informative 
and the other not, and one could believe one and not the other. 
 
Millians, especially Salmon [1986: ch. 8], tend to argue that (A) and (B) 
actually say the same thing, but (usually) suggest different modes of 
presentation when embedded in attitude contexts. The intuition Frege 
was playing off might be unsatisfied by this position, but if so then the 
Fregean should not say that (1) and (2) say the same thing either. If 
they concede that they do, then given the foregoing, all the same 
considerations might apply equally to (1), (2) and (3) saying the same 
thing, if anything. The idea is the same: that of grasping the same 
content under different modes of presentation and so believing it one 
way but not the other. Everett’s objection plays two conflicting 
intuitions off against each other: the one which individuates content by 
mode of presentation and the one which individuates contents by truth 
conditions. 
 
That was pretty quick, but it should make us think a bit harder about 
the objection and the intuitions behind it. Saying that (1) and (2) have 
the same content (or both have no content) allows for a certain amount 
of content misrecognition, and lumping (3) in with them as well could 
be more of the same. The distinctions in play here may not be 
distinctions of content. In fact, I will argue in §4.41 that the things said 
in defence of Millians here, by for example Jennifer Saul [1998], cannot 
all be applied equally to Braun’s GPs, at least when we are dealing with 
attitude ascriptions. Nonetheless, if we have accepted the idea of 
content misrecognition in one place, as the Millian must, it gives us an 
initial response to Everett. It would however be nice if the Millian could 
say something principled about what (1) and (2) have in common with 
each other but not with (3). In the next section I will give them 





 1.22: A metalinguistic solution 
  
The explanation we will give of what (1) and (2) have in common with 
each other but not with (3) need not be confined to cases involving 
empty names. The same phenomenon probably arises in cases such as 
Kripke’s [1979] ‘Pierre’ and ‘Paderewski’ puzzles about belief, and 
Salmon’s [1986: §7.2] puzzle about Elmer and Bugsy Wabbit5. It will 
however plausibly apply to any puzzle involving empty names similar 
to Everett’s. The explanation uses Donnellan’s [1974] metalinguistic 
notion of a block, which he introduces to give truth conditions for 
singular existentials. ‘Block’ is not rigorously defined, but is supposed to 
capture the idea of a name being introduced without successfully 
attaching to a referent. He puts forward this rule: 
 
(R) If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative 
statements with the intention to refer to some individual, 
then ˹N does not exist˺ is true if and only if the history of 
those uses ends in a block. [Donnellan 1974: 25]6 
 
(R) is not meant to give the meaning of ‘N does not exist’, but it is 
supposed to be true. ‘Zeus exists’ is not synonymous with ‘The history 
of “Zeus” does not end in a block’, because the former sentence is not 
about ‘Zeus’ (or blocks) and the latter is. Donnellan is aware that he has 
not given an analysis, but (assuming everything exists and that negative 
existentials containing empty names are true) he is right about the rule, 
                                                          
5 The Pierre puzzle is more discussed in the literature, but the Paderewski 
puzzle is in some ways harder. The extra complication is that ‘Paderewski’, if it 
is equivocal at all, is only so in the believer’s idiolect. The same issue arises in 
Salmon’s puzzle. There is more discussion of these puzzles in the next chapter. 
6Donnellan’s formulation ‘proper name that has been used in predicative 
statements with the intention to refer to some individual’ may incidentally 
help us to get a handle on what it would take for something to be syntactically 
a name but lack a semantic value. 
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since the histories of all and only empty names will end in blocks. Fred 
Adams and Robert Stecker [1994] say that on Donnellan’s view, if a 
negative existential statement expresses a proposition, it must be the 
metalinguistic proposition that the name does not refer, or that its 
history leads to a block. 
 
Although Donnellan gives us the ‘truth’ rule (R), he never tells us 
exactly which proposition 'Vulcan does not exist' expresses. One 
possible proposition expressed is ‘“Vulcan” does not refer’. 
Indeed, other than our view that no proposition is expressed, 
this is the only possibility we can think of for a proposition 
expressed (dismissing description theories, as Donnellan does). 
[Adams and Stecker 1994: 395] 
 
As I read Donnellan, he definitely does not think that the metalinguistic 
proposition is what is expressed. He discusses the issue in §7 of his 
paper, and seems fairly clear that the metalinguistically expressed 
truth-conditions of an utterance come apart from the proposition 
expressed by that utterance, even in non-empty cases. ‘Cicero is wise’ is 
true iff the referent of ‘Cicero’ is wise, while ‘Tully is wise’ is true iff the 
referent of ‘Tully’ is wise, even though they express the same 
proposition. He does not settle on an answer for the proposition 
expressed by a sentence like ‘Vulcan does not exist’. Braun thinks it 
expresses a GP, and it is obvious that if there are GPs then they are 
candidate contents for ‘Vulcan does not exist’, in competition with the 
metalinguistic content which Donnellan rejects. 
 
Donnellan worries that ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ and the French ‘Père 
Noël n’existe pas’ will not turn out to be translations of one another, 
because they involve different names. However, different names’ 
histories do not always lead back to different blocks. The referent of 
‘London’, if any, must be the same as that of ‘Londres’ and ‘Londinium’, 
because the histories of those three names all (let’s assume) converge, 
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dividing either by corruption or translation, but leading back to the use 
of a single name7. Likewise with ‘Father Christmas’, ‘Santa Claus’ and 
‘Père Noël’. Donnellan recognizes this: 
 
...in the example before us, and others one can think of, our 
inclination to say that people using different empty names 
express the same negative existence proposition seems to be a 
matter of historical connection between the blocks involved. In 
our example, it seems to me that the reason we think both 
children express the same proposition is that the story of Santa 
Claus and the story of Père Noël, the stories passed on to the two 
children as if they were actual, have a common root. And if there 
were not this common history, I think we should rather hold that 
the two children believed similar, perhaps, but not identical 
falsehoods... [Donnellan 1974: 30] 
 
Now we have something to say to Everett. Since the histories of ‘Santa 
Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ converge as they are traced back, it will 
have to be the same block for each name. The two uses of ‘Bugsy 
Wabbit’ in Elmer’s idiolect in Salmon’s puzzle are similar. There are 
facts about history from which it follows (given some facts about how 
reference is determined and transmitted) that (1) is true iff (2) is true. 
It also follows that if ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ refer, then 
                                                          
7 The idea of the history ending (starting?) in a block should be taken with a 
pinch of salt. Gareth Evans [1973; 1982: ch.11] points out that the connection 
between a name and its referent is more complicated than a simple baptism 
followed by transmission of reference from speaker to speaker. Names can 
probably become empty, cease to be empty, and change referent. However, 
while this makes the situation more complicated, it should not change the 
consequences for the present argument. The required convergence is that the 
histories of use converge more recently than any changes in the referents of 
the names, so they have the referent now that the name had then, if any, and 
otherwise no referent. 
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‘Santa Claus is Father Christmas’ will be true. This does not mean ‘Santa 
Claus is Father Christmas’ is actually true8. (Depending on our other 
commitments, we could have an intensional predicate tracking the 
metalinguistic phenomenon, such that ‘s.c. ≈ f.c.’ was true. I include this 
option in the semantics given in the appendix to chapter three.) 
Donnellan wants to say that there are particular truths and falsehoods 
being believed here, and that (1) and (2) have the same contents and 
(3) has a third. We need not commit ourselves to anything that strong 
at this point, since all we want to do is point to something that (1) and 
(2) share with each other and not with (3), to explain the undeniable 
feeling that they do. However, perhaps we do also want to commit 
ourselves to some kind of sameness of content. 
 
 1.23: A Fregean solution 
 
Sam Cumming [2007, 2008, forthcoming] identifies a level of content he 
calls discourse content9. This is a kind of Fregean content constituted by 
discourse entities, which are socially constructed abstract objects which 
form the scoreboards in language games, in the terminology of Lewis 
[1979]. I will go into Cumming’s view in more detail in §2.12, but for 
                                                          
8 It is tempting here to use the connection between existence and identity to 
argue the point, saying that existence is being something, so identity 
statements involving empty names must be false. It’s a defective argument 
though, because if Santa is said to be identical to Santa, and Santa is not 
something, then the identity statement doesn’t entail the existential one. We 
need to argue on independent grounds that the identity statement is false, and 
give an alternative account of the connection between the two names which 
denies that they are coreferential, or that the identity statement is true. That is 
what I am doing. 
9 It may understate Cumming’s ambitions to call it just a level of content. I will 
not get into whether it is the primary level here though, the important thing 
being that Cumming offers us a way to say what (1) and (2) have in common if 
we are willing to reify a certain level of content. 
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now the important thing is the idea of having a level of content which 
isn’t individuated by what is represented, but by what is being done to 
try to represent the world. Even if these attempts are unsuccessful, we 
can talk about the attempts. If they are attempts which more than one 
person can participate in, for example by using the same word in 
deference to the same people, then we can get a level of content 
capturing interpersonal generalizations off the ground. This is what 
Cumming does. We could think of it as a kind of metalinguistic content, 
or since not all attempts to represent the world are linguistic, 
metarepresentational content. David Chalmers [2011] does something 
similar when he constructs something like Fregean senses out of A-
intensions, which are functions from epistemically possible scenarios to 
semantic values. 
 
Gillian Russell [2008] offers another proposal which would allow us to 
cash out Donnellan’s suggestion, this time without invoking an extra 
level of content. She proposes to rehabilitate the analytic/synthetic 
distinction by thinking of analyticity as truth in virtue of reference 
determiner. Some things are done to make words have the referents 
they have, if any, such as pointing, baptizing or using indexicals. 
Sometimes these things are enough to ensure that utterances of those 
sentences are true. For Russell, these are the analytic sentences. ‘I am 
here now’ is one of her examples, following Kaplan [1989: 508-9]. 
Perhaps a more common situation is when a sentence will be true in 
virtue of reference determiner unless there is reference failure, in 
which case they might not be true. She calls these pseudo-analytic 
[2008: 100-5]. ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is a straightforward example, and 
she offers ‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius Clay’ as a less trivial example10. If 
                                                          
10 The reason this works is that (let’s suppose) one name was used in fixing 
the reference of the other: “The referent of Mohammed Ali was introduced in a 
slightly different way, when Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the Nation of 
Islam, said Let’s use ‘Mohammed Ali’ to name Cassius Clay. Mohammed Ali thus 
refers to whatever object, if any, Cassius Clay refers to.” [Russell 2008: 58-9] 
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we buy into this, we can say that two sentences are pseudo-analytically 
equivalent iff their reference determiners ensure that they have the 
same truth values if any. Now we can say that (1) and (2) are pseudo-
analytically equivalent, as are any sentences with ‘Santa Claus’ 
substituted for ‘Father Christmas’ or vice versa. We can also say that 
‘Father Christmas’ and ‘Père Noël’ are pseudo-analytic translations of 
one another, in that they would be suitable translations for producing 
pseudo-analytically equivalent French and English sentences. Obviously 
the other words would have to be pseudo-analytically translated too, 
which might be difficult in many cases, but it should at least allay 
Donnellan’s worry that ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ and ‘Père Noel 
n’existe pas’ will not turn out to be translations of each other. Even if we 
ultimately decide they have no content worthy of the name, we can still 
say that they are pseudo-analytic translations in this sense. 
 
Russell’s proposal does not demand that sentences containing empty 
names have contents, because their reference determiners may fail to 
give them one. If two sentences are pseudo-analytically equivalent, the 
reference determiners of both will succeed or fail together, and the 
truth values if any will always be the same. A difference between empty 
and non-empty names is that the latter can co-refer even if their 
reference determiners do not demand it. The histories of ‘Phosphorus’ 
and ‘Hesperus’, for example, do not converge until you get to Venus 
itself and the initial baptisms11. This special kind of convergence is 
unavailable for empty names: two empty names cannot have been 
successfully used to baptize the same object because they were not 
successfully used to baptize any object. We could however have two 
                                                          
11 One might think they have converged now because everyone either knows 
that the morning star is the evening star or defers to someone who does. This 
kind of thing means that any uncontroversial example of non-convergence 
would have been a controversial example of co-reference. We can however say 
uncontroversially that ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ used to be an example of 
co-reference without convergence. 
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empty names which were analytic translations of each other without 
their histories converging, if their references were fixed by the same 
descriptions. Thus if two isolated communities both introduced a name 
for the thing than which none greater could be conceived, or the set of 
all non-self-members, they could be said to be having pseudo-
analytically equivalent thoughts and making pseudo-analytically 
equivalent utterances even if the names were empty. I don’t see this 




1.3 Empty names and truth theories 
 
 1.31: Davidsonian theories of meaning 
 
The rest of this chapter is about Donald Davidson’s idea of using truth 
theories for languages as theories of meaning for those languages12. 
This relates to the present project in two ways. First, we have argued 
for assigning pessimistic truth values to sentences containing empty 
names. If the truth theory for the language is meant to serve as its 
theory of meaning, then we need to make sure the truth values we 
assign do not generate implausible consequences for the theory of 
meaning. Also, if we can fit genuinely empty names into a Davidsonian 
theory of meaning, this gives at least one framework for understanding 
how names and sentences can be meaningful (and learnable) while 
being semantically defective in the way we have suggested. This applies 
to David Braun’s proposal on which sentences involving empty names 
express Russellian GPs, but similar issues will arise for any theory 
evaluating sentences according to a negative free logic, including the 
system of Fregean gappy propositions I will cautiously endorse in 
§3.42. The discussion in §1.33 especially will tie in with that, 
introducing Fregean elements into Davidson’s proposal. In short, we are 
interested in Davidson’s framework for two reasons: we want to show 
that negative free-logical treatment of empty names does not clash with 
it, and it might provide one way of understanding how there could be a 
theory of meaning for a language containing genuinely empty names. 
                                                          
12 Davidson [1965] introduces the idea as a constraint on interpreting a 
language, on the grounds that a language which couldn’t be given an axiomatic 
truth theory would be unlearnable. He develops the idea in several other 
papers, most of which are in Davidson [1984]. Notable contributions to the 
programme by others are Davies [1981], Evans [1981] and Larson and Segal 
[1995]. It is possible that Davidson himself viewed the role of a theory of 
meaning slightly differently from his successors; I am thinking of it in terms of 




So, what is a Davidsonian theory of meaning? One way to view a theory 
of meaning is as the set of propositions you need to know to be able to 
understand a language. Maybe you need some non-propositional 
knowledge too, or some skill which isn’t knowledge at all, but it is 
reasonable to say you need at least some propositional knowledge. This 
applies to speakers, and it also applies to people who study the 
speakers and say what they mean. Davidson’s idea is that the theory of 
truth for the language can serve as a theory of meaning, or be 
systematically transformed into one. Now we need to know what a 
theory of truth is. 
 
A truth theory for a language is one where for each sentence of that 
language there is a T-sentence in the metalanguage, of this form: 
 
 ‘S’ is true iff _____ 
 
These T-sentences would be true whenever the blank was filled by a 
sentence with the same truth value as ‘S’. To serve as a theory of 
meaning, however, the truth theory must be interpretive. This means 
that the blank must be filled by a sentence of the metalanguage 
synonymous with ‘S’, and then the T-sentence can give the meaning of 
‘S’. For example: 
 
 ‘La neige est blanche’ is true iff snow is white. 
 
This is the T-sentence for ‘La neige est blanche’, where French is the 
object language and English is the metalanguage. The hope is that 
somebody could know a language by internalizing the contents of T-
sentences for indefinitely many sentences of that language, by deriving 
them from finitely many axioms giving the semantic values of the words 
in the language and the ways the values of complex expressions depend 
on the values of their simpler parts. If someone knew the content of an 
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interpretive truth theory for a language, that would be all the 
information they would need to understand the language. They would 
also probably need some practice at using it, but no new information.  
 
There is an objection to (this retelling of) Davidson which is worth 
addressing here because it illuminates how this sort of thing is meant to 
work. The concern is that interpretive truth theories cannot be 
informative because all the T-sentences might be like the following 
uninformative-looking sentence: 
 
T ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white. 
 
This would happen (at least for the context-independent fragment of 
the language) if the metalanguage contained the object language. Hilary 
Putnam objects along these lines [1975: 258-62]. As Putnam tells it, 
Davidson sounds to have been a little cowed by this objection in 
conversation, but I don’t think there is reason to be cowed by it now. 
There are two issues here. First, it is useless for you to give me a theory 
of meaning for (without loss of generality) English if you do it in 
English. This is to be expected though: either I will not understand the 
theory (because I don’t speak English) or I will already have the 
information (because I do). Second, it seems that sentences like T can’t 
contain any information because they are trivial instances of the 
disquotation schema. This isn’t right either though, since a theory of 
meaning is a set of propositions, not a set of sentences. It happens that 
we have a convention according to which propositions like that 
expressed by T can be expressed by sentences which, given how the 
meanings of their words are determined, could not be false. (This 
makes the sentences analytic, or at least pseudo-analytic, in Gillian 
Russell’s sense.) T is such a sentence. The speakers will not be able to 
internalize the proposition (in the first instance) under this mode of 
presentation though, because they don’t understand the language. They 
will have to learn it under a different mode of presentation. The 
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proposition expressed by T is a non-trivial, contingent proposition 
about a sentence, snow and whiteness, and it is the proposition you 
need to know to decide whether to assent to ‘snow is white’ or not. 
 
One might press the objection that someone could, on encountering an 
unfamiliar sentence of a familiar language, apply the disquotation 
schema to produce an interpretive T-sentence without thereby coming 
to know what the unfamiliar sentence meant. The correct response is 
that while they would know that the T-sentence they produced was 
true, they would not form a belief with the T-sentence’s content 
because they would not understand the sentence. You might as well 
have given them a T-sentence in an unfamiliar language and told them 
it was true. 
 
We should bear in mind then that a T-theory, insofar as it is internalized 
by competent speakers, is embodied by a system of beliefs, not a system 
of natural language sentences. Each competent speaker, insofar as they 
are competent, will have a system of beliefs which have the same 
contents (if any) as the sentences of an interpretive truth theory for the 
language, and which would be correctly verbally expressed by giving 
such a theory. We can call the beliefs corresponding to the T-sentences 
T-beliefs. Call the beliefs corresponding to axioms of the T-theories A-
beliefs. Since these beliefs may correspond to empty name sentences, 
they may lack contents or at least have gappy contents. The next 
chapter will include an explanation of how the speakers’ deductions can 
be valid even if the beliefs suffer from referential or intentional failure, 
which helps make sense of A-beliefs with gappy contents or no contents 
featuring as axioms of the speakers’ internalized T-theories. Now we 
have a sense of how Davidson’s idea works, we can see how empty 






 1.32 The Davidsonian problem of empty names 
 
The principal issue with empty names arises because the meanings of 
the words in a language are supposed to be fixed by the truth theory for 
that language internalized by its competent speakers. That is how we 
distinguish the true interpretive T-theories from the true 
uninterpretive ones. The worry is that the only things fixing the 
meaning of an empty name are the speakers’ A-beliefs saying what it 
refers to, and these beliefs are not true. As such, it seems like there is 
nothing left to give meaning to an empty name at all, and yet the 
speakers seem to understand each other. What do they know that non-
speakers of the language don’t? 
 
The axiom for ‘Vulcan’, for example, is this: 
 
 (V) ‘Vulcan’ refers to Vulcan. 
 
It must be so, because the speakers, not knowing that ‘Vulcan’ is an 
empty name, internalize an axiom much like the one for a non-empty 
name, e.g.: 
 
 (P) ‘Pluto’ refers to Pluto. 
 
However, while (P) is true, (V) is on my account not true. Its truth 
condition is that the value of ‘“Vulcan”’ refers to the value of ‘Vulcan’. 
There is no value of ‘Vulcan’, so (V) is not true. This is fine in principle, 
because (V) simply captures the belief of the speakers that ‘Vulcan’ is 
non-empty, and their corresponding belief that Vulcan exists. They are 
indeed wrong about this, so it is understandable that the corresponding 
A-beliefs would not be true. This captures what they are getting wrong, 





 1.33 Semantic competence and semantic ignorance 
 
We can start by pointing out that (V) is not really the only thing 
competent speakers internalize. They also know that ‘Vulcan’ is a name. 
This way they know how to get truth conditions for sentences in which 
it occurs. This may not sound like much, but we will see that it is all we 
need if the only meaning facts about ‘Vulcan’ are that it is a name and 
that it does not refer. The speakers are right that it is a name and wrong 
to think it refers to anything. That is the right result: they have the 
name’s syntax right and its semantics wrong. 
 
The reason this may be no bar to their understanding the language is 
that it may not give them any false or uninterpretive T-beliefs. Since 
what you come across and come out with when using a language are 
sentences, if you understand the meanings of those then you can 
understand the language well enough to use it. If someone asks you 
about the semantics of the language – for example if they ask you what 
‘Vulcan’ refers to – you will give the wrong answer. This is not a 
problem of language mastery though, or at least not the aspect of 
language mastery which the Davidsonian approach is trying to account 
for, i.e. the ability to use a language as opposed to the ability to talk 
about it.13 
                                                          
13 The view that the T-sentences are the only part of the T-theory constitutive 
of language mastery can be separated from the view, also associated with 
Davidson, that dispositions to respond to sentences are the only evidence 
admissible to the linguist in setting up a theory of meaning. Putnam [1975: 
258-262] is understandably critical of this, saying that in practice and in 
theory the linguist can learn what words mean by asking speakers directly. 
Even if we hold that (beliefs in) T-sentences are constitutive of language-
mastery, we can still agree with Putnam that information about semantic 
axioms is admissible evidence, because the T-sentences are derived from the 
axioms and so information about axioms is evidence for what the T-sentences 




We have the makings of a Davidsonian explanation for the speakers’ 
incorrect semantic axioms not interfering with their language mastery. 
What about our language mastery? We don’t believe the false axioms, 
but it isn’t very plausible that to master a language you need to join its 
speakers in their ignorance – semantic ignorance – of which names are 
empty. A truth-theory with true axioms as well as true T-sentences, 
perhaps as established by the field linguist but in any case known by 
anyone who knows all the semantic facts about the language (rather 
than just enough to speak it), will presumably contain this sentence 
instead of (V): 
 
(V*) ‘Vulcan’ has no referent. 
 
The truth theory internalized by the speakers of a language does fix the 
syntactic categories of the expressions, presumably, but it cannot 
guarantee that the names have referents. This reflects that the 
speakers’ implicit beliefs about their language’s syntax are not fallible in 
the way that their implicit beliefs about semantics are. To be in a 
syntactic category a word just has to be used as such, whereas to have a 
referent its history needs not to end in a block. 
 
Replacing (V) with (V*) in the field linguist’s theory of meaning is not a 
complete solution to the problem, however, because the speakers will 
also have T-beliefs they would express like this: 
 
 (VP) ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is true iff Vulcan is a planet. 
 
This sentence is (at least according to the negative free logic argued for 
in §1.1) true, since it is a biconditional both sides of which are false. It is 
                                                                                                                                                   
when we ask the speakers what a name means they will still answer falsely, 
e.g. by saying ‘“Vulcan” refers to Vulcan’. 
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also interpretive, since if ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is meaningful at all then the 
right-hand side of the biconditional is a fine translation. For the 
speakers to derive (VP) is easy, because they have internalized (V), and 
they can derive it the same way they derive (PP) using (P): 
 
(PP) ‘Pluto is a planet’ is true iff Pluto is a planet. 
 
The conscientious field linguist has more trouble, because she wants to 
put a synonym of ‘Vulcan is a planet’ on the right hand side, but has no 
word ‘Vulcan’ in her language. Why should she? Empty names are 
introduced by accident. Unless we have a very good reason for thinking 
otherwise, it makes sense to hold that everything true should be 
statable in a language that contains no empty names. Cian Dorr says 
something similar about translating ‘phlogiston’ into a language used by 
people who never came up with a phlogiston theory: 
 
It would be absurd for the Tritonians [who never came up with 
the phlogiston theory] to advocate linguistic reform on the 
grounds that without a new word, they will be unable to express 
the fact about chemistry expressed in English by the sentence 
‘there is no phlogiston’. And their lack of any word equivalent to 
‘phlogiston’ need not, intuitively, prevent them from stating a 
perfectly excellent semantic theory for English. [Dorr 2005: §16] 
 
How easy it is to meet this desideratum will depend on how much there 
is to the meaning of a genuinely empty name. In this section we see 
what we can do if the only facts about a genuinely empty name’s 
meaning are that it is empty and that it is a name. If there is more to the 
meaning of a genuinely empty name than this, the account in §1.34 may 
be more appropriate, even though it may not be able to fully eliminate 




Since (VP) contains ‘Vulcan’, the linguist needs another interpretive T-
sentence which only includes words in her own language or respectable 
additional technical terms. She knows (V*), that ‘Vulcan’ is a name, that 
the value of ‘is a planet’ is {x: x is a planet}, that ‘is a planet’ is a 
predicate, and that a sentence of the form [name]^[predicate] is true iff 
the value of the name is a member of the value of the predicate. I can 
offer two possible solutions. They complicate the canonical derivations 
of T-sentences but not in any damaging way, since the truth values of 
the object language sentences and the T-sentences for straightforward 
cases are left the same as before.  
 
The simplest solution is this: whenever she comes across an atomic 
sentence which must be false because it contains an empty name she 
replaces the sentence with a sentential constant ‘’, which is defined as 
being always false. So instead of (VP), she has this: 
 
 (VP*) ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is true iff . 
 
This captures only that ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is semantically defective 
with the effect of always being false. If this is all there is to say about the 
meaning of ‘Vulcan is a planet’, then (VP*) is interpretive. Braun thinks 
there is more to its meaning: it expresses the GP represented by <__, 
planethood>. In that case, what we need is a term in the language to 
indicate the semantic defectiveness of ‘Vulcan’ without entailing the 
complete defectiveness of ‘Vulcan is a planet’ and the like. We can use 
‘__’. It is arguably not an empty name because is not a name at all; it is 
just a term whose semantic rule is that where it appears in an atomic 
sentence that sentence is false. If this is enough to make it a name, 
perhaps we can console ourselves with the fact there is only one of it. 
Where our conscientious linguist comes across an empty name N, she 
derives T-sentences by applying the canonical rules to the axiom ‘N 
refers to __’. There is nothing to stop her doing this, and the fact that ‘N 
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refers to __’ is false does not matter, since she does not believe that 
axiom. If we choose this option the T-sentence will be (VP**): 
 
 (VP**) ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is true iff __ is a planet. 
 
(VP**) may be an improvement even if we don’t want GPs. Even if 
‘Vulcan is a planet’ expresses no proposition gappy or otherwise, it is 
still plausibly about planethood, which (VP*) does not capture, and so 
(VP*) is arguably not interpretive. In any case, this solution is at least 
safer than that using ‘’. If Braun is right and the contents of atomic 
sentences with empty names are GPs, ‘’ is not fine-grained enough to 
accommodate the rich variety of contents. If he is wrong and they all 
mean the same thing – nothing more than is needed for them to be false 
– then sentences like ‘__ is a planet’ will mean that too. So we may as 
well go for the latter option. ‘__ is a planet’ (and ‘’ if you prefer that 
option) are both well-formed sentences and enter into compounds like 
any others, so we get the correct result that the interpretive truth 
theory contains T-sentences like this: 
 
‘Vulcan is a planet or grass is green’ is true iff __ is a planet or 
grass is green. 
 
Two more examples:  
 
 ‘Father Christmas is Santa Claus’ is true iff __ is __. 
 
 ‘“Vulcan” refers to Vulcan’ is true iff ‘Vulcan’ refers to __. 
 
This gets us what was wanted. In particular, it captures the speakers’ 
mistake in thinking that a name is not empty, while explaining their 
ability to understand their language because their T-beliefs are all true 
and interpretive. However, someone learning the language but knowing 
that the names are empty is also able to learn an interpretive T-theory, 
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but derived from a set of axioms modified to say correctly that the 
empty names have no referents, and expressed in a metalanguage 
which contains no empty names itself. This is what Dorr and I wanted. 
 
 1.34 More tentative semantic axioms 
 
If the worst thing about the proposal we have just seen was that it 
attributed false A-beliefs to the speakers, this would probably not be a 
problem. The speakers do think ‘Vulcan’ refers to Vulcan, and that’s 
false. If we give them credit for thinking ‘Mars’ refers to Mars, why not 
criticize them for thinking ‘Vulcan’ refers to Vulcan? This is not the only 
odd thing about the proposal though. The odd thing is that it doesn’t 
distinguish between the meanings of any empty names, and so ‘Vulcan 
is a planet’ comes out synonymous with ‘Santa is a planet’. Now, Braun 
thinks that they do indeed have the same content, and in §1.21 and 
§1.22 we saw how you might defend this. But maybe we still want to 
say they have different contents, and so “‘Vulcan is a planet’ is true iff __ 
is a planet” will not count as an interpretive T-sentence. For that, we 
need another proposal. 
 
Mark Sainsbury [2005] provides one. His idea is to replace the semantic 
axioms for names with universally quantified ones with this form: 
 
∀x[‘n’ refers to x ↔ x = n] 
 
According to the two-valued negative free logic Sainsbury works with, 
these will be true when ‘n’ refers, but they will also be true when ‘n’ is 
empty. The T-sentences will follow from these more tentative semantic 
axioms just as they do in the original proposal. This takes speakers as 
having true A-beliefs, even when they think the name is non-empty, 
because this existential commitment is not a commitment about 
meaning. As I said, not much turns on the truth of the speakers’ A-
beliefs: they are wrong about something and it does not affect their 
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language mastery, and whether we call their ignorance strictly semantic 
is not a particularly substantive issue. There are two more important 
features of Sainsbury’s proposal, one welcome and one potentially 
unwelcome. 
 
The welcome feature is that the field linguist can believe the universally 
quantified semantic axioms, whatever they think about whether the 
name refers. From this they can derive T-sentences like “‘Vulcan is a 
planet’ is true iff Vulcan is a planet”. We could even say “‘Vulcan is a 
planet’ means that Vulcan is a planet”, where ‘means’ is taken to be a 
relation between an expression and the proposition referred to by the 
following ‘that’ clause.14 This lets us say that T-theories have to put the 
right empty names in the right places to count as interpretive. This is 
how things should be if we agree, with the proponents of 
metarepresentational content but perhaps against Braun, that empty 
names are not all synonymous. This set-up also allows us to say that co-
referring names need not be synonymous. 
 
The potentially unwelcome feature of this account is that we lose Dorr’s 
desideratum that it should be possible to give a theory of meaning for a 
language containing empty names in a language which doesn’t contain 
correspondingly empty names. I agreed that this desideratum had some 
intuitive appeal. Is there anything we can say to feel better about not 
meeting it? Perhaps it would help to recall the newly tentative semantic 
axioms, and how they don’t commit us to the names not being empty. 
Using a name and thinking it non-empty are just two different things. 
                                                          
14 For a concrete proposal of a formal language admitting that kind of 
sentence, we could fit it into the language given in the appendix to chapter 
three. It would be formalized as MEANS(‘Pv’, THAT(Pv)), where ‘Pv’ refers to 
an expression and THAT(Pv) refers to a proposition. MEANS would work much 
like BEL, taking a term in the first position and a proterm (propositional term) 
in the second. 
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But it still seems weird that we need empty names to express all the 
facts. 
 
Let’s step back and think about what the information is that we’re using 
the empty name to capture. It is the sense of the name. Saying “the 
sense of ‘Santa’” won’t do, if for no other reason then because we are 
trying to get acquainted with the sense of ‘Santa’ under a mode of 
presentation other than using the description ‘the sense of “Santa”’15. In 
principle, we could however presumably find out everything there was 
to know about the sense of the name, and present this information in 
such a way that we could have an operator O which combined with an 
appropriate expression E of this information to produce a term with the 
sense of the name we started with. Then we could have semantic 
axioms which looked like this: 
 
∀x[‘n’ refers to x ↔ x = O(E)] 
 
These don’t contain any empty names as primitive expressions, and 
since ‘O(E)’ is stipulated to have the same sense as ‘n’, the resultant T-
theory will presumably be interpretive. It won’t be practical to use this 
method, but that is to be expected: it really isn’t practical to capture the 
sense of the word ‘Santa’ without using the word or a synonym. But in 
principle, we probably could, and it is only our limitations as 
                                                          
15 Kripke [2011d: 343-4] makes the similar point that the motivation of 
computability theory speaks in favour of what Quine [1961: 330] 
disparagingly called a ‘frankly inequalitarian attitude towards the various 
ways of specifying [a] number’. Just as ‘f(x)’ is not an informative answer to 
‘what is f(x)?’, ‘the sense of “Santa”’ is not an informative answer to ‘what is 
the sense of “Santa”?’. This objection is different from Putnam’s objection 
discussed in §1.31, as can be seen if we translate the parts of the T-theories 
into another language. ‘Santa’ will still appear on both sides even when the 
metalanguage is not homophonic, whereas in the kind of case Putnam is 
talking about it wouldn’t. 
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investigators and speakers that force us to use the shortcut. Perhaps 






There are lots of ways people use apparently empty names. This 
chapter has been about the worst kinds of case: names which are 
introduced in the contexts of mistakes and lies. People use them to try 
to represent the world, and in a sense they seem to be failing. On the 
other hand, the names seem to be meaningful in some sense, and there 
seems to be a difference between people who understand the names 
and people who don’t. We have been trying to make sense of this. 
 
§1.1 was mostly about assigning truth values to utterances containing 
genuinely empty names. David Braun has one proposal, involving gappy 
propositions (GPs). Utterances containing genuinely empty names 
express GPs, and GPs have truth values assigned in accordance with a 
two-valued negative free logic. The commitment to GPs is neither 
innocuous nor outrageous, and we looked at some other ways of 
assigning truth values to the utterances in question. The main claim was 
that we can assign pessimistic truth values to the utterances, at least in 
extensional contexts, and there is a reasonable case for using the two-
valued negative free logic Braun uses. 
 
A consequence of the pessimistic truth values is that you will be able to 
freely substitute one genuinely empty name for another (at least in 
extensional contexts) without affecting the truth value. If Braun is right, 
then it won’t affect the sentence’s content either. §1.2 thus considered 
Anothony Everett’s objection that Braun’s position does not have the 
resources to explain what ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ have in 
common with each other that they don’t have in common with ‘Hamlet’. 
We saw that it may be open to Braun to use some of the resources 
Millians use to challenge some other intuitions about co-referring 
names. Even if this does not ultimately work, we can still explain what 
needs explaining in metalinguistic or metarepresentational terms, 
following Donnellan. The metarepresentational explanation offers some 
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resources for classifying utterances by a level of metarepresentational 
content, following Cumming and Chalmers. Alternatively we can 
regiment the phenomena using Gillian Russell’s notion of pseudo-
analyticity, without committing to a level of content. 
 
§1.3 was about Davidsonian theories of meaning. While we seemed to 
be able to make sense of what would follow from names being 
meaningful but genuinely empty, situating them within a Davidsonian 
theory gives a specific proposal for explaining how such names are 
possible. It also removes the potential objection that genuinely empty 
names cannot be meaningful because the Davidsonian theory is correct 
and they can’t fit into it. The Davidsonian problem of empty names is 
that the competent speakers’ semantic axioms fixing the meanings of 
empty names will all be false, leaving nothing in virtue of which for the 
names to be meaningful. We saw two possible responses to this. We can 
say that the speakers’ semantic axioms are false but their T-beliefs are 
nonetheless true and interpretive, explaining their semantic 
competence. This solution was most plausible if the only facts about 
empty names’ meanings are that they are names and they are empty. If 
there are other meaning facts to capture, we can get an interpretive T-
theory, for the speakers and for the linguist who knows the names are 
empty, by adopting Sainsbury’s proposal for non-existentially 
committing semantic axioms. While this seems to mean that not all facts 
are statable in a language containing no empty names, we saw that this 
limitation may be practical rather than theoretical, which might be less 
of a problem. 
 
The account in this chapter is only supposed to apply to the worst cases 
of apparently empty names. Other uses will not be treated so 
pessimistically, as we will see in chapter three when we look at attitude 
ascriptions, and in chapter four when we look at fictional names. First, 
however, we need to look at the beliefs people have corresponding to 
 55 
 
the kind of usage we have dealt with in this chapter, and the deductions 
people make involving those beliefs. That is the topic of chapter two.  
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The last chapter was mostly about language. This chapter is about 
thought. It is reasonable to suspect that if there are linguistic practices 
involving names without referents then they will give rise to beliefs, or 
at least mental states like beliefs, that are not about things in the world 
in the way ordinary beliefs are. Exposure to communicative practices 
involving the referring name ‘Winston Churchill’ and the empty name 
‘Santa’ induce psychological states in a child which are intrinsically the 
same kinds of thing, and which are commonly described as beliefs 
about Churchill and Santa. The latter are instances of the kind of thing 
which this chapter is about. We can call such psychological states 
‘gappy beliefs’, while remaining neutral on whether gappy beliefs are 
really beliefs. Perhaps to count as a belief a state has to have a 
propositional content, and I won’t return to the issue of gappy beliefs’ 
contents until chapter three. Instead of talking in terms of contents, this 
chapter will talk about beliefs (and gappy beliefs) and the things and 
properties they are about. We will also postpone discussion of attitude 
ascriptions to chapter three: now we are concerned with the attitudes 
themselves (a cognitive phenomenon), rather than our ascriptions of 
them (a linguistic phenomenon). 
 
A lot of this chapter will be about Frege’s puzzle about co-referring 
names and the corresponding beliefs. This is because the puzzles both 
arise from a mismatch between beliefs and the things they are beliefs 
about. Frege’s puzzles arise when we have co-reference, and empty 
name puzzles arise when we have no reference. To explain how gappy 
beliefs fit into an account of the relationship between beliefs and the 
things they are about, we first need an account to fit them into. Such an 
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account needs to be able to deal with the various forms of Frege’s 
puzzle. 
 
This chapter has two parts. §2.1 motivates a solution to Frege’s puzzle 
at the level of individual psychology, rather than at the level of 
communication or linguistic meaning. I discuss communication-based 
accounts with specific reference to Sam Cumming’s [2007, 2008, 
forthcoming] account in terms of discourse content, but I argue that 
consideration of Saul Kripke’s [1979] puzzle about belief leads to a 
dilemma which no communication-based account can solve.  
 
§2.2 presents my preferred psychological solution. I consider views 
which take belief tokens to have their truth-conditions explained by the 
language of thought hypothesis defended by Jerry Fodor [1975, 2008]. 
While Fodor’s solution would work, the hypothesis is controversial and 
substantive and I will try to get by without it. Drawing in particular on 
work by Kit Fine [2003, 2009], I examine some less controversial folk-
psychological assumptions which would be explained by the language 
of thought hypothesis but do not presuppose it. I consider some 
objections to Fine’s key concept of co-ordination based on work by 
Timothy Williamson and Laura Schroeter, and defend the concept 
against them. With the concept found to be in good standing, I argue 
These assumptions are all we need to explain the data thrown up by 
Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles. I give a fairly formal framework 
embodying these assumptions, which lets us say when someone’s 
beliefs are inconsistent or when their deductions are valid, without 
invoking the contents of their attitudes. Instead we talk about the 
potential contents or objects of their attitudes, as constrained by the co-
ordination relations between them. Once we have done that, I 
demonstrate that it is simple to accommodate gappy beliefs, and to 
allow deductions involving them to be governed by rational norms in 
the way that deductions involving ordinary beliefs are. 
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2.1 Frege’s puzzle 
 
Frege’s puzzle is a family of problems which arise when speakers are 
unaware that two names, or two classes of occurrences of the same 
name, refer to the same thing16. For example (ignoring the fact that they 
are fictional), Lois Lane doesn’t know that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ 
co-refer. She has conflicting beliefs about him, for example she has a 
belief that he can fly which she expresses by saying ‘Superman can fly’, 
and a belief that he cannot fly which she expresses by saying ‘Clark Kent 
can’t fly’. This is true even though she understands both names. The 
puzzle arises because she seems to have beliefs whose truth conditions 
logically could not jointly be met, but without being guilty of the kind of 
irrationality normally associated with (logically) inconsistent beliefs. If 
she assertively said ‘Superman can and cannot fly’ she would have 
made a logical mistake, but since she is acquainted with him in two 
ways she can have (in a sense) inconsistent beliefs about him without 
being guilty of this kind of irrationality. 
 
There are two other kinds of puzzle relating to co-referring names, 
which this chapter will not directly discuss. The first is a puzzle about 
identity statements, analyticity and informativeness. It seems that 
‘Superman is Superman’ is analytically true and uninformative, while 
‘Clark Kent is Superman’ is synthetic and informative. This is sometimes 
taken to be an argument against names’ meanings being exhausted by 
their referents. Here is Quine:  
 
Frege’s example of ‘Evening Star’ and ‘Morning Star’ and 
Russell’s of ‘Scott’ and ‘the author of Waverley’, illustrate that 
                                                          
16 Similar problems can probably arise in the absence of any co-referential 
linguistic expressions too, assuming that there can be non-linguistic modes of 
presentation, as there presumably can. I will focus on cases involving language 
though, both for ease of exposition and to keep close to the existing literature. 
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terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning. [Quine 
1951/1953: 21] 
 
I won’t discuss whether this puzzle about identity statements (and 
some other statements17) is adequate motivation for rejecting 
Millianism (the view that a name’s meaning is just its referent), 
although for the record my own view is that it is not. You could however 
try to use the same machinery to explain both the difference in meaning 
and Lois’s rationality, and that would count as a communication-based 
account of the kind this chapter argues against. 
 
The other category of Frege puzzle concerns attitude ascriptions and 
Leibniz’s law. It is fairly natural, at least in some contexts, to say that 
Lois believes that Superman can fly but not that Clark Kent can. Since 
‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ ordinarily co-refer, this appears to be a 
failure of Leibniz’s law, in that co-referring names in attitude contexts 
seem not to be substitutable for one another salva veritate. This issue 
can also be used as the basis for an argument against Millianism. I am 
more sympathetic to this than the argument from informativeness, but 
this chapter is about attitudes rather than attitude ascriptions, and this 
issue about ascriptions will be deferred until chapter three. 
 
The parallels between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzles of empty names 
are starkest when we look at the issues about beliefs and rationality. 
This should become apparent when we consider the problem in some 
more depth. Lois is not only rational to hold her inconsistent beliefs, but 
she can also make justified deductions whose rationality cannot be 
explained by the things the beliefs are about. For example, if she 
believes that (to speak naturally but perhaps loosely, depending on 
your view of attitude ascriptions) Superman can fly and Superman 
                                                          
17 For example ‘If Superman flies then Superman flies’ seems uninformative, 
while ‘If Superman flies then Clark Kent flies’ seems informative. 
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wears a cape, she can infer that some cape-wearer flies. She could not 
infer this from beliefs that Superman flies and Clark wears a cape. This 
means that the rationality or otherwise of her inferences cannot be 
explained just by the logical relations between the propositional 
contents of her beliefs, if these contents are individuated in so-called 
Russellian fashion by the things that the beliefs are about. Both are 
about Superman. That there is an issue about deduction as well as one 
about consistency should be no surprise, because (classically) valid 
arguments are those whose premises are inconsistent with the 
negations of their conclusions. A solution to Frege’s puzzle needs to be 
able to explain why Lois can make the deductions she can make, and 
can’t make the deductions she can’t make. 
 
Gappy beliefs can also be the premises and conclusions of real-life 
chains of reasoning, and this reasoning is subject to the same rational 
constraints. If a child believes that Santa is jolly and Santa is fat, she can 
infer that someone fat is jolly. She cannot make the same inference from 
the belief that Santa is jolly and the Tooth Fairy is fat. Assuming there is 
no Tooth Fairy or Santa, these cannot be explained by the things the 
child’s beliefs are about, because there are no people for them to be 
about. According to David Braun’s account of GPs discussed in chapter 
one, these rational constraints cannot be fully explained by the beliefs’ 
contents either, because he takes the GPs that Santa is fat and that the 
tooth fairy is fat to be identical. This does not doom his view 
immediately, because as we saw with Lois and Superman, Frege’s 
puzzle already creates problems for an account which explains the 
constraints purely in terms of the beliefs’ contents, if those contents are 
individuated by the objects the beliefs are about. One thing to bear in 
mind is that even if GPs are individuated more finely, however, the 
logical relations between them might be unsuitable, on the grounds that 




The co-reference and empty name cases give rise to similar problems, 
and it would be good to give a unified solution to them if we can. That is 
what I will try to do. Another way of putting it is that everyone needs to 
solve puzzles of co-reference, whatever they think about empty names 
and gappy beliefs. This means we can use Frege’s puzzle to motivate 
some machinery while remaining neutral on empty names and gappy 
beliefs. Once we have the machinery, we can show that gappy beliefs fit 
into it easily, without causing any new problems. The point is that you 
don’t need new machinery like non-existent objects when you have 
independently motivated machinery that can already solve the 
problem. 
 
 2.11 Descriptivism 
 
To get a feel for how communication-based solutions might work, let’s 
look briefly at descriptivism. Russell [1905] is the locus classicus for the 
view that the meaning of a name is the same as the meaning of some 
definite description. On that view, co-referring names can then be 
synonymous with different descriptions which are satisfied by the same 
object, and different non-referring names can be synonymous with 
descriptions which are not satisfied by anything. This means that the 
propositions expressed by Lois’s utterances ‘Superman can fly’ and 
‘Clark Kent cannot fly’ will be different propositions, equivalent to the 
propositions expressed by sentences involving different descriptions. 
This way the rational permissibility of her beliefs can be explained by 
the consistency of their contents. The descriptions are in fact satisfied 
by the same person, but there is no incoherence in their being satisfied 
by different people, only one of whom can fly. The extension of this idea 
to rational constraints on deduction should be simple. 
 
The same idea can used in the empty name case: ‘Santa’ and ‘the Tooth 
Fairy’ are associated with different unsatisfied definite descriptions. 
This gives ‘Santa is fat’ and ‘the Tooth Fairy is not fat’ consistent 
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contents, and the content of ‘someone jolly is fat’ follows from that of 
‘Santa is jolly and Santa is fat’ but not that of ‘Santa is jolly and the 
Tooth fairy is fat’. 
 
Descriptivism has lost a lot of popularity since Russell’s day, in large 
part due to Kripke [1980]. It is rare to hold the same version of it that 
Russell held, but the general strategy for solving Frege’s puzzle is 
simple and attractive. Instead of explaining the constraints on 
rationality by assigning beliefs contents individuated by the things the 
beliefs are about (if any), we individuate their contents in some other 
way. The logical relations of consistency and consequence between 
these contents can then explain the rational constraints on belief sets 
and deductions.  
 
It is possible that the view I will end up endorsing could be recast as 
one in which rational relations between belief tokens could track logical 
relations between their contents. I don’t think that is the most natural 
way of putting it and won’t put it that way, but perhaps it could be done. 
Whether or not it can be done is not the point though, because there is 
still a substantial difference between communication-based accounts 
and the one I am putting forward.  One way of thinking about 
communication is that I believe something, express my belief with an 
assertion, and then you end up believing what I believe. This kind of 
communication aims to get the hearer to resemble the speaker in some 
way, and this resemblance can be described as us having beliefs with 
the same contents. We can also say that assertions have the same 
contents as the beliefs they are used to transmit. I will argue that no 
level of content which can play this role in understanding 
communication can also explain the rational relations between belief 
tokens. With Russell’s theory no longer in vogue, however, in what 
follows I will use Sam Cumming’s [2007, 2008, forthcoming] view as a 




 2.12 Anaphora and drefs 
 
Cumming [2007: ii] says he is conducting an experiment in ‘what 
happens if you treat names as anaphoric expressions on a par with 
pronouns’. When people use words like ‘she’ and ‘it’ they have to keep 
track of who and what are being talked about, and what they keep track 
of will be different in different conversations. The way Cumming thinks 
about this is to take reference to be mediated in these cases by entities 
which attach to the objects in question, and which are denoted by the 
words. These entities are called discourse referents (hereafter drefs)18. 
Cumming’s idea is to take names as referring via drefs as well, although 
while the drefs denoted by pronouns will usually (though not always) 
be confined to one discourse, drefs denoted by names will generally 
span many discourses. These discourses may be far apart in time, and 
the participants in one may not even know about the participants in 
another. Since it would be hard to keep track of a dref across such 
distances using expressions used to denote as many different drefs as 
‘it’ or ‘she’, we introduce a name. While indistinguishable names 
sometimes attach to different drefs, using names seems to combine 
with context to narrow the options enough that in practice we can keep 
track in a way that we couldn’t if we always used pronouns. In the rest 
of this section I will give some more detail on how this machinery 
works, and in the next section I will show how Cumming applies it to 
Kripke’s puzzle, and argue that it is unsatisfactory. 
 
In a textbook case of anaphora, an indefinite expression is used, 
introducing an object, and then a definite expression is used to refer 
back to that object: 
 
                                                          
18 ‘Denote’ is Cumming’s word for what a word does to a dref, so I will follow 
him in this. To keep the terminology uniform, I will say a words and speakers 
denote drefs, drefs attach to objects, and words and speakers refer to objects.  
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‘Wash a bunch of fresh spinach well and then shred it finely. 
Sauté it in a little butter until it is wilted, drain __, then put a little 
into each ramekin.’ [Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1457; their 
emphasis] 
 
Note that some pronouns in the second sentence have their antecedent 
in the first. Cumming [2007: §1.2] shows how something similar can 
happen with names: you start off with an expression like (to use his 
example) ‘Jessica Rett, a prominent fashion designer’ and subsequently 
you just say ‘Rett’ or something like that. You introduce her into the 
discourse, indicating which name you’ll be referring back to her with, 
and then use the name anaphorically. In subsequent discourses you can 
still refer back to the original referent, because anaphora can cross 
discourses. Allowing this is not just an ad hoc measure to solve 
problems about names, because it is useful for ordinary anaphora to 
cross discourses too: 
 
We can even imagine an individual being introduced in the first 
discourse (e.g. a new love-interest) and becoming salient enough 
to be retrieved by a pronoun at the beginning of the second 
discourse (`Did he call?'). Now, a natural way of describing this 
would be to say that the pronoun at the start of the second 
discourse is anaphoric to some indefinite expression embedded 
in the first. However, this explanation is impossible if discourse 
boundaries are impervious to anaphora. [Cumming 2007: 17] 
 
One might be resistant to the idea that this is anaphora at all: if the man 
is salient enough then maybe you can refer to him anyway, just by his 
salience. This is may not be a question best settled from the armchair: 
for example, there might be empirical data showing that people’s 
responses to names are more like people’s responses to deictic 
pronouns than to anaphoric pronouns, or the other way around. It does 
not matter for present purposes whether Cumming’s treatment of 
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names as anaphora is ultimately the best way of carving things up, 
however, since I am only using it as a worked example to show that 
communication-based solutions to Frege’s puzzle do not work. If 
treating names as anaphoric is empirically implausible then that is 
another reason to reject Cumming’s specific communication-based 
solution, but I am interested in showing what is wrong with those types 
of solution in general. For present purposes we can largely ignore 
criticisms of Cumming’s position which are unrelated to Frege’s 
puzzle.19 
 
The application of Cumming’s proposal to simple variants of Frege’s 
puzzle is quite straightforward. Words refer to objects by denoting 
drefs which attach to those objects. When I say ‘Phosphorus is big but 
Hesperus is not’, the two names denote distinct drefs which both attach 
to Venus. We can imagine a conversational scorecard, following David 
Lewis [1979], showing what the common assumptions of the 
participants in a conversation are. Drefs will correspond to columns on 
the scorecard which help us keep track of objects. The conversational 
                                                          
19 There is at least one advantage of treating the ‘did he call?’ case and classic 
anaphora in the same way which can be seen from the armchair. It allows you 
to treat anaphoric reference back to earlier sentences the same way you treat 
anaphoric reference back to earlier in the same sentence (as in the spinach 
example), without having an arbitrary cut-off between different-sentence 
anaphora and Cumming’s case. If it is a stretch to call it anaphora in the latter 
case, you can preserve what is important in Cumming’s proposal by having 
classic anaphora, names and non-demonstrative discourse-initial personal 
pronouns all refer via drefs, and allowing drefs to survive across discourses. 
This should still exclude cases where a personal pronoun is accompanied by a 
demonstration, as when you point at someone and say ‘he’s tall’. One way of 
drawing the distinction is between referents which are eligible because they 
have already been talked about, so there is a dref to reuse, and referents which 
are eligible for some other reason (e.g. because you’re pointing at them or they 
just walked in carrying a gun), where there is no dref to reuse and so the 
pronoun cannot be anaphoric. 
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scorecard is updated in order to keep track of the conversational 
common ground; for example, if I say ‘Cicero was bald’ and everyone 
accepts this then ‘bald’ (or baldness) is added to a column of the 
scorecard corresponding to the dref denoted by ‘Cicero’.  
 
There are various ways of thinking about the status of the scorecard, 
but for present purposes it is easiest to think of there being one 
objective scorecard for the conversation, and if we have our own 
personal ones they are just there for keeping track of the communal 
one. It gives a more realistic picture of communication if the columns 
correspond to drefs rather than directly to objects, because that allows 
that not all true identities and their consequences will be trivially part 
of the common ground: sometimes asserting a true identity can entail a 
non-trivial update to the scorecard.20 
 
This will mean that when I say ‘Phosphorus is big but Hesperus is not’, 
the change in the score mandated by the first conjunct need not conflict 
with that mandated by the second conjunct, as it would be if I said 
‘Phosphorus is big but Phosphorus is not’. This is because the first 
conjunct updates the column for the dref denoted by ‘Phosphorus’ and 
the second updates the column for the dref denoted by ‘Hesperus’. Since 
the score does not incorporate the fact that ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ 
denote drefs attaching to the same object, the worldly inconsistency 
which my utterance introduces to the scorecard does not create any 
                                                          
20 I have not wanted to get into the metaphysics of drefs because the problems 
with Cumming’s account are supposed to generalize to other communication-
based accounts, so changing the metaphysics of drefs will not help. To help get 
a handle on what they are, one can view them as the same sorts of things as 
conversational scorecards: presumably abstract and possibly dependent on 
social practices in the sense defended in Thomasson [1999], although 
somewhere could probably be found for them in a systematic ontology of 
abstracta, such as an ontology of impure sets or the ontology of property-
encoding objects due to Zalta [1983]. 
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difficulties in updating it. The contradiction in the information 
represented is not intrinsic to the scorecard, because the contradictory 
properties are kept in separate columns. 
 
 2.13 Paderewski 
 
While Cumming’s account works quite straightforwardly for simple 
cases like that of ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’, it will run into trouble if 
puzzle cases still arise where there is not only sameness of referent but 
also sameness of dref. The natural candidates for such cases are in 
Kripke’s puzzles about Pierre and London and Peter and Paderewski21. I 
will focus on the latter, since the bilingual issue in the former is an 
unnecessary complication for present purposes.  
 
In the Paderewski puzzle [Kripke 1979: 449], a man called Peter is 
familiar with Paderewski as a politician and as a pianist, both under the 
name ‘Paderewski’. He thinks they are two different people, and assents 
to ‘Paderewski has musical talent’ when talking about him as a pianist, 
                                                          
21 The puzzles are laid out and discussed in Kripke [1979], who notes [pp. 448-
9] that some similar puzzles appear in Putnam [1975]. Here is one: 
“[S]uppose Oscar is a German-English bilingual. In our view, in his 
total collection of dialects, the words ‘beech’ and Buche are exact 
synonyms. The normal form descriptions of their meanings would be 
identical. But he might very well not know that they are synonyms! A 
speaker can have two synonyms in his vocabulary and not know that 
they are synonyms! 
… Oscar may well believe that this is a ‘beech’ (it has a sign on it that 
says ‘beech’), but not believe or disbelieve that this is a ‘Buche’.” [1975: 
270] 
There may also be examples of non-homophonic names in the same language 
which are also naturally taken to denote the same dref. A possible candidate is 
Gillian Russell’s example of ‘Cassius Clay’ and ‘Muhammad Ali’, for a 
description of which see footnote 10, above. 
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but rejects it when talking about him as a politician. Explanations 
appealing to differences in meaning run into trouble here because 
‘Paderewski’ is the same word with the same meaning whether it is 
used to talk about Paderewski as pianist or as politician. If the drefs are 
the same in this case then their being different cannot be doing the 
work. This might also suggest that differences in dref may not be doing 
the work in the simple case either, since whatever is causing the trouble 
with Paderewski might also be able to cause the trouble with 
Phosphorus and Hesperus. As such, Cumming needs to say that the 
drefs are different even in the Paderewski case, and that is exactly what 
he does. 
 
This means he needs a mechanism for generating multiple drefs for the 
same name (rather than just for indistinguishable names), so he says 
[§3.4] that when names are taught to people they introduce a new dref, 
and the new speaker’s uses only start denoting the public dref after a 
while, when they synchronize their usage with that of the community at 
large. 
 
This mechanism of introducing names with new drefs is partly 
motivated by a kind of phenomenon Cumming identifies where names 
are taught to people with indefinite constructions. Indefinite 
constructions always introduce new drefs. 
 
(C) Tampa was home to a serial killer named Bobby Joe Long. 
Long was known as ‘the Classified-Ad Rapist’. [2007: 2] 
 
This is somewhat fishy, because it takes a mention of a name and treats 
it like a use, but the use/mention distinction is not always as clear-cut 
in practice as Quine might like22. However, even if there are problems in 
                                                          
22 For some examples of the distinction being less clear-cut than Quine might 
like, see Moore [1986]. 
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other cases, there is a reading of (C) which respects the distinction 
entirely. The first sentence says something about who the name refers 
to so that the audience understands the second sentence. It is analogous 
to saying something like this: 
 
(D) ‘Defenestrate’ means to throw something out of a 
window. Yesterday I defenestrated a television. 
 
In the first sentence of (D) we say something about a word we are about 
to use so people will understand us when we use it in the second 
sentence. We can explain (C) the same way. ‘Long’ in the second 
sentence of (C) can be anaphoric on uses of the name in previous 
discourses the speaker has been involved in, and the audience will 
understand that the dref attaches to a serial killer from Tampa. This 
model nicely accommodates Cumming’s data.  
  
The indefinite construction ‘a serial killer named Bobby Joe Long’ does 
introduce a new dref, also attaching to Mr Long. This is only to say 
something about the name though, and when you go on to use rather 
than mention the name it denotes the same dref it did in previous 
discourses. This means we do not have to introduce the name every 
time and then have new speakers co-ordinate their use with that of 
others after a while, merging their drefs with those of the community at 
large. The merging process is covered briefly in Cumming [2007: §3.4], 
but I don’t think he needs it to deal with the case where the name is 
introduced by apparently mentioning it when describing someone 
introduced with a specific indefinite construction, as in (C). Instead we 
have the alternative I sketched, which still treats names as anaphoric. 
Cumming does however also use the creation/merging mechanism for 
generating extra drefs to account for Kripke’s puzzle. I will argue that it 
does not ultimately solve the puzzle though, and since we do not need 
the mechanism to accommodate cases like the ‘Bobby Joe Long’ 




On Cumming’s account, with Peter the merging never properly happens. 
The community at large knows that Paderewski is a pianist and a 
politician and talks as if he is one person (‘Paderewski’ is not a 
homonymous stage-name), but Peter is still talking as if there were two. 
Cumming says that Peter has two drefs attaching to Paderewski which 
are only denoted in conversations in which he (or someone who defers 
to him) is a participant, and neither dref is the common-currency one: 
 
Furthermore, Peter does not possess the common-currency dref 
that refers to the musician-statesman (call it upad). Why not? We 
can narrate the situation as follows. At his first introduction to 
the name (under its politician guise) he acquired the dref upad1 
(remember, from §3.4, that one is always first introduced to a 
new dref, and only later, by learning the skill of coordination, 
acquires the one already in currency). The next time he heard 
the name, rather than connecting it with his old symbol, he 
forged a new symbol (thus betraying the ability he still lacked) 
and attached another new dref upad2 to it. 
 So long as his concept of Paderewski was ‘fractured’ (the 
terminology is Fine's) in this way, his ability to coordinate with 
others on the dref upad was compromised. For an interlocutor 
could not rely on Peter accessing the same mental symbol on 
successive uses of the name Paderewski. [Cumming 2007: 80] 
 
Cumming seems to load two things into the example: an approximate 
symmetry between the strengths Peter’s acquaintances with 
Paderewski under the two guises, and a weakness in these 
acquaintances compared to those of ordinary members of the 
community. With these two features in place, Cumming’s solution looks 





Someone (call her Penelope) might become very acquainted with 
Paderewski, easily satisfying the dref possession-conditions, but then 
also hear about him under a new guise, thinking it was someone else. 
Penelope first comes to know all about Paderewski as a politician, more 
than most in fact, comfortably acquiring the dref upad. (You don’t have to 
know that someone plays the piano to understand their name.) Then 
she hears about him as a musician, and fails to make the connection. 
Cumming could say that Penelope loses upad and acquires two more 
drefs, or keeps upad and acquires one more. He can’t say (as I will) that 
she either doesn’t acquire a new one or acquires the old one a second 
time, because Penelope is now in a position to generate puzzle cases, 
and Cumming’s explanation of puzzle cases is that there are two drefs 
attaching to the same object.23 
 
Suppose we say Penelope loses or discards upad and acquires two new 
drefs. This means that the contents of assertions expressing her long-
standing beliefs about Paderewski will have changed, since they no 
longer make the same demands on how the conversational scorecard is 
updated. I suppose the problem here is that the reason people lack the 
mob’s drefs and have their personal ones instead is meant to be that 
they are in some way epistemically removed from Paderewski, but in 
fact Penelope knows more about Paderewski than most of the mob do, 
even if we ignore her knowledge about Paderewski as musician. 
 
Coming to believe that there is a distinct pianist called ‘Paderewski’ 
does not stop her communicating as before, and effecting the same 
                                                          
23 Cumming [2007: 80] anticipates in a footnote that he will be accused of false 
precision for talking about the merging process as if it was determinate which 
dref we grasped at any given time. I should stress that I’m not making this 
accusation or exploiting any indeterminacy here. It should become clear in the 
discussion to follow that the problem lies elsewhere. 
 72 
 
changes in the beliefs of others as before24. Since she does not lose the 
ability explained by her grasp of the dref, it is unreasonable to say she 
loses the dref without offering another explanation of the ability. The 
acquisition of a personal dref should not explain it, since if it did there 
would have been no reason to postulate public drefs at all. I am arguing 
that we should solve the puzzles at the level of something individual 
rather than something public, and conceding that public drefs are an 
idle wheel in solving the puzzles would establish that. 
 
Now suppose she keeps upad and acquires another personal dref. This is 
perhaps worse, because Penelope could go on to find out a lot about 
Paderewski as a musician, happily co-ordinating her use with the music 
buffs she talks to about him, such that she would have acquired upad if 
she didn’t already have it corresponding to her notion of Paderewski 
the politician. We could say that the music buffs and the political 
analysts have different public drefs, but this is hard on people who 
know about all Paderewski’s exploits political and musical, but only talk 
about his music to the music buffs and his politics to the political 
analysts. 
 
Perhaps there is a danger that I have convoluted the example too much 
to make it realistic, and unrealistic cases are spoils to the victor. Given 
this, we can put the problem in a more general way. We need to decide 
how strong the possession conditions for a dref are going to be. If we 
make them stronger, people only superficially acquainted with public 
objects will have their private drefs, which reduces their usefulness for 
                                                          
24 Note in particular that people talking to her will usually be able to tell that 
Penelope is accessing the same mental symbol (to speak in Cumming’s 
framework) as before. Telling which dref is denoted by an occurrence of 
‘Paderewski’ is no harder than telling which dref is denoted by an occurrence 
of ‘he’. Penelope has a problem, but it is a problem about belief which mostly 




explaining communication and what is common about common 
knowledge or belief. If we make the conditions weaker, people will be 
able to acquire them more than once as in Penelope’s case, so to 
describe their beliefs we have to look at their psychology and not at 
their drefs. I am happy with the latter course, because for the purposes 
of addressing puzzles like Kripke’s I want to classify beliefs at the level 
of individual psychology and not the level of communication. 
 
This point having been made, it is worth looking at how far it extends to 
other communication-based classifications of beliefs. Instead of talking 
about possession-conditions for drefs, we can talk about possession-
conditions for concepts, or understanding-conditions for words. The 
strength/weakness dilemma is still going to arise, at least for most 
things you might have beliefs about. Exceptions might be de se beliefs, 
beliefs about sense-data, or beliefs involving logical constants, identity 
and other concepts which are simple enough that to possess them you 
need to know more or less all there is to know about them, and perhaps 
also complex concepts built out of these. What matters here is that 
beliefs about ordinary things are not exceptions. For de re beliefs about 
things like Venus and Paderewski we do not have the luxury of (the 
relevant kind of) nearly complete grasp of concepts. Instead we have 
something incomplete which allows the possibility of recognition-
failure. This possibility means solving the puzzles at the level of 
psychology, and that leaves public content up for grabs. Note that 
beliefs could still be individuated by drefs, but with weaker possession-
conditions for drefs and the Frege puzzles solved at the level of 
psychology. The important thing is just that the level at which 
successful communication gets people to have beliefs with the same 
contents cannot be the level at which the logical relations between 
contents mirror the rational relations between belief tokens. 
 
This, at least, is one way of viewing the puzzles. Frege’s puzzle shows 
that we can fail to recognize objects and form conflicting belief systems 
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about them. One might try to explain this through a difference in words 
or concepts, but Kripke’s puzzle shows that we can also fail to recognize 
words, concepts, drefs, or whatever other public objects we use to 
explain how two people can entertain the same thought contents. It is, 
however, worth considering a little longer exactly whether this is true, 
and if it is, why it is true and whether things could have been 
othwerwise. Kaplan [1968] introduces the notion of a vivid name: 
 
The notion of a vivid name is intended to go to the purely 
internal aspects of individuation. Consider typical cases in which 
we would be likely to say that Ralph knows x or is acquainted 
with x. Then look only at the conglomeration of images, names, 
and partial descriptions which Ralph employs to bring x before 
his mind. Such a conglomeration, when suitably arranged and 
regimented, is what I call a vivid name. [Kaplan 1968: 201] 
  
Vivid names play the role which drefs play in the Frege puzzles, in that 
the puzzles arise from a person having two vivid names for the same 
thing: 
 
We can easily form two vivid names, one describing Bertrand 
Russell as logician, and another describing Russell as social 
critic, which are such that the identity sentence simply can not 
be decided on internal evidence. In the case of the morning star 
and the evening star, we can even form names which allow us to 
locate the purported objects (if we are willing to wait for the 
propitious moment) without the identity sentence being 
determinate. Of course Ralph may believe the negation of the 
identity sentence for all distinct pairs of vivid names, but such 
beliefs may simply be wrong. And the names can remain vivid 
even after such inaccurate non-identities are excised. It may 
happen that Ralph comes to change his beliefs so that where he 
once believed a non-identity between vivid names, he now 
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believes an identity. And at some intermediate stage of wonder 
he believes neither the identity nor the non-identity. Such Monte 
Cristo cases may be rare in reality (though rife in fiction), but 
they are nevertheless clearly possible. They could be ruled out 
only by demanding an unreasonably high standard of vividness, 
to wit: no gaps, or else by adding an artificial and ad hoc 
requirement that all vivid names contain certain format items, 
e.g. exact place and date of birth. Either course would put us out 
of rapport with most of our closest friends. Thus, two vivid 
names can represent the same person to Ralph although Ralph 
does not believe the identity sentence. [Kaplan 1968: 205] 
 
Vivid names are not public objects, but considering Kaplan’s discussion 
can help us decide whether any public objects could play the role of 
concepts/drefs in explaining communication without allowing 
recognition-failure. There are two points to address here which Kaplan 
raises: the ‘no gaps’ condition and the ‘format items’ condition. The 
corresponding issues for concept/dref possession conditions are 
whether you need to know everything about the things your concepts 
are of, and whether concepts include specific uniquely identifying 
things you need to know to grasp the concept. 
 
The first presumably cannot be met: we can talk about things and 
people we do not know everything about. The format items are more 
promising though, in the case of recognising particular concepts. While 
it would be ad hoc to say that there was some particular identifying 
format item which every concept had to incorporate to be a concept of a 
thing, it is less ad hoc to say that each concept has a format item which 
you must know in order to grasp the concept. (Different items for 
different concepts.) These concepts still need not be equivalent to those 
expressed by descriptions or rigidified descriptions, because while 
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knowledge25 of the format item could be a necessary condition for 
possession of the concept, there could also be other necessary 
conditions to do with causal acquaintance with the object, involvement 
in a linguistic practice with other users of the concept, or something 
else along those lines. 
 
Since different concepts could have different format items, one might 
still be able to think of the same object under two such concepts. For 
example, if one concept required that the thinker know its object was 
the first heavenly body seen in the evening at such and such time in the 
astronomical cycle, and another concept required that the thinker know 
its object was the last one seen in the morning at such and such a time, 
these would satisfy the uniqueness condition but could still be of the 
same object without the thinker knowing. Some pairs of concepts will 
rule out their being of the same object though: the format item of a 
concept of Adam could entail being the first human and the term for a 
concept of Eve could entail being the second. These exclude each other. 
Concepts like this might not be susceptible to Kripke’s puzzle. If there 
was a concept of Paderewski which you couldn’t grasp unless you knew 
it was a concept of a person born at such and such an exact place and 
time, maybe you couldn’t grasp that concept twice without either 
recognizing it or being subject to rational criticism.  
 
This particular case assumes two people cannot be born at exactly the 
same place and time, and that the concepts of the places and times are 
themselves not subject to recognition failure. In general, the picture 
                                                          
25 I have talked about knowledge here rather than belief, although perhaps 
there could be concepts of objects which required that thinkers believe the 
object satisfied the format item but not that they know it, or which even 
required that thinkers have a false belief about the object or at least an untrue 
gappy belief in the case of empty vivid names. Whether or not you find that 
picture appealing, similar arguments should still go through for concepts 
requiring mere belief. 
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needs the format items to be exclusive in the sense that no two objects 
could have the same item, and transparent in the sense that there could 
not be recognition-failure for the items themselves. These assumptions 
are substantive but I will not challenge them now. The second is 
probably more problematic than the first, since the format items could 
have a uniqueness condition built in. 
 
Instead what we should say is that while the possibility (if it is a 
possibility) of such concepts is interesting, it is not an accurate 
description of the concepts/drefs which we actually use to 
communicate with one another, at least in many cases which generate 
puzzles. If there were cases where it was, then maybe a communication-
based solution to Frege’s puzzles might be appropriate for those cases, 
because the intrapersonal puzzles would not arise. The picture is 
probably more plausible for mathematical concepts than for concepts of 
concrete things. Consider whether Pierre could have got confused 
between ‘nine’ and ‘neuf’ without some kind of failure of rationality. 
Kripke [2008: 187] takes the view that ‘nine’ has a revelatory sense, 
which means ‘one can figure out from the sense alone what the referent 
is’. It is not obvious whether the concepts under discussion are all and 
only the revelatory senses, but the two ideas are close. I expect there is 
room for somebody suitably sceptical about a priori knowledge and the 
analytic/synthetic distinction to resist the view that ‘nine’ has a 
revelatory sense, but if there are concepts for which Kripke’s puzzle 
could not arise then mathematical concepts are promising candidates. 
 
The issue is with the concepts though, rather than their objects, because 
the puzzles could presumably arise between two different concepts of 
the same number. Even setting aside the question of whether 
mathematical identities like ‘eiπ = -1’ can be genuinely informative, not 
all concepts of numbers are mathematical concepts. One could have a 
concept of the Number of the Beast without knowing it was 666. I 
probably have a concept of Graham’s Number although I have forgotten 
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how to construct it, and perhaps never knew which number it is. (It’s 
big.) The puzzles can obviously arise for descriptive concepts like that 
expressed by ‘the number of the planets’, but ‘the Number of the Beast’ 
and ‘Graham’s Number’ do not clearly express descriptive concepts. 
They look like definite descriptions, but they could still be rigid 
designators, like ‘The Statue of Liberty’26. Another example of a non-
revelatory sense denoting a number might be that expressed by ‘π’, 
given the amount of effort which went into working out which number 
it was. 
 
The fact that most of our concepts for concrete things are not 
transparent in this way is a non-trivial fact about communication and 
thought, but it seems to be supported by experience. If it wasn’t, then 
the fictions and thought experiments in which cases like this are so rife 
would be psychologically implausible, rather than just historically so. If 
ways of thinking about things corresponded 1-1 with the meanings of 
words for them, that would be interesting and we would be missing out 
on some generalizations if we never classified singular thoughts 
according to the word-meanings they corresponded with. That is not 
how things are though, and if it was then communication would be 
different and perhaps harder. Kripke’s puzzles arise from this failure of 
thought and communication to match. If we want to explain what 
Pierre, Peter and Penelope aren’t getting wrong (it’s obvious what they 
are getting wrong) then we have to look beyond communication.27 
                                                          
26 Cumming [2007: §1.1] has an interesting discussion of the forms proper 
names can take, including examples which look like definite descriptions. 
27Laurence Goldstein [2009] claims that the lesson of Kripke’s puzzle is that 
we should be more careful about forming beliefs. We shouldn’t, for example, 
form the belief that London is pretty on the basis of the way a few parts of it 
look, even if we are monolingual Londoners. This may be another lesson of the 
puzzle, but its being such doesn’t conflict with anything I’ve said. It is sufficient 
for my purposes that Peter not be subject to rational criticism for having two 
beliefs of significantly different strengths that Paderewski is e.g. musical, even 
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2.2 A psychological solution to Frege’s puzzle 
 
 2.21 The language of thought hypothesis 
 
The easiest thing would be if there was something psychological which 
was structurally just like a language, with beliefs being like sentences, 
constructed out of things like names and predicates, and which allowed 
distinct names to sometimes co-refer. We could say that Pierre’s beliefs 
were consistent in that there was an interpretation (in some sensible 
class e.g. first-order classical interpretations) on which they were all 
true, although they were inconsistent in that on the intended 
interpretation of the psychological things corresponding to names in a 
language the beliefs could not all be true28. The reason we do not fault 
Pierre’s logical acumen is that his set of belief tokens is true on some 
sensible interpretation, and that is all logic demands. 
 
This picture is the one put forward by Mark Crimmins and John Perry 
[1989] and by Jerry Fodor [2008: ch. 3]. On the Crimmins-Perry picture, 
beliefs are constituted by ideas, which correspond to predicates, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
though he uses the same dref to communicate these beliefs. If my purposes are 
not met in this regard, then Kripke’s puzzle is not the argument for epistemic 
modesty which Goldstein takes it to be, so much as an argument for 
scepticism, and we have enough of those already. 
28 There is a small complication here when dealing with Frege puzzles 
involving predicates. We want to say that ‘Cicero is a doctor’ and ‘Cicero is a 
physician’ are inconsistent in the same way as ‘Cicero is an orator’ and ‘Tully is 
an orator’, but the definition we gave only looked at the intended 
interpretations of the names, not the predicates. To avoid problems of 
contingently co-extensive predicates, it might be best to extend the definition 
to doctor/physician cases by using a logic assigning properties to predicates 
and extensions to properties. Worldly consistency of beliefs would then be 
truth on some model which matched the intended model for assigning objects 
to names and properties to predicates. 
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notions, which correspond to names. Peter has two notions of 
Paderewski, one involved in beliefs involving his idea of being a pianist, 
and one involved in beliefs involving his idea of being a politician. It is 
fairly clear how this will go, and as far as I tell, it works. 
 
Fodor already has independent reasons [see especially Fodor 1975, 
2008] for thinking that propositional attitudes involve sentences in a 
language of thought, and he enlists this picture in solving Frege’s puzzle. 
If you are already committed to a language of thought then perhaps you 
might as well use it to solve the puzzle if it works, and even if you are 
not committed to it for other reasons, its usefulness in solving them is a 
prima facie argument in its favour. 
 
It should also be noted that the solution to Frege’s puzzle offered by this 
picture can easily be extended to a treatment of beliefs corresponding 
to empty names, explaining why it could be rational to think that Vulcan 
is bigger than Santa, but not to think that Santa is bigger than Santa. We 
allow the constituents of beliefs corresponding to names to lack objects, 
and then treat them exactly as empty names were treated in chapter 
one. Essentially, if beliefs are like sentences then a treatment of names 
without referents can be used as a treatment of gappy beliefs, and we’ve 
got one of those already. Problem solved. 
 
The snag is that the language of thought hypothesis is controversial and 
substantive. It is not the sort of hypothesis you can believe just to solve 
a puzzle, and if the brain does not work that way then we need another 
story. If the brain may or may not work that way, then we are still 
leaving a hostage to biology, and if it even might not have worked that 
way then we are leaving hostages to multiple realizability. Co-referring 
names in the language of thought cannot be the solution to the problem 
unless there is a language of thought with names in it. There are two 
obstinate strategies one could attempt. First, one could provide 
arguments for the language of thought hypothesis being the only 
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plausible story about how the brain works, and as such dismiss the 
possibility that psychology does not provide us with suitable sentence-
like structures. This may be appropriate within Fodor’s project, but it 
would be good to have something with more general appeal.  
 
You could instead say that beliefs being sentence-like is a part of folk 
psychology, so whatever the brain is like, if it realizes folk psychology 
then it realizes ideas and notions, so there is no hostage to empirical 
fortune. That is not clearly a hopeless strategy, but it is not quite mine. I 
will make some more minimal claims about folk psychology, which 
could be explained by the language of thought hypothesis’ truth, but do 
not entail it. Showing that only the language of thought could explain it 
is a job for what Fodor [1975: preface] unabusively calls ‘speculative 
psychology’. I have no real problem with speculative psychology, but I 
am not doing it here, and more crucially, I am not relying on any 
particular speculative psychological position. The picture I will put 
forward keeps what you need to solve Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles and 
accommodate gappy beliefs but could still be true even if Fodor and his 
allies are wrong about how the brain works. 
 
 2.22 Dispensing with psychological sententialism 
 
Beliefs have truth conditions. I do not mean this in any controversial 
sense. I have a belief token that Obama is American, and this belief is in 
some sense true iff Obama is American. If Obama is American then the 
belief state I’m in represents the world right, and if he is not or does not 
exist then the state represents the world wrong. Other things being 
equal, I try to be in belief states which represent the world right. Gappy 
beliefs can represent the world wrong too: a child’s belief that Santa is 
jolly represents it wrong. There is room for gappy beliefs which are not 
existentially committing though, and these might represent the world 
right. An example might be a child’s belief that Santa didn’t write Alice 
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in Wonderland. The situation is analogous to that with assertions 
containing empty names discussed in the last chapter. 
 
Having truth-conditions in this hopefully uncontroversial sense is a 
feature beliefs share with utterances. With respect to truth-conditions, 
my belief that Obama is American is like an assertive utterance (under 
normal conditions) of ‘Obama is American’. The utterance’s truth 
conditions are explained by its syntactic structure. It is of subject-
predicate form, and the subject refers to Obama and the predicate to 
being American, and these three facts combine to mean that it has the 
truth conditions it has. My belief is a more mysterious thing. We do not 
have such a straightforward story about why it has the truth conditions 
it has. It stands in some causal relations to Obama and America, but it is 
far from obvious that it has a constituent standing in the appropriate 
relations to each.  
 
The simple and controversial explanation takes beliefs to be 
syntactically structured and have truth conditions explained in a 
manner analogous to those of utterances29. Following Mark Richard 
[1990], let’s call this view psychological sententialism (hereafter PS). 
Will PS be true of all beliefs? It would have to be true of all singular 
beliefs to provide a general solution to Frege’s puzzle, and there is 
                                                          
29 I have been talking deliberately about utterances rather than sentences. 
Utterances are concrete tokens, and since I am talking about beliefs as 
concrete tokens, it makes sense to treat them as analogous to utterances 
rather than to sentences. Another benefit is that we do not need an account of 
the ontology of sentences here, which would experience similar problems to 
an account of the ontology of words, which are discussed in Kaplan [1990]. 
The ontology of utterances and beliefs seems more straightforward: 
utterances are actions and beliefs are states. There are general questions 
about the ontology of actions and states, but it is better to piggyback on the 
solution to a general problem than have to deal with the specific problem of 
what sentences are. 
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reason to think that it is not. One set of problems is all the reasons 
(except the bad ones) people argue against the language of thought 
hypothesis, but another problem is that sententialism is, as I will argue, 
not even true of all utterances. Some utterances have truth conditions 
which are not explained by their syntactic structure. Since language is 
supposed to be the paradigm, and sententialism is not even 
exceptionlessly true of language, this undermines the idea that it is 
exceptionlessly true of belief. 
 
Richard [1990: 35] gives an example from George Pitcher [1964: 12] of 
a language in which “catamat” means that the cat is on the mat. Richard 
rightly points out that the example is underdeveloped, but it is to be 
expected that some words will have the same conventional meanings as 
syntactically structured assertions, but without having any discernible 
syntactic structure.  
 
I do not want to lose half my audience by talking about language games, 
but consider some children playing on the street who warn each other 
of a car coming by just saying ‘car’ instead of saying ‘there’s a car 
coming’. ‘Car’ does not look syntactically structured, but maybe it is. 
Perhaps we could say that the context supplies the predicate and the 
word supplies the subject, fitting the assertion into a compositional 
semantics that way. If in that situation someone says ‘bus’, ‘polar bear’ 
or ‘Mr Wilkins’, that might well mean (examples of) those things were 
coming. To account for the fact (if it is a fact) that if they said 
‘Antarctica’ it would not mean that Antarctica was coming, we can say 
the choice of noun phrase shifts the context to one that does not supply 
that predicate. The phenomenon of utterances shifting their own 
contexts to accommodate a charitable interpretation is familiar30. This 
sort of thing may have some mileage in it, but the point is that while 
language in fact has these systematic features for the most part, even in 
                                                          
30 See Lewis [1979: 346-7] on rules of accommodation. 
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idiomatic constructions, they do not have to be everywhere. Some 
utterances could have rules of their own, communicating something 
complicated without having complicated structure. ‘Fire!’ may be a 
plausible example. Davidson’s [1965] learnability argument for 
compositionality does not require compositionality to be exceptionless, 
since adding an unstructured idiom to a language does not make it 
unlearnable. Adding infinitely many would have this effect if the 
learnability argument is sound, but all I am suggesting is that linguistic 
sententialism is not exceptionless. It doesn’t look exceptionless, and the 
arguments that linguistic sententialism is the rule do not show that it is 
an exceptionless rule, or even place a finite bound on the number of 
exceptions. 
 
Similarly, beliefs would not have to all be syntactically structured to 
play the causal roles which make the beliefs’ presences felt. Or if they 
would, this is not obvious. It is not obvious that beliefs would have to be 
syntactically structured in the normal case, and even less obvious that 
there could not be exceptions to the rule, even if PS was the rule. We 
shouldn’t believe PS unless we have to, but maybe it seems that to solve 
the Frege puzzles we do. That would be a shame though, and I will 
argue that it is not the case: we can solve the Frege puzzles by making a 
weaker set of assumptions which would be unified by PS but which do 
not entail it. 
 
Fine [2007: ch.3 esp. §§A, B] also criticises PS, not by claiming it to be 
incoherent or unable to account for tacit beliefs, but by saying that it is 
not clear that it must be true, and that it does not appear to be true in 
fact. There seem to be exceptions to it. He says: 
 
But suppose now that a thought signifies a proposition 
containing two occurrences of a given object, say the proposition 
that this man is the same as that man (it is better for the 
purposes of the example if the thought is not expressed in 
 85 
 
words, but is a “felt” identity). Then it is not clear that there must 
be two components of the thought, each responsible for putting 
its occurrence of the object into the proposition. Thoughts do not 
appear to have the same kind of clear syntax as sentences. 
 This then creates a difficulty if we want to talk of co-
ordination within a thought. For between what do we co-
ordinate? What I would like to suggest is that it may still be 
correct to talk of a thought being of an object in a given 
occurrence or position in such cases, even though there may be 
no corresponding constituent of the thought. [Fine 2007: 73] 
 
The talk of co-ordination relates to the idea Fine pushes throughout the 
book, which is (roughly: I’m not trying to sum up the book in a few 
lines) that semantic facts are not just about what the words mean, but 
about which occurrences are co-ordinated with which. The difference 
between ‘Cicero is Tully’ and ‘Cicero is Cicero’ is not a difference in the 
meanings of ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, since there may be none. It is a 
difference in whether or not the subject and complement are co-
ordinated. In ‘Cicero is Cicero’ they are; in ‘Cicero is Tully’ they aren’t. 
 
Yagisawa [1993] disagrees with this. He thinks that the semantic facts 
about a name are just that it refers immediately (as in not mediated by 
anything), and that’s all. The fact that the subject and complement of 
‘Cicero is Cicero’ co-refer is therefore not, for Yagisawa, a semantic fact. 
This isn’t a crazy thing to think, especially in the light of Kripke’s puzzle, 
since some utterances of ‘Cicero is Cicero’ might not have the subject 
and complement co-ordinated. One reason for disagreeing with 
Yagisawa is that one could say the same about ‘Cicero’ and ‘his’ in 
‘Cicero washed his socks’. If we allow co-ordination arising from 
anaphora, why not allow it with names? The framework of drefs can 
deal with both. However, Yagisawa could say about anaphoric pronouns 




I think the best defence of co-ordination in language against Yagisawa 
goes in three steps. First we concede that it might be a widening of what 
counts as semantics to say that co-ordination is a part of it, but if co-
ordination happens then that is enough: it doesn’t matter whether we 
call it semantics or not. Second we say that refusing to theorize about 
the co-ordination of anaphoric pronouns misses out on connections 
which are there to be captured. We can say illuminating things by tying 
anaphoric reference to the drefs which relate speech acts to the 
dynamics of a discourse’s shared assumptions, so we should. Third, 
now that we have widened our theorizing to include co-ordination, why 
not apply it to names? To understand this sentence you need to know 
which pronouns are co-ordinated with which: 
 
“John met his brother at five, but he had been waiting since four, 
and since he wouldn’t admit his mistake he is now refusing to 
speak to him.” 
 
Exactly the same thing can happen with names though, it is just as much 
in need of explanation, and the same explanation will do. Quoting 
Kaplan: 
 
“My mother’s primary care physician is Dr. Shapiro. He referred 
her to a specialist, another ‘Dr. Shapiro’ as it happened. My 
mother reported her gratitude to Dr. Shapiro for sending her to 
Dr. Shapiro and compared Dr. Shapiro’s virtues to those of Dr. 
Shapiro in a blithe piece of discourse, clearly oblivious to be 
homonymy. I was racing to keep up (which I was strangely able 
to do). But from her point of view, she was quite properly using 
two different words to refer to two different people. Why should 
there be a problem?” [Kaplan 1990: 108] 
 
Maybe you are tempted to think that Kaplan could follow what his 
mother said because he is so clever, and that it isn’t a normal thing so 
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we don’t need to theorize about it. You do not have to be as clever as 
Kaplan to do it, though. In the sitcom Frasier it is a common comical 
device for Daphne to do the same thing, referring just as blithely to two 
characters as ‘Dr Crane’. The viewer follows it but sometimes her 
interlocutor doesn’t, with hilarious consequences. Note that one could 
pick up on the co-ordination relations even if one didn’t know who 
either Dr Shapiro/Crane was, which shows that there is a fact separate 
from the references to pick up on. Fine thinks it is a semantic fact, but 
the important thing is that it is a fact. 
 
Fine argues that relations of co-ordination obtain not just in linguistic 
communication, but also in individual thought, and between speakers 
and thinkers. Here we can exploit his idea of intrapersonal co-
ordination of beliefs.31 The last sentence of the passage quoted earlier is 
important: 
 
What I would like to suggest is that it may still be correct to talk 
of a thought being of an object in a given occurrence or position 
in such cases, even though there may be no corresponding 
constituent of the thought. 
 
Folk psychology may not demand that PS be true, but it does demand 
that there be a difference between a belief that Helena loves Demetrius 
and a belief that Demetrius loves Helena. That difference might be 
explained by the beliefs’ syntactic structures and it might not, but 
whatever the difference is, that is what thoughts being of objects in 
given occurrences or positions amounts to. 
 
Now, what about co-ordination between different occurrences of 
objects of thought? This is the sort of thing which means that some 
                                                          
31 It is Fine’s idea so I don’t take credit for the insight, but I don’t want to 
attribute the way I’m explaining it to Fine since my purposes are not 
exegetical and he might not endorse my applications of it. 
 88 
 
beliefs have to have the same object appearing in more than one 
position, such as a co-ordinated belief that Cicero likes Cicero, whereas 
some beliefs do have the same object but need not have, such as an 
unco-ordinated belief that Cicero likes Tully. It is also the sort of thing 
which is tied to rational requirements of consistency: Peter is not 
irrational to have his beliefs that Paderewski is and is not musical, 
because these beliefs are not co-ordinated with each other. I would be 
irrational to have contradictory beliefs about Paderewski, because all 
my beliefs about Paderewski are co-ordinated (I hope). If PS is true, this 
co-ordination might be due to belief tokens sharing constituents, like 
ideas and notions. Folk psychology might not say how the co-ordination 
happens, but it certainly says it happens. If it didn’t say this, then 
Kripke’s stories would sound stranger than they do.  
 
It may be that folk psychology is bunk, or at least the fragment under 
consideration about singular thought is bunk. In that case Kripke’s 
puzzle won’t arise, because it is a puzzle about singular thought. You 
could deal with it as Lewis [1981] does by dropping the externalist 
typing of beliefs, or you could be entirely eliminativist about beliefs, in 
which case none of these problems about rationality and propositional 
attitudes arise. There are no contradictions or puzzles of this kind about 
neurons firing32. But if folk psychology is not bunk, and we do have 
singular thoughts, then their objects occur in various positions, and 
                                                          
32 This seems to have some truth in it, but it may be worth questioning why 
the puzzles arise when we describe the beliefs in psychological or intentional 
terms but not in neural terms. Perhaps the idea is that the descriptions giving 
rise to puzzles are normatively loaded: we want to say what Pierre etc are 
doing right and what they are doing wrong. If that is true, eliminativism would 
only dissolve the puzzles if it eliminated the intentional descriptions in favour 
of something non-normative, but if it did that then presumably something 
would be lost. How much of a problem that would be would presumably 
depend on the kind of eliminativist you were. 
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they are co-ordinated such that some of the positions of some of a 
subject’s beliefs have to be directed at the same object. 
 
 2.23 Problems with co-ordination 
  
So far I have taken it for granted that there is a kind of irrationality such 
that Pierre isn’t irrational to believe that Londres is pretty and London 
is not, but would be irrational to believe that London is and isn’t pretty. 
The requirements not to be irrational in this way are closely related to 
co-ordination relations between thoughts. Now I’ll pause to question 
whether the phenomenon under discussion really is a kind of 
irrationality at all, and if there is even a phenomenon in good standing 
there at all. Worries come from two places.  
 
First, we have the anti-luminosity argument due to Williamson [2000: 
93-113; 2008], which is meant to show that few if any non-trivial states 
will be such that if a subject is in the state they will always be in a 
position to know they are in the state. This is because most non-trivial 
states will have fuzzy boundaries, and if you are in the state but near 
the boundary, you will be close enough to not being in the state that you 
can’t tell whether you are in it or not. If there are borderline cases of co-
ordination, perhaps people are not always in a position to know which 
co-ordination relations obtain between their thoughts. Perhaps it is not 
irrational not to take co-ordination relations into account if you don’t 
know they obtain; put another way, perhaps there can’t be rational 
norms applying to people in virtue of cognitive states they don’t know 
they are in. 
 
Second, we have the possibility that co-ordination might not entail co-
reference. Laura Schroeter [2007] discusses a ‘slow switching’ version 
of the Twin Earth thought experiment from Putnam [1975], where it 
seems that beliefs involving the same mental file (or however else we 
understand co-ordination) might not all be about the same object. If it is 
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possible to have co-ordination without co-reference, it seems strange to 
say it is irrational to have differences in credence which take these 
possibilities into account, or perhaps even co-ordinated beliefs which 
jointly entail that they are about different things. These kinds of 
rational norms are supposed to rule out belief sets which cannot be all 
true, but if co-ordination does not entail co-reference, the norms would 
rule out belief sets which could be all true, and perhaps some belief sets 
which actually are all true. 
 
I will deal with the two objections in different ways. In §2.321 I will 
argue that while we might have co-ordinated beliefs without knowing 
it, this does not undermine the rational norms governing them, since 
the same is true of beliefs themselves, which are uncontroversially 
governed by rational norms. In §2.322 I will argue that co-ordination 
must in fact entail co-reference (where there is reference at all), and 
that denying this risks leading to a vicious regress. 
 
 2.231 Anti-luminosity 
 
The anti-luminosity argument can only apply to co-ordination if there 
are apparent borderline cases. There are at least three types of possible 
example. The simplest of these is to try constructing an example by 
brute force, taking a clear case of co-ordination and transforming them 
molecule by molecule into a clear non-case of co-ordination. 
Somewhere in the middle of the series there may well be borderline 
cases. 
 
A more psychologically interesting case is where two belief sets merge 
gradually, as the subject gets more confident of an identity belief, 
eventually just having one body of belief which includes the information 
that the object in question has two names. This is probably the process I 
went through with ‘maize’ and ‘corn’, and perhaps people went through 
the process with ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ as the astronomical 
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consensus was forming. It seems reasonable to say that there could be 
borderline cases in the middle of this process. 
 
A third case relates to analyticity. Some true identity statements seem 
to be candidates for analyticity, not in Gillian Russell’s sense of being 
true in virtue of reference determiner, but in that understanding them 
requires knowing they are true. ‘Jacko is Michael Jackson’ or ‘John F. 
Kennedy is JFK’ might be examples. ‘The KLF are the Timelords’, on the 
other hand, is definitely not analytic, although it is true. It is hard to pin 
down the exact difference; perhaps it is something like the difference 
between a variant and an alias. Is there any principled reason why there 
could not be analytic connections between ‘John F. Kennedy’ and ‘JFK’ if 
there can be such connections between ‘bachelor’ and ‘married’, as 
there paradigmatically can? Fine says this: 
 
‘One need not be a Quinean sceptic about the analytic/synthetic 
distinction to believe that the distinction has no clear application 
in the case of names.’ [Fine 2007: 84-5] 
 
He says this because even if there is identifying information associated 
with a name there would be no tenable distinction between the 
information which is constitutive of the name’s meaning and that which 
is not. We could take this either as saying that the distinction is fuzzy, or 
as saying there is no distinction to be made. If there is a fuzzy 
distinction, anti-luminosity could set in. If there is no distinction, then at 
least this conception of analyticity will not apply to names. If there is, 
we have another possible kind of borderline case of co-ordination. 
 
There is however a heavy to responding to possible borderline cases by 
saying the idea of co-ordination isn’t in good standing and we shouldn’t 
theorize about it. Borderline cases can be constructed for other mental 
states like belief and intention, and while their existence might affect 
our theorizing (e.g. borderline cases of belief might lead us to reject 
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closure of implicit belief under multi-premise entailment), they don’t 
make theorizing impossible. This should not be a problem once we are 
aware of it, though. It will however turn out to be helpful to introduce a 
concept to describe cases near the borderline which are not cases of co-
ordination. 
 
Where borderline cases are not quite co-ordination, they will tend to be 
cases of what we can call pseudo-coordination. We can say x and y are 
pseudo-ordinated iff they are not co-ordinated with each other, but they 
are co-ordinated with the two sides of an identity belief the subject has. 
So if Smith’s belief that Phosphorus is big and Hesperus is round are not 
co-ordinated, they can still be pseudo-coordinated if Smith believes that 
Phosphorus is Hesperus, and the two Phosphorus positions are co-
ordinated, as are the two Hesperus positions. Note that we cannot get 
by with just pseudo-coordination, because it is defined in terms of 
coordination. This will be important in the next section. 
 
 2.232 Slow switching 
 
A second kind of case threatens to undermine the notion of co-
ordination. These are called ‘slow switching’ cases, and happen when 
the intentional object of a word or set of beliefs seems to switch slowly 
after the primary source of information relating to the word or beliefs 
shifts from one thing to another. The classic example of a word shifting 
its reference is ‘Madagascar’, discussed by Kripke [1980: 163] and 
Gareth Evans [1973: §3]. In that example something like the following 
happened: Marco Polo started using the name when he wanted to talk 
about the island, following the locals’ use of the name. Actually the 
locals were using the name to refer to somewhere else on the mainland 
though, so maybe Polo’s use, intended to follow the locals’ usage, 
referred to that other place instead, at least at first. But by now, of 




Laura Schroeter [2007] gives a slow switching Twin Earth example 
which is meant to be a slow-switching case of thought, but where some 
of the beliefs don’t switch: 
 
Many years after his [unwitting] switch to Twin Earth, Peter is 
on vacation with his twin-family and he begins reminiscing 
about his childhood vacations at the ocean. He and his sister Jo, 
Peter recalls, used to love playing in the water. Glancing out the 
window, he notices the fastidious Jo who’s unwilling to venture 
in the water despite general coaxing. Peter is suddenly struck 
with the juxtaposition of these two thoughts – his memory and 
his perceptual belief – and he begins to wonder how Jo could 
have changed so much. What exactly are the reference and truth-
conditions for Peter’s thoughts in this train of reasoning? Is he 
thinking about the Earthly things of his childhood or the Twin-
Earthly things of his current environment, or both? 
 The most natural answer, I submit, is that Peter’s 
thoughts refer to different things. Peter’s childhood memory is 
true just in case his biological sister Jo1 liked playing in H2O; his 
perceptual belief is true just in case her counterpart Jo2 dislikes 
playing in XYZ. [Schroeter 2007: 606] 
 
Schroeter’s assessment of the case presents a direct challenge to the 
idea of co-ordination, and it does have some intuitive pull. The belief 
that Jo1 loved playing in the H2O was formed years ago, and has just 
been sitting there waiting to be recalled. Why should the move to Twin 
Earth suddenly make it a belief that Jo2 loved playing in the XYZ? Peter 
never saw Jo2 playing in the XYZ. On the other hand, the new beliefs 
must be about Jo2 and XYZ, if we accept that slow switching can happen 
when you move to Twin Earth, just as it happened with ‘Madagascar’. 
 
Acting against these intuitions, we have co-ordination. If co-ordination 
is to play the role in justifying reasoning that it is meant to play, it will 
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have to work at least almost all of the time. We have a conflict here 
between two forces determining what beliefs are about. One is that 
beliefs tend to be about the causal sources of the information which led 
the subject to form them. The other force is that co-ordinated beliefs 
tend to be about the same things. Which force wins? 
 
You could say that co-ordination always wins, because it isn’t really a 
force: the forces determine which thing a set of co-ordinated object 
positions will be about. There are forces pulling in both directions, but 
since the switching is deemed to have happened in some cases, it must 
have happened in all of them. While Peter’s memory hasn’t been 
accessed since before the move to Twin Earth, it got dragged with the 
rest when the switch happened. This is what I’m inclined to say. 
 
The alternative is to say that co-ordination is a strong but defeasible 
force, and in Peter’s case it is defeated. While I acknowledge this 
position’s intuitive pull, it leads to a difficulty. If co-ordination is 
defeasible, it seems that rationally we should consider each case of co-
ordination on its merits. Suppose I have co-ordinated beliefs that Venus 
is big and Venus is round, and I wonder how confident I should be that 
something is big and round. This is affected by my confidence that the 
object of one belief is the object of the other. But then we have 
something like pseudo-coordination except with no real co-ordination 
anywhere. If there is no co-ordination, how does this identity belief 
(that the objects of the beliefs are the same) get to be more infallibly 
connected to the beliefs about Venus than they were to each other? I 
don’t say this difficulty can’t be solved, but it’s the reason I’m inclined to 
say co-ordination isn’t defeasible.33 
 
                                                          
33 A possible alternative is to say that while we know that co-ordination is 
defeasible, when dealing with our own thoughts it is always rational to treat 
particular cases as indefeasible, as part of some kind of anti-sceptical strategy. 
I won’t pursue this here. 
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If we take this hard line, it would be good to say something to recognize 
the intuitions against it. One option is to use pseudo-coordination again. 
While our longstanding beliefs are co-ordinated, allowing us to 
integrate them into patterns of reasoning, when new information comes 
in it does so via unco-ordinated beliefs, often involving perceptual 
modes of presentation. These beliefs only get pseudo-coordinated with 
the longstanding beliefs when we identify something in front of us as 
something we have longstanding beliefs about.34 So while Peter has co-
ordinated beliefs about Jo2 and XYZ, as he must to be able to use them 
both in his reasoning, he also has a pseudo-coordinated perceptual 
belief about Jo2 and XYZ, and possibly also a quasi-perceptual one from 
his episodic memory about Jo1 and H2O. 
 
 2.24 A more formal framework for co-ordination 
 
I have been arguing informally for some theses about folk psychology’s 
treatment of singular thought. These theses are meant to be more 
innocuous than the language of thought hypothesis, although if 
something like that hypothesis is true then this would explain how our 
psychology got to have these features. Now we can put the features 
together into a more formal framework. First we’ll recap the features, 
and then we’ll present the formal framework. 
 
 People have beliefs. 
 Beliefs have truth conditions. 
 Beliefs can be about things, and these things are involved in their 
truth conditions. 
                                                          
34 This kind of picture is influenced by the one in Chalmers [2003], although he 
uses the temporary modes of presentation as ways of thinking about 
phenomenal properties, which we have while we are experiencing them, in 
virtue of experiencing them. 
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 The relation between beliefs and the things they are about has 
enough structure that the belief that Helena loves Demetrius is 
different from the belief that Demetrius loves Helena. This is 
what we mean by a belief being about an object in a certain 
position. 
 Sometimes there are co-ordination relations between the objects 
of beliefs in certain positions, such that the nth object of Bx must 
be the mth object of By, where x and y may or may not be the 
same. 
 
It is helpful to think of co-ordination as what Fine calls strict co-
reference. A pair of beliefs can be intrinsically such that there has to be 
co-reference, if there is reference at all. This co-reference, if they refer 
at all, is representationally required, in Fine’s terms. Schroeter [2007: 
600] talks about de jure co-reference, distinguishing it from de facto co-
reference where beliefs are not co-ordinated but co-refer anyway. This 
lets us think about co-ordination as corresponding to a kind of 
representational necessity, which we can represent with a box: R. Rφ 
will be true iff φ is true at all the representational possibilities: all the 
ways things could be while respecting the co-ordination relations, and 
whatever other representational requirements there are. A sentence φ 
is true iff true at the actual representational possibility, where beliefs 
are about what they are actually about. So R obeys the modal axiom T: 
Rφ → φ.  
 
When I say people have beliefs, I mean beliefs as particular states. No 
matter how similar your belief that Venus is round is to mine, they are 
different beliefs. Beliefs are states, and perhaps there is room for 
ontological qualms about referring to states, although it is fairly 
commonplace to refer to events. Nonetheless, the formalism will 
involve reference to beliefs, in order to say that they stand in relations 




We want to say that beliefs have objects. These can be either objects or 
properties and relations. I will represent the properties as their 
extensions, although we could have a sui generis domain of properties 
instead and talk about instantiation instead of membership. The use of 
extensions instead of properties is supposed to keep nominalists happy, 
since they will be used to paraphrasing set-talk. Beliefs have objects in 
different positions, and at most one object per position, so what we 
need is a function from <belief, number> pairs. We will have two 
functions, one for the objects and one for the properties and relations: 
O(B, n) is the thing B is about in nth object position, and P(B, n) is the 
property or relation B is about in nth property position. These functions 
will be partial, to allow for gappy beliefs. Since beliefs are not in general 
representationally required to have the objects they actually have, these 
functions can take different values at different worlds. However, if a 
belief is representationally required to take a particular object, perhaps 
if it is a mathematical or identity belief, we can express it as in these 
examples: 
 
R[O(B, 1) = π] 
R[P(B, 2) = {<x, y>: x=y}] 
 
Beliefs have truth conditions, which we can represent in terms of the 
functions from beliefs to their objects. Suppose I have a belief B that 
Helena loves Demetrius. B has two object positions and one relation 
position, and is true iff the first object stands in the relation to the 
second object. We express this thus, where ≣R stands for necessarilyR 
iff: 
 
T(B) ≣R <O(B, 1), O(B, 2)> ∊ P(B, 1) 
 
In fact O(B, 1) is Helena, O(B, 2) is Demetrius, and P(B, 1) is {<x, y>: x 
loves y}, so it follows, with the T axiom, that T(B) ↔ Helena loves 
Demetrius. That’s the right result. We can deal with intentional failure – 
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cases like the belief that Santa is coming – in the same way we dealt 
with it in the previous chapter. Beliefs might be existentially 
committing or not. Suppose a child has an existentially committal belief 
B1 that Santa is not coming (because they have been naughty), and I 
have an existentially non-committal belief B2 that Santa is not coming 
(because he doesn’t exist). We have these: 
 
T(B1) ≣R O(B1, 1) ∊ P(B1, 1) 
T(B2) ≣R ¬[O(B2, 1) ∊ P(B2, 1)] 
¬∃x[x = O(B1, 1)] 
¬∃x[x = O(B2, 1)] 
P(B1, 1) = {x: x is not coming} 
P(B2, 1) = {x: x is coming} 
 
Evaluated according to a negative free logic, motivated in the same way 
as in chapter one, B1 is false and B2 is true, which is how things should 
be. (If you decided that different pessimistic truth values were the way 
to go in chapter one, then we get corresponding truth values here, and 
that is how things should be instead.) Now we can deal with a slightly 
more complicated example, showing how co-ordination is involved in 
deduction. Suppose I have a belief B3 that Venus is big and a co-
ordinated belief B4 that Venus is round. I can infer that something is 
round. We start with these, expressing their truth conditions and the 
co-ordination relation: 
 
T(B3) ≣R O(B3, 1) ∊ P(B3, 1) 
T(B4) ≣R O(B4, 1) ∊ P(B4, 1) 
R[O(B3, 1) = O(B4, 1)] 
 
Now I want to form a new belief B5 (that Venus is big and Venus is 
round) which is guaranteed to be true if B3 and B4 are both true. This 
belief will have two object positions, co-ordinated with each other and 
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with the object positions of B3 and B4, and two property positions, one 
co-ordinated with each of the property positions of B3 and B4. 
 
T(B5) ≣R [O(B5, 1) ∊ P(B5, 1) & O(B5, 2) ∊ P(B5, 2)] 
R[O(B5, 1) = O(B5, 2) = O(B3, 1) = O(B4, 1)] 
R[P(B5, 1) = P(B3, 1)] 
R[P(B5, 2) = P(B4, 1)] 
 
From all these truth conditions and representational requirements, it 
follows that it is representationally required that if B3 and B4 are both 
true, B5 must be true: 
 
R[[T(B3) & T(B4)] → T(B5)] 
 
This shows how co-ordination justifies the integration of beliefs into 
deductions. We can generalize this sort of thing, by defining notions of 
deductive irrationality, deductive licensing, and deductive forbidding: 
 
Σ is deductively irrational =df R∃β[β∊Σ & ¬T(β)] 
Σ deductively licenses α =df R[∀β[β∊Σ → T(β)] → T(α)] 
Σ deductively forbids α =df R[∀β[β∊Σ → T(β)] → ¬T(α)] 
 
There is room for debate over the exact normative force of these kinds 
of facts. The issues are parallel to issues about the normative role of 
logic. For orientation in that debate see MacFarlane [MS]. Some of my 
own views on the subject appear in my [MSa, MSb]. A reasonable first 
pass is the following:  
 
If Σ is deductively irrational, Σ is jointly impermissible. 
If Σ deductively licenses α, and Σ is permissible, α is permissible. 
 
We don’t have a special norm for deductive forbidding, because it can 
be defined in terms of deductive irrationality. Σ;α is deductively 
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irrational iff Σ deductively forbids α, although the two notions might not 
be interdefinable in a development of the system based on a peculiar 
logic in which Σ, α ⊨ did not entail Σ ⊨ ¬α. If we adopted a logic like that, 
we might need an independent concept of deductive forbidding and a 





The principal aim of this chapter has been to give an account of how 
rational norms governing consistency and valid deduction can apply to 
gappy beliefs, without any special pleading for them. To this end, §2.1 
showed how an account of rational norms which is independent of the 
beliefs’ propositional contents can be independently motivated, by 
considering versions of Frege’s puzzle as it applies to beliefs, and 
especially Kripke’s puzzle. The lesson we drew from them is that logical 
relations between interpersonally accessible propositional contents are 
ill-suited to explain the rational norms governing beliefs. Instead we 
should explain them at the level of individual psychology. We need to 
invoke a notion of co-ordination between the object positions of an 
individual’s belief tokens. These co-ordination relations could be 
explained by a language of thought, but however they are realized, folk 
psychology is committed to the co-ordination relations. I considered the 
objections that co-ordination was not a notion in good standing, either 
because we could not always know when our beliefs were co-ordinated, 
or because it is possible in principle for co-ordination to happen 
without co-reference. I conceded that co-ordination relations were not 
transparent, but they are no worse off in this regard than beliefs, which 
are uncontroversially subject to rational norms. I argued that while in 
some cases we may seem to have co-ordination without co-reference, 
this would lead to a problematic regress. I concluded that the concept of 
co-ordination is in good shape. 
 
§2.2 showed in a more formal way how we can use the co-ordination 
relations to define the notions of consistency, deductive licensing and 
deductive forbidding which we need to talk about rational norms. These 
relations were defined independently of the beliefs’ actual contents, so 
they do not fall foul of Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles, and they can still 
apply when there is intentional failure. They were instead defined in 
terms of the beliefs’ potential objects, as constrained by co-ordination 
 102 
 
relations. None of this relies on any commitment to gappy propositions, 
because the co-ordination relations are about what beliefs have the 
potential to represent, not what they actually represent. 
 
Now we have a reasonable account of how names could be meaningful, 
and how the corresponding beliefs could be involved in deductions 
suitable for non-trivial rational appraisal, even when the names are 
genuinely empty and the beliefs suffer from intentional failure. In 
chapter one we argued that the sentences and beliefs in question should 
be assigned pessimistic truth values, at least in non-intentional 
contexts. Pessimistic truth values, however, have less plausibility in 
intentional contexts, like ‘Leverrier believes Vulcan is a planet’ and 
‘Fred worships Zeus’. The next chapter will try to give a more suitable 
account of this kind of case.  
 
The next chapter will also pick up a loose end which was discarded in 
this chapter. There I argued that no level of content could be both public 
enough to explain communication and fine-grained enough to explain 
the rational norms governing individuals’ beliefs. For the problems of 
this chapter, we had to go for an individualistic solution. In the next 
chapter we will be looking at public-level content again.   
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Chapter one dealt with empty names introduced in the context of 
mistakes and lies, where there is little pressure to be charitable about 
the truth values of utterances containing them. We allowed that the 
names in this kind of case were meaningful, or at least grammatical, but 
said that atomic predications containing empty names were false, or at 
least untrue. We can get different truth-evaluations of compound 
sentences containing empty names depending on how we understand 
the untruth of the atomics and how we understand the compounding, 
and I argued that a negative free logic without truth value gaps is 
probably the best option. 
 
Chapter two discussed the corresponding systems of propositional 
attitudes: if a child thinks ‘Santa’ refers they will acquire corresponding 
gappy beliefs. That chapter offered a way of understanding the rational 
relations between beliefs, both in Frege-puzzle cases and gappy belief 
cases, which did not rely on the logical relations between the actual 
propositional contents of the beliefs. One consequence of this is that we 
have more freedom in giving an account of their propositional contents 
if any, and of the corresponding attitude ascriptions. These things are 
the subject of this chapter. 
 
This chapter deals with a use of empty names where the speaker is not 
making a mistake: attitude ascriptions. We could talk about attitudes 
the way chapter two did, but this is not how we usually do it, and it does 
not make interpersonal generalizations about propositional content. 
Normally we ascribe attitudes using the empty names the speakers 
would use in making assertions expressing those attitudes. We describe 
Leverrier as believing that Vulcan was a planet, using the name ‘Vulcan’, 
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even though if everyone had known what we know about the solar 
system then the name would not have been introduced into the 
language. Since our use of the name in the attitude ascription does not 
arise from any mistake of ours, there is some pressure to give charitable 
truth values to sentences like ‘Leverrier believed that Vulcan was a 
planet’.  
 
Where empty names are not involved, a semantics for attitude 
ascriptions usually takes them as referring to a proposition, although 
they may also be referring to something else too35. In the simplest 
picture ‘S believes that P’ is analysed as a binary predication, asserting 
that the referent of ‘S’ stands in the belief relation to the proposition 
referred to by ‘that P’, which will be the proposition ordinarily 
expressed by ‘P’36. There can be some variation from this simple model, 
                                                          
35 Frege [1952] and Church [1950, 1954] have done much to influence the 
view that attitude ascriptions involve reference to propositions. Frege said 
that in direct quotation sentences refer to themselves and in indirect 
quotation they refer to the thoughts they customarily express. The attempt to 
have sentences in indirect quotation and attitude contexts referring to 
themselves was embarrassed by Church’s translation test, since the German 
for e.g. ‘“the sky is blue”’ is ‘“the sky is blue”’, and having the English 
expression appear in the German translation of an English attitude report 
looks terrible. I agree with the spirit of Church’s point even if I have misgivings 
about the letter, mostly relating to considerations about the individuation of 
linguistic expressions of the type raised by Kaplan [1990]. As such I have been 
trying to avoid metalinguistic analyses of discourse not overtly about language 
where possible. I will continue avoiding them in this chapter. 
36 From a syntactic point of view, it is probably unsatisfactory to treat ‘that’ 
clauses as noun phrases, as argued in Huddleston and Pullum [2002: 1014-
22]. In the semantics I give in the appendix to this chapter they will be in a 
special category called proterms. From a semantic point of view we can 
however get the results we want by treating proterms as referring to 
propositions, while having a different syntactic category allows us to hold that 
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but typically some appeal will be made to the propositional content of 
the embedded sentence. Here we have a problem when ‘P’ contains an 
empty name. We might think that normally if a sentence contains a 
name, the referent of the name will be a constituent of the proposition 
the sentence expresses, either directly or by being the res of a de re 
Fregean sense which is a constituent of the thought, in the manner of 
McDowell [1984]. Where ‘P’ contains an empty name we want ‘that P’ to 
name the proposition ‘P’ expresses, but prima facie that would mean 
reifying a proposition without reifying all its constituents. That looks 
bad, but it would be a shame to have to abandon the semantics for 
attitude ascriptions which takes them as referring to propositions, 
unless we have to. 
 
Solutions to this problem can vary a lot in their details, but in view of 
the way we have set it up they can be divided into three general 
strategies:  
 
 Reify the constituents. 
 Avoid reifying the constituents by not reifying the propositions 
either. 
 Reconcile the reification of the propositions with the rejection of 
the constituents. 
 
§3.1 will raise some issues which might help us choose between these 
options, relating to the theoretical role of propositions, intuitions about 
truth values and the validity or invalidity of some arguments, the 
connection between propositional and objectual attitudes, and the 
theories’ ontological commitments. §3.2 will discuss the first strategy, 
where the constituents are either taken to be non-existent concreta or 
existent abstract objects. §3.3 will discuss some versions of the second 
                                                                                                                                                   




strategy, either taking the attitude ascriptions in question to be false, 
paraphrasing them, or understanding speakers as only pretending to 
ascribe attitudes. §3.4 will discuss two versions of the third strategy, 
where the contents are either David Braun’s ontology of Russellian 
propositions which can have gaps (which we first met in §1.1), or 
Fregean propositions which can have non-denoting modes of 
presentation as constituents. I will come down on the side of this last 
option. I present a semantics for attitude ascriptions embodying the 
Fregean view, and show how the proposal copes with the issues 




3.1 Desiderata for a solution 
 
With a few solutions to the problem of contents without constituents on 
the table, we need to find some criteria for deciding between them. In 
this section I will discuss four issues a solution should deal with: 
 The theoretical role of propositions for expressing 
generalizations about communication and thought. 
 Truth intuitions about attitude ascriptions: we want an account 
of attitude ascriptions which either makes the ascriptions true 
which we think are true, or explains why we get them wrong. 
 A theory of attitude ascriptions is best if it links up nicely with a 
theory intentional37 transitive verbs, such as ‘admires’, 
‘worships’ and ‘seeks’. 
 The ontological commitments of our chosen solution should not 
be too implausible.  
 
 3.11 The role of propositions 
 
In §2.11, I said this: 
 
One way of thinking about communication is that I believe 
something, express my belief with an assertion, and then you 
end up believing what I believe. This kind of communication 
aims to get the hearer to resemble the speaker in some way, and 
this resemblance can be described as us having beliefs with the 
same contents. We can also say that assertions have the same 
                                                          
37 There is a tendency in the literature [e.g. Richard 2001, Forbes 2013] to call 
these ‘intensional transitives’, with an S. This is misleading. It prejudges the 
question of whether they are extensional, and suggests they are not 
hyperintensional. The question is how to deal with verbs expressing 
intentional attitudes, and if we want to phrase the question in terminology 
neutral between different answers, we should call them intentional 
transitives, with a T. 
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contents as the beliefs they are used to transmit. I will argue that 
no level of content which can play this role in understanding 
communication can also explain the rational relations between 
belief tokens. 
In chapter two I was looking at the role of propositions in explaining 
rational relations between belief tokens, but now we can focus on the 
other role, in expressing generalizations about thinkers and 
communication between them. The basic picture is that thought 
contents express important resemblances between thinkers, including 
how they relate in similar ways to the world. Utterances have contents 
transmitting these resemblances. There are two important things to 
note about this picture as applied to the problems of the present 
chapter. First, we need to make sure we individuate the contents in a 
way that captures the important generalizations. If two children’s 
beliefs that Santa is coming are importantly similar to each other and 
different from a third child’s belief that the Tooth Fairy is coming, then 
it would be good to say that the first two children’s beliefs had the same 
content and the third’s had a different one. This issue is about 
generalizations about thought. The second issue is about the link 
between thought and communication. When an utterance expresses a 
belief token, in much the same way as saying ‘ouch’ expresses a pain 
token, the content of the utterance and the content of the belief should 
be the same. This gives sense to the idea that people verbally express 
their thoughts, rather than saying one thing because they think 
something else altogether. This issue will also become important in 
§4.432, when we look at intentional attitudes involving fictional names. 
 
 3.12 Truth intuitions about attitude ascriptions 
 
We make attitude ascriptions, and have intuitions about their truth 
values. Some of these intuitions are firmer than others, but insofar as 
we have truth intuitions about attitude ascriptions, a theory is better if 
it predicts that these intuitions are right. Where it predicts that they are 
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wrong, it would be good to have an explanation for this. Here are some 
examples of intuitions about attitude ascriptions we might want to 
uphold: 
 
 Disquotation: If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely 
assents to ‘p’, then they believe that p. [From Kripke 1979: 439] 
 Biconditional disquotation: A normal English speaker who is not 
reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to ‘p’ iff they 
believe that p. [Also from Kripke 1979: 439] 
 Non-substitutivity: A person can believe that n is F and not 
believe that m is F, even if (in fact, unbeknownst to them,) n is m. 
[From Frege 1952] 
 Positive quantifying in: If n is a G and a person believes that n is F, 
then there is a G that they believe is F. [From Sider 1995: §8] 
 Negative quantifying in: If n is a G and a person does not believe 
that n is F, then there is a G that they do not believe is F. [Also 
from Sider 1995: §8] 
 
All these principles give rise to puzzle cases, and some solutions to the 
cases might give some of them up, or at least restrict them. However, it 
would be good if our theory of attitude ascriptions containing empty 
and/or fictional names did not create any new problems with respect to 
our truth intuitions about attitude ascriptions. 
 
 3.13 Intentional transitives 
 
There is a temptation to think that once you’ve got a theory of attitude 
ascriptions that links up nicely with a theory of the embedded 
sentences appearing as assertions, you’re done. But you’re not really 
done, because of intentional transitives. We don’t just express 
intentional attitudes using sentences of the form ‘x [attitude]s that φ’; 




 Jack admires Jill. 
 Jill worships Zeus. 
 Everyone loves a sailor. 
 
You could just take these as a separate problem, claiming that nothing 
about attitude ascriptions directly commits you to anything about 
intentional transitives. Alternatively, you could say, drawing on Larson 
et al [1997], that intentional transitives can be paraphrased as 
propositional attitude ascriptions like ‘Jack thinks Jill is admirable’, and 
then say that the semantics for attitude ascriptions will therefore 
suffice. This strategy is a bit of a promissory note and its use of 
paraphrase is slightly unsatisfactory in the way uses of paraphrase tend 
to be, even if extensionally adequate paraphrases could be given. 
 
If we don’t take a theory of attitude ascriptions to be an automatic 
theory of intentional transitives, it is dangerous to try treating the 
problems separately. That is because there are connections between 
our propositional and objectual attitudes. If Jack admires Jill, that is a 
reason to think Jack thinks various things about Jill. Substitutivity issues 
arise for intentional transitives as well as propositional attitudes: Lois 
fancies Superman but not Clark, and believes Superman is brave and 
Clark isn’t. Moreover, it makes sense that she fancies the one she thinks 
is brave and doesn’t fancy the one she thinks isn’t. Existential 
commitment issues arise as well: you can worship Zeus even if Zeus 
doesn’t exist, although pace Parsons [1980: 217] you probably can’t 
rationally worship him if you know he doesn’t exist. Lastly, intentional 
transitives raise issues about the validity of arguments involving 
quantification, just as propositional attitude ascriptions do. For some 
examples of valid or at least nearly valid argument forms involving 
intentional transitives, see Richard [2001: 106-7]. 
 
Part of the issue is that similar problems arise for both sorts of attitude 
ascriptions, so we would be missing a trick if we didn’t at least see 
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whether the same machinery could deal with both. It is however at least 
as important that an account should be unified enough to make the 
connections natural, and let us express those connections by saying 
things like ‘Lois admires everyone she believes is brave’, which should 
be inconsistent with ‘Lois thinks Clark is brave but doesn’t admire 
Clark’. This will be hard to explain if our analysis of ‘Lois thinks Clark is 
brave’ is unrelated to our analysis of ‘Lois admires Clark’. 
 
 3.14 A plausible ontology 
 
 As with many debates in philosophy, one way of choosing between 
competing theories is to look at their ontological commitments. We 
don’t want our theory to commit to too many things. If it does, it is good 
if they are things we are committed to already for some other reason. If 
they are not, it is good if the new things are not too strange. In all cases, 
it is good if there is a satisfying explanation of how the considerations at 
hand give reasons to think that there are such things, rather than that 
people mistakenly think there are such things. If it sounds like these 
platitudes are being used to stitch up the Meinongians, that is because 
in a way they are. However, they really are platitudes, people really do 
reject Meinongianism on the basis of them, and part of the project of 
this thesis has been to provide a viable and ideally preferable 
alternative to Meinongianism. I’m not dismissing Meinongianism out of 
hand or saying it is incoherent, but that doesn’t mean I can’t draw 




3.2 Reifying the constituents 
 
 3.21 Meingongianism 
 
A Meinongian solution to the problem of contents without existent 
constituents says they have non-existent constituents. The big, obvious 
problem with this is that the ontology is implausible to a lot of people, 
and as I’ve just said, probably with good reason. However, it shouldn’t 
go unnoticed that the Meinongian proposal is quite neat. If you can 
come up with a Meinongian ontology which doesn’t give rise to 
paradoxes, the solutions it offers to the problems of attitude ascriptions 
are quite straightforward. You can effectively just graft it onto your 
preferred theory of attitude ascriptions. If you are a Russellian, then 
you can have people believing propositions with non-existent objects as 
constituents. If you are a Fregean, you can have people believing 
propositions with modes of presentation of non-existent objects as 
constituents. Intentional transitives can also be dealt with 
straightforwardly, with thinkers related either to non-existents or to 
modes of presentation of non-existents.38 
 
Meinongianism makes it easier to give an account of the semantics of 
intentional attitude ascriptions not involving existents. This feature 
might appeal to our laziness, but what would really speak in its favour 
is if there was something Meinongianism could do that its competitors 
couldn’t do, even with difficulty. In fact, there may be. Meinongianism 
allows you to reconcile the following: 
                                                          
38 If we go for the second option, this won’t mean that ‘Fred worships Zeus’ 
says that Fred worships a mode of presentation of Zeus. It will mean, 
approximately, that Fred worships the thing that mode presents, via that 
mode. This allows us to reject the substitution of identicals salva veritate in 
intentional transitive contexts, since different modes of presentation could 
present the same (non-existent) object, and a subject could worship that 
object via one mode but not the other.  
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 No existential commitment: it is possible that n does not exist 
and S believes that n is F, where these claims are taken at face 
value rather than paraphrased. 
 Non-substitutivity salva veritate of names without existent 
referents: it is possible that n does not exist, and m does not 
exist, and S believes that n is F, and S does not believe that m is F. 
 Referential transparency: if n is m, and S believes that n is F, then 
S believes that m is F. 
 
The first two features are fairly uncontroversially desirable. Referential 
transparency is less clearly desirable; it isn’t consistent with the non-
substitutivity and biconditional disquotation desiderata from §4.12, 
given that people sometimes competently assent to ‘n is F’ and not ‘m is 
F’, even when n is m. There are however things that can be said in 
favour of referential transparency, especially if we don’t tie it to 
existential commitment and substitutivity salva veritate of names 
without existent referents. You can construct examples which seem to 
speak in favour of referential transparency, such as those due to 
Jennifer Saul [1998] and Sider and Braun [2006] which will come up in 
§4.41. Referential transparency also makes it easier to give a semantics 
validating positive and especially negative quantifying in, although the 
semantics I will give manages to validate both of these without 
transparency. Finally, transparency can seem especially plausible in the 
case of intentional transitives. Here is Kripke: 
 
What about [Church’s Fregean] analysis? Applying it here [to 
intentional transitive verbs] seems to me to be beset by various 
difficulties. First, it implies that the verb ‘worship’ is intensional, in 
the sense of not being subject to ordinary substutivity of identity. 
But this seems to me not to be so. And similarly for ‘admires’. 
Suppose Schmidt admired Hitler. If Hitler was the most murderous 
man in history, then it seems to me that Schmidt did admire the 
most murderous man in history. And it does not seem to me that the 
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latter statement is ambiguous as between an intensional, or opaque, 
and a transparent one. There is not one sense in which he did 
admire the most murderous man in history and another in which he 
didn’t. If he himself would deny that Hitler can be so characterized, 
then it is true that he didn’t admire Hitler as the most murderous 
man in history. But it still is true that he admired the most 
murderous man in history… 
 …Now even when ‘worships’ is followed by an apparently empty 
name we can make such substitutions. Suppose the Greeks 
worshipped Zeus, and Zeus is the tenth god mentioned by Livy. 
Then the Greeks did worship the tenth god mentioned by Livy. 
[Kripke 2013: 68-69; emphasis in original] 
 
Kripke doesn’t argue for transparency for all intentional verbs, and his 
biconditional disquotation principle (from Kripke [1979]) conflicts with 
transparency for propositional attitude ascriptions. There do seem to 
be some reasonably strong intuitions on his side in the passage just 
quoted, though. In §3.42 I will explain how my preferred treatment can 
meet him halfway on his examples, but it is worth pointing out that 
reconciling his intuitions are a big difficulty for most accounts while 
giving Meinongianism no trouble at all. 
 
 3.22 Abstract artefcacts 
 
Most people don’t want to reify non-existent objects, and in §3.14 I gave 
some reasons for this stance. A natural alternative is to reify some 
existent objects to play the role instead. One option for reifying fictional 
characters as existent objects is taking them to be abstract artefacts, 
which means they are abstract objects which exist in virtue of our 
practices. Fictional characters could be created by our literary practices, 
but we could also have objects like Vulcan and Zeus existing in virtue of 
mistakes and lies. Defenders of such a view, e.g. Nathan Salmon [1998: 
§VI] sometimes distinguish these from fictional objects by calling them 
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mythical objects. There will be much more on fictional characters as 
abstract objects in the next chapter, particularly §4.121 and §4.3, but 
for present purposes two things are important. First, the objects exist, 
in the same way numbers, properties, sets and whatever other abstract 
objects there are exist (assuming they do). Second, the objects are 
abstract, and as such are nothing like the way the people making the 
mistakes think they are. If Vulcan is an abstract object, then it is not a 
planet, not spatially located, does not orbit the sun, and so on. While a 
Meinongian can say that Vulcan is a non-existent planet orbiting the 
sun, the abstract artefact theorist cannot, because if another planet 
orbiting the sun existed then we would know about it. 
 
Both of these divergences from the Meinongian position lead to 
difficulties. The first, that they exist, leads first to an obvious problem 
with negative existentials. When we say ‘Urbain believes than Vulcan 
exists’, we should be attributing Urbain a false belief, but on the view 
under consideration we would not be. There could also be problem 
with properties besides existence where the abstract object is 
coincidentally the way the subject thinks the object of their belief is. We 
can either respond to this with paraphrasing, or an error theory, or a 
combination of the two, but whichever way we go we will end up with 
something less neat than the Meinongian proposal. 
 
The second issue is that we are attributing subjects some quite wacky 
recognition failure, in saying that people’s beliefs, rather than being 
about nothing, are radically false beliefs about abstract objects. We are 
saying that someone who thinks Vulcan is a planet has the wrong end of 
the stick in the same way as you might if, for example, you heard 
someone say ‘I saw Così fan tutte last night’ and thought Così fan tutte 
was a person. One might think that recognition failure this extreme is 
not possible, and instead results in referential or intentional failure. On 
this view you don’t believe Così fan tutte is a person; you have a gappy 
belief referring to nothing at the object position, although you do 
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believe ‘Così fan tutte’ is the name of a person. Imogen Dickie [2011] 
offers such a treatment of cases like this, and gives a principled way of 
deciding when we have recognition failure and when we have a gappy 
belief, which can be applied to cases like this39. Whether we follow 
Dickie on this or not, the case is weird, and won’t come up very much. 
 
Both of these problems make the resultant theory ugly, but they 
probably do not make it untenable. A third problem may be more 
decisive. If we adopt the abstract artefacts view, then we may have to 
sever the link between the contents of the attitudes we ascribe people 
and the contents of their utterances, which undermines the theoretical 
role propositions were meant to play in the first place. If we do not, 
then we can’t use the proposals given in chapter one. Furthermore, we 
wouldn’t be able to use the proposals for understanding gappy beliefs 
in chapter two, unless we said that gappy beliefs can be analysed in two 
ways: as gappy beliefs when explaining the cognition at an individual 
level, and as about abstract artefacts when ascribing them shareable 
contents. If abstract artefacts were the only acceptable option on the 
table, then we would just have to live with that, but we will see later 
than other options are available, and adopting them does less violence 
to the hopefully well-motivated machinery of the first two chapters. 
                                                          
39 She considers our judgements of when reference fails and when it succeeds 
in a variety of cases, and argues that to succeed we have to be somehow tuned 
in to the possible behaviour of the thing we are trying to refer to. She calls this 
the Governance View. The possible behaviour of an abstract artefact is 
radically different from that of a person, so her view is likely to rule that 
reference will fail in this kind of case. 
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3.3 Rejecting the contents 
 
 3.31 Error theory 
 
As a general methodological principle, it is usually good idea to be open 
to the possibility that the discourse we are trying to understand is 
mostly false. We can separate the questions of whether mathematical 
discourse commits us to abstract objects and whether there are such 
objects, or whether moral discourse commits us to objective values and 
whether there are such values. To say that the commitments of a 
discourse are false in this way is to embrace an error theory. Some error 
theories are very plausible; for example some religious discourse 
almost certainly commits to there being things of a kind which there are 
not. Interpretive charity must come to an end somewhere, especially if 
we have an explanation for people making the error in question. 
 
As such, rejecting a Meinongian ontology does not immediately rule out 
a Meinongian analysis of discourse involving fictional names. Marga 
Reimer [2001] proposes just this package. We analyse sentences 
involving empty names as the Meinongian does, except that wherever 
the Meinongian sees reference to a non-existent, we see failure of 
reference. Even attitude ascriptions are then bad cases which can be 
treated along the lines of chapter one, because it is a mistake to be 
committed to the content the believing of which we are ascribing. There 
are no non-existents, so there are no contents with non-existents as 
constituents, and so nobody can believe them, and we shouldn’t say 
they do. 
 
Reimer notes that even if a theory of gappy propositions like Braun’s 
(see §4.41) can account for all our intuitions about the truth of 
sentences involving fictional names, it can’t account for our intuitions 
about their content. Following A. P. Martinich [1996: 184], she says that 
non-philosophers think that when we use empty names we are talking 
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about their bearers. If a kid says ‘Santa is coming’, or if I say ‘Santa 
doesn’t exist’, we say they are talking about Santa. These content 
intuitions commit us to there being a Santa, even if there doesn’t have 
to be a Santa to evaluate what the child says as false and what I say as 
true. And if what we say about contents commits us to a Meinongian 
ontology, then it is reasonable to take us as (implicitly) committed to 
one, and to give a Meinongian analysis of discourse involving empty 
names. This leads to either a Meinongian ontology or an error theory, 
and Reimer’s sense of reality is robust enough to recommend the latter. 
 
Reimer’s challenge is a serious one, and she is right to separate the 
commitments to the Meinongian analysis and the Meinongian ontology. 
We can argue that her position is uncharitable, but as with other error 
theories, charity has only so much weight. Another way of arguing 
against her is to point out that the case for non-Meinongian analysis of 
different kinds of discourse involving apparently empty names doesn’t 
only rest on the implausibility of the Meinongian ontology.  
 
 
In chapter four we will distinguish two kinds of discourse involving 
fictional names, one which is about things as real as musical works, and 
one which is pretence and so does not commit us to anything. In §3.42 I 
will offer a non-Meinongian analysis of the attitude ascriptions. Even if 
we stand by the case for those analyses, we could still remain error 
theoretic about the content intuitions, although hopefully we won’t 
have to even do that. 
 
We can of course question how strong and how resilient the intuitions 
are, but if we can’t explain them away, we can offer a non-Meinongian 
analysis of the content intuitions. We could take ‘x is about y’ not to be 
extensional in the y position, and analyse it the same way we will 
analyse intentional transitives in §3.42. Alternatively, we could follow 
Andrew Bacon [2013] and adopt an independently motivated positive 
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free logic for ascriptions of reference and aboutness. The first option is 
closer to my own position, but Bacon’s proposal shows that Reimer’s is 
not the only other game in town when it comes to ascribing reference 
and aboutness. 
 
An error theory would be appropriate if we found non-Meinongian 
analyses of attitude ascriptions unsatisfying, but still found the 
Meinongian ontology implausible. I agree that the Meinongian ontology 
is implausible, but I don’t agree that non-Meinongian analyses are 
unsatisfying. The case against Reimer rests in large part on the positive 
case for the analyses I will give later on, in §3.42 for attitude 
ascriptions, and in the next chapter for discourse involving fictional 
names. 
 
 3.32 Pretence and paraphrase 
 
Reimer’s error theory is one way of rejecting the contents because there 
aren’t the constituents: she says we’re committed to them and we’re 
wrong. A more charitable way is to say that we know full well there 
aren’t the contents, and so we don’t presuppose that there are. We 
might sound like we are presupposing that there are the contents, but 
we are speaking either non-seriously or non-literally. There are a few 
ways of cashing this out. On the non-serious side, we could say that the 
attitude ascriptions are pretence. We could either be pretending to 
attribute Meinongian contents, or pretending to attribute contents 
involving the abstract artefacts if we actually want to commit to those40. 
On the non-literal side, we could paraphrase the apparent attitude 
ascriptions as somehow conveying information about thinkers’ 
knowledge of the make-believe games, or the texts, or something like 
                                                          
40 In the terminology of §4.42, pretending to attribute Meinongian contents 
without committing to there being such contents would be unanchored 
pretence, while pretending to attribute contents involving objects which we 
do commit to would be anchored pretence. 
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that. Walton [1990: 396-419] proposes something like this, where the 
paraphrases are unsystematic, but in each particular case taken in 
context it will be reasonably clear what information is being conveyed. 
 
My objection to the pretence and paraphrase accounts also applies to 
the error-theory. Certainly we do sometimes speak non-seriously, non-
literally or falsely, in order to convey true information to one another. 
There is no particular reason in principle why attitude ascriptions 
involving fictional names could not be a case in point. The problem is 
that it isn’t plausible to say that this non-serious, non-literal or false 
discourse doesn’t convey some true information, and if we admit that it 
does, our theoretical work isn’t done. Saying that it isn’t part of the 
literal content and thus consigning it to what Kripke [2011d: 328] 
called the ‘pragmatic wastebasket’ doesn’t really help. 
 
Recall the role of propositions for expressing generalizations about 
thought and communication. We don’t commit to propositions just to 
make ourselves feel better about our actual propositional attitude 
ascriptions; we commit to propositions either to explain or at least 
describe resemblances between the way thinkers cognitively engage 
with the world, and the way these resemblances propagate themselves 
through communication. The question about whether attitude 
ascriptions involving fictional names commit us to a level of 
propositions is not just about giving a semantics for the attitude 
ascriptions; it is about whether the resemblances we are conveying 
information about are properly modelled by a level of propositional 
content. I will suggest in §3.42 that they are. 
 
Once we have done the work, investigating whether it is reasonable to 
invoke a level of propositional content here, we may find that a 
semantics for the attitude ascriptions drops out of it. This will be the 
case if two conditions are satisfied: the resemblances must be 
describable in terms of propositional content, and the resemblances so 
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described must match up systematically enough to the sentences we 
use to convey the information that a semantics can be given. If it can, 
this will undercut the motivation for treating the attitude ascriptions as 
non-serious, non-literal or false. It follows then that treating the 
attitude ascriptions in this way only leaves the job half done, and until 





3.4 Gappy propositions 
 
 3.41 Russellian gappy propositions 
 
We first met David Braun’s theory of Russellian gappy propositions 
(GPs) in chapter one41. Then we were considering it as a way to justify 
evaluating the truth values of sentences containing empty names 
according to a negative free logic. We saw that it wasn’t the only way to 
justify this, but it was one way. As well as having sentences express GPs, 
however, we could also let embedded sentences in attitude ascriptions 
refer to GPs. So, on that view, ‘Vulcan is a planet’ expresses <∅, 
{Planethood}>, and ‘Urbain believes that Vulcan is a planet’ says that 
Urbain believes <∅, {Planethood}>. 
 
The first worry about Russellian GPs is metaphysical. They are strange 
things, in that we know which possible state of affairs corresponds to 
<{Mars}, {Planethood}> but it is mysterious which corresponds to <∅, 
{Planethood}>. We can see it as an abstraction from all the propositions 
that something is a planet, but perhaps that doesn’t help. This 
metaphysical worry is a problem if we want propositions to play a 
robust explanatory role, but if we only want them to play a descriptive 
role we can just define their descriptive role and leave it at that. From 
chapter two, we have a notion of beliefs having a representationally 
required structure to their truth conditions, and being about objects 
                                                          
41 To recap: an ordinary Russellian proposition is an entity structured 
similarly to the sentence expressing it, but instead of being composed out of 
words it is composed out of the objects and properties words refer to. We can 
represent them as ordered n-tuples, e.g. the proposition that Jack is tall is 
represented as <{Jack}, {Tallness}> and the proposition that Jack loves Jill as 
<<{Jack}, {Jill}>, {Loving}>. Russellian GPs are like this except they can have 
gaps where the objects would go in an ordinary proposition. We represent the 
gaps with the empty set, so the proposition that Vulcan is a planet is 
represented as <∅, {Planethood}>. 
 123 
 
and properties. (In chapter two we represented the properties as 
extensions for simplicity, but now we should use properties.) 
 
In the notation of chapter two, we can say that if someone believes the 
(gapless) proposition represented as <{n}, {P}> iff they have a belief B 
such that: 
 True(B) ≣R O(B, 1) instantiates R(B, 1) 
 O(B, 1) = n 
 R(B, 1) = P. 
Similarly, we can say that they believe the GP represented as <∅, {P}> iff 
they have a belief B such that: 
 True(B) ≣R O(B, 1) instantiates R(B, 1) 
 ¬∃x[O(B, 1) = x] 
 R(B, 1) = P. 
 
These definitions generalize to other GPs. This doesn’t say anything 
about what GPs or propositions in general are, but if we are only using 
them for the purposes of description then this probably does not 
matter. If the definitions in terms of ordered n-tuples were taken as 
read, then we could probably use the n-tuples themselves, but since in 
everyday discourse these definitions are not taken as read, we can take 
people’s descriptions to presuppose an ontology of GPs structurally 
similar to the n-tuples. How happy we are with this will really depend 
on what we think about the role of abstract objects in general.  
 
Now we have a way for the Russellian GP theorist to determine who is 
going to count as believing which Russellian GPs. We can also give a 
semantics for attitude ascriptions bearing it out in terms of the sential 
semantics in the appendix to this chapter42. This makes the proposal 
precise, so now we can see whether it does what we want. First let’s 
                                                          
42 The restriction on models we need to apply is to have each object denoted 
by only one object sense, and have only one non-denoting object sense. 
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look back at the criteria we considered in §3.12. We have disquotation, 
but not biconditional disquotation. This goes with the fact we have 
referential transparency, rather than non-substitutivity. That conflicts 
with some intuitions, but there are arguments against those intuitions 
based on some examples we will look at shortly. On the sential 
semantics we will have both positive and negative quantifying in, unless 
the quantification is taken as existentially committing, in which case we 
presumably shouldn’t have either. Like the Meinongian we don’t have 
existential commitment, but unlike the Meinongian we have 
substitutability salva veritate of non-referring names in belief contexts. 
This isn’t a bad showing for the Russellian GP proposal. Now let’s look 
at some objections. 
 
The first is that it doesn’t carry over very well to an account of 
intentional transitives. We could just treat them as extensional 
according to a negative free logic, which means you can’t admire Thor 
because there is no Thor. Alternatively, we could say (again using the 
sential semantics) that if someone has an attitude towards n, and ‘n’ is 
empty, then they have that attitude towards all m where ‘m’ is empty. 
That is not very satisfying, but it preserves the link between objectual 
and propositional attitudes, since the classification of the propositional 
attitudes is correspondingly unsatisfying. Alternatively, we may be able 
to paraphrase objectual propositional attitudes ascriptions, but this 
does no better than the previous strategy, since empty names will again 
be interchangeable. This is not really an extra problem though, since if 
we can get used to Leverrier believing Thor is a planet, we can probably 
get used to the Vikings worshipping Vulcan. 
 
This leads us into the second objection, though: can we get used to 
Leverrier believing that Thor is a planet? This problem about the 
interchangeability of empty names is closely related to Anthony 
Everett’s objection, discussed in §1.2. That objection was that the 
Russellian GP theorist should be able to say what ‘Santa Claus doesn’t 
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exist’ and ‘Father Christmas doesn’t exist’ have in common with each 
other that they don’t have in common with ‘Hamlet doesn’t exist’. I 
argued in §1.2 that there are things you can say in response: first that 
the objection risks unfairly playing two incompatible intuitions off 
against each other, and second that we can cash out the difference in 
terms of reference-fixing rather than propositional content. 
Nonetheless, the Russellian GP account does make a lot of positive 
attitude ascriptions come out surprisingly true, and their negations 
come out surprisingly false. 
 
Millians [e.g. Salmon 1986: ch. 8] have been defending themselves 
against this line of attack for a while, since they are also surprisingly 
permissive about attitude ascriptions like ‘Lois believes Clark can fly’ 
and ‘Lois believes Clark is Superman’. Similarly, they must reject ‘Lois 
does not believe Clark can fly’, although they accept ‘Lois believes Clark 
cannot fly’, and Lois would reject ‘Clark can fly’. The Millian can say that 
Lois believes the propositions but not under the guises associated with 
the embedded sentences ‘Clark can fly’ and ‘Clark is Superman’.  
 
One way of bolstering the Millian response is to find situations where 
we would make the strange attitude ascriptions the Millian accepts, so 
we can say that they are strictly speaking true although normally we 
wouldn’t say them. Jennifer Saul gives an interesting example the 
Millian can use: 
 
The well-known failures of substitutivity only tell half the story. 
Sometimes, substitution of co-referential names does seem to 
guarantee sameness of truth value. The following provides some 
indication of this: Suppose I am discussing what people tend to 
think of Bob Dylan's singing abilities, and the person I'm talking 
to knows him only as 'Bob Dylan'. I've been told (truthfully) that 
Glenda, a childhood friend, who knows him only as 'Robert 
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Zimmerman', believes that he has a beautiful voice. Specifically, 
someone I trust has uttered sentence (6):  
 
(6) Glenda believes that Robert Zimmerman has a 
beautiful voice.  
 
I may report this with sentence (7)43:  
 
(7) Glenda believes that Bob Dylan has a beautiful voice.  
 
(7) seems true, even though Glenda would never assent to it. To 
know that (7) is true, moreover, we don't need to know anything 
at all about how Glenda thinks of her childhood friend Robert 
Zimmerman. All that matters is his identity, and the fact that she 
liked his voice. Substitution inferences, this suggests, are 
sometimes perfectly acceptable. Since we sometimes find them 
unacceptable, we need an account which can reflect the fact that 
our intuitions about the legitimacy of substitution inferences 
vary with context. [Saul 1998: 366; original emphasis.] 
 
This presumably isn’t game over for the Fregean, but it does suggest 
that if the Fregean is right then the amount a name’s associated mode of 
presentation contributes to an attitude ascription’s assertability 
conditions (and perhaps truth conditions) varies with context. Saul’s 
example makes use of the fact that the person having the attitude 
ascribed to them is only familiar with Dylan under one name, and their 
audience was only familiar with him under a different name. We can 
elicit a similar intuition if the person ascribing the attitude only knows 
him under one name. Suppose Dylan met Glenda back home and said 
‘hey, do you know a lot of people think I’m the best songwriter in the 
world?’. Glenda could then truthfully say this to her friends: ‘a lot of 
                                                          
43 This ‘7’ is a ‘2’ in the original, which I have assumed to be a typo. 
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people think Robert Zimmerman is the best songwriter in the world’. It 
works both ways, and both kinds of example support the Millian. 
 
However, this support for the Millian doesn’t look like it will carry over 
to support the Russellian GP theorist. They need cases where people 
would say ‘Urbain thinks Thor is a planet’, and you can’t construct those 
in the same way. You can of course try persuading people of Braun’s 
theory on other grounds and then assert that Urbain thinks Thor is a 
planet, but that kind of data is hardly admissible. Even if the Millian can 
talk people round over substituting co-referring names, the Russellian 
GP theorist will probably have to just bite the bullet over substituting 
empty names. 
 
Sider and Braun [2006] also defend Millianism by arguing that our non-
Millian intuitions about the truth values of attitude ascriptions clash 
with our logical intuitions about the validity of arguments, such as 
positive and negative quantifying in. This argument doesn’t carry much 
weight against the proposal I’m adopting in the next section, because it 
validates positive and negative (non-objectual) quantifying in without 
being a Millian. Even if you don’t adopt my solution, however, note that 
in the context of empty names you can only make positive and negative 
quantifying in work anyway if the quantification is not existentially 
committing. If the quantification is objectual, then the argument form ‘S 
believes that n is F; therefore ∃x[S believes that x is F]’ isn’t valid, since 
Urbain believes Vulcan is an intramercurial planet but there is nothing 
Urbain believes is an intramercurial planet. Empty names thus 
undermine the case for Millianism based on quantification intuitions. 
Combined with the problems with substitution intuitions and 







 3.42 Fregean gappy propositions 
 
One advantage of Russellian (non-gappy) propositions is that their 
constituents are ordinary objects. If, perhaps unlike Frege44, you can 
stomach the idea of ordinary concrete things being the constituents of 
thought contents, there isn’t a further mystery about what the 
constituents are like. They are ordinary objects, and we already know 
what those are like. If you want to have Fregean propositions, however, 
distinguishing between propositions that Cicero is bald and that Tully is 
bald, then you need to say something more about what the constituents 
are like. The Fregean answer is to have the constituents be senses, 
which are modes of presentation of objects, but there is work to be 
done saying what these senses are like. 
 
Russellian GPs have a similar advantage. If you can stomach the idea of 
propositions with gaps in, there isn’t a further question about what the 
gaps are like. The gaps left by the emptiness of ‘Thor’ and ‘Vulcan’ are 
the same: they are just gaps. Consequently, the propositions that Thor is 
angry and that Vulcan is angry are the same. If you want to distinguish 
them, as I argued there is some pressure to do, then we need to say 
more about the contributions of ‘Thor’ and ‘Vulcan’. They don’t 
contribute an object, but they don’t just leave a gap either. The natural 
Fregean answer is that they contribute a non-denoting sense, which 
gives us what we can call a Fregean GP. Susanna Schellenberg [2011: 
27-9] already argues that we should understand hallucinations as 
having Fregean GPs as their propositional contents, where the non-
denoting senses are modes of presentation which can be subjectively 
                                                          
44 Frege wrote this in a letter to Philip Jourdain: ‘Now that part of the thought 
which corresponds to the name ‘Etna’ cannot be Mount Etna itself; it cannot be 
the reference of this name. For each individual piece of frozen, solidified lava 
which is part of Mount Etna would then also be part of the thought that Etna is 
higher than Vesuvius. But it seems absurd that pieces of lava, even pieces of 
which I had no knowledge, should be parts of my thought.’ [Frege 1980]  
 129 
 
indistinguishable from perceptual modes of presentation which do 
denote. The idea here is to extend that account to cover the contents of 
attitudes ascribed using empty names. It gets you the propositions you 
want, but it leaves some work to do on the metaphysics, explaining 
what the Fregean senses are and why the ones we need can be non-
denoting. I will have to leave some of that for further work, although I 
will have some preliminary things to say about it. First, however, I will 
show why the work is worth doing, by setting out a version of the 
proposal in a more detailed way, and considering some of the problems 
the it solves. 
 
To get a fixed version of the proposal, we need a formal semantics for 
attitude ascriptions which can validate Fregean non-substitutivity 
intuitions, and which allows non-synonymous non-denoting names. 
Some work has been done in this area both others, such as Richard 
Montague [1973], and Richmond Thomason [1980] which builds on 
Montague. The semantics I will use is my own, from Bench-Capon 
[MSc]. A formal presentation of that semantics is given in an appendix 
to this chapter; now I will present it informally and show to what extent 
it meets the desiderata laid out at the beginning of this chapter. That 
way we will have a concrete version of the semantic part of the Fregean 
GP proposal, and we will be able to see how it helps. The metaphysical 
part, establishing what the potentially non-denoting senses are really 
like, is left for further work; at this stage the senses are more or less 
black boxes, although we will talk some more about how the further 
work might go at the end of this section. 
 
The central idea is to have two value functions, one from linguistic 
expressions to senses, and another from senses to references. We allow 
non-denoting senses by having the function from senses to references 
be partial, but we rule out meaningless expressions by having the 
function from expressions to senses be total. To get the results we 
wanted involving quantification, the basic kind of quantification is 
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sential, not objectual, in that it uses assignments which assign senses to 
expressions, not objects. The senses in the ranges of these assignments 
are from a privileged subset of the senses, called object senses. Object 
senses can only denote objects (or nothing), and names can only 
express object senses. Objectual quantification can be defined in terms 
of sential quantification and identity. In non-intentional contexts the 
logic is a negative free logic, and this includes identity, so where x, y, or 
both are assigned non-denoting senses, x=y is false. 
 
We can exploit the senses of expressions to deal with intentional 
contexts, both for objectual attitudes (intentional transitives) and 
propositional attitudes. In non-intentional contexts, truth values are 
determined by the objects denoted by the senses expressed by the 
expressions, whereas in intentional contexts the senses can make a 
difference to the truth value without differing with respect to reference. 
The two kinds of intentional context here are intentional transitive 
verbs and a THAT operator for dealing with propositional attitudes. The 
extension of an intentional transitive verb (i.e. the extension denoted by 
its sense) will be a set of ordered pairs of objects and senses, rather 
than just objects and objects, such that Fxy is true iff <V(S(x)),S(y)> is in 
the extension of F. The THAT operator is a sentential operator, such 
that the sense of THATφ denotes a proposition corresponding to the 
sense of φ. There are some constraints on the function from sentences’ 
senses to propositions to ensure that propositions’ truth values track 
those denoted by the senses, but aside from that we can treat 
propositions as black boxes, like the senses. (It is left open whether 
propositions are senses.) Now that we have the THAT operator, we can 
have attitude verbs like BELIEVES(x, THATφ), which is true iff the 
object denoted by the sense of x believes the proposition denoted by 
the sense of THATφ, which will be the proposition corresponding to the 
sense of φ. Sentences in the scope of a THAT operator can contain free 




The appendix presents the foregoing material more formally, but this 
presentation should give us enough to work with. Now we can see how 
it deals with the desiderata set out in §3.1. These were: doing justice to 
the theoretical role of propositions, preserving truth intuitions about 
particular kinds of sentences and the validity of some kinds of 
argument, linking up propositional and objectual attitude ascriptions, 
and not making implausible ontological commitments. 
 
One of the places where the proposal is strongest is in giving 
propositions their proper theoretical roles. The proposition referred to 
by THATφ just is the proposition expressed by φ, so the propositional 
contents we ascribe to people’s beliefs are the same as the contents 
they assert when they assertively utter the embedded sentence. This 
goes for sentences involving empty names too: if we are willing to 
commit ontologically to Fregean GPs, then this semantics makes full use 
of them. Unlike the treatments involving Meinongian objects or abstract 
artefacts, it also does justice to the idea that apparently empty names 
don’t refer to anything, which makes it fully compatible with the 
machinery of chapters one and two. 
 
Now we can look at our intuitions about truth values and validity in 
particular cases. First we can satisfy Fregean intuitions about non-
substitutivity of co-referential names in intentional contexts. Lois 
doesn’t believe Clark can fly, or that Clark is Superman, but does believe 
Superman can fly and Superman is Superman. This is because THAT[Fc] 
and THAT[Fs] need not refer to the same proposition, even if c and s 
refer to the same object, if they have different senses. The same goes for 
THAT[c=s] and THAT[s=s]. If we do want a name to appear in an 
intentional context transparently and with existential commitment, we 
can simulate this as follows: 
 
Opaque:  Believes(Lois, THAT[Flies(Superman)]) 




We probably can’t have transparency without existential commitment, 
but it is difficult for any non-Meinongian proposal to do that, since it 
involves having identity without an entity, given that only Meinongians 
have non-existent entities. As well as non-substitutivity, we can satisfy 
the disquotation principle, and almost get biconditional disquotation 
too. Biconditional disquotation does break down in Kripke-puzzle cases, 
however, since in some contexts Peter will reject ‘Paderewski is 
musical’, but he still believes that Paderewski is musical, in virtue of his 
other belief. This is because ‘Paderewski’ has the same sense in both 
contexts, unbeknownst to Peter. I argued in §2.13 that individuating 
public modes of presentation finely enough to deal smoothly with 
Kripke puzzle cases isn’t really viable, so this restriction on 
biconditional disquotation is probably necessary. We still do much 
better on biconditional disquotation than the Millian. 
 
We can also allow both positive and negative quantifying in, without 
being Millian. (This is actually the puzzle, from Sider [1995], that 
motivated the semantics in the original paper.) These would be 
formalized as follows: 
 
Positive: Believes[a, THATφb] 
  ____________________________ 
  ∃x[Believes[a, THATφx] 
 
Negative:  ¬Believes[a, THATφb] 
  _____________________________ 
  ∃x[¬Believes[a, THATφx] 
 
The conclusion of each is true when the premise is, because the open 
sentence is true on the assignment assigning the sense of ‘b’ to x. We 
don’t have existential commitment, however, in that the argument from 
‘S believes that n is F’ to ‘n exists’ isn’t valid. This combination is 
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possible because the quantifier is sential and thus does not carry 
existential commitment. (The sense of ‘b’ could be non-denoting.) We 
can express that there is something existent which S believes is F, but 
this involves the existence predicate ‘E!’ (which is definable in terms of 
the identity predicate in the normal way, assuming the models don’t 
allow non-existent objects) 
 
Non-committal: ∃x[Believes(S, THAT[Fx])] 
Committal:  ∃x[E!x & [Believes(S, THAT[Fx])]] 
 
The proposal also smoothly incorporates a semantics for intentional 
transitives which does not treat them as extensional. This is because we 
already have the modes of presentation in the models, so we can allow 
intensional or hyperintensional predications which are true when the 
mode of presentation stands in a certain relation, rather than when the 
object it denotes does. This relation will be, approximately, admiring 
(say) the object presented, via the mode of presentation in question. 
(This issue was addressed earlier, in footnote 38.) This satisfies 
intuitions about non-substitutivity and existential commitment, and 
makes it simple to express connections between objectual and 
propositional attitudes such as ‘Lois admires everyone she believes can 
fly’: 
 
∀x[Believes(Lois, THAT[Can fly(x)]) → Admires(Lois, x)] 
 
One problem is that the non-substitutivity intuitions about intentional 
transitives are not universal. We saw in §3.21 that Kripke is among the 
dissenters, and I promised to meet him at least halfway. Specifically, 
Kripke thinks these two arguments are valid: 
 
(1) Schmidt admired Hitler. 




Schmidt admired the most murderous man in history. 
 
(2) The Greeks worshipped Zeus. 
Zeus is the tenth god mentioned by Livy. 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
The Greeks worshipped the tenth god mentioned by Livy. 
 
(1) is easier to deal with. We can treat ‘the most murderous man in 
history’ in Russellian fashion, rather than a as referring expression, and 
have it appear outside the scope of the attitude. We can analyse the 
argument as follows: 
 
(1*) Adm(s, h) 
∃x[∀y[x=y ↔ y is a most murderous man in history] & x = h] 
 __________________________________________________________________________ 
∃x[∀y[x=y ↔ y is a most murderous man in history] & Adm(s, x)] 
 
Kripke says he doesn’t think that (1) has a reading on which it is invalid. 
And in fact, you can’t formalize it into our semantics in a way that 
makes it invalid, unless you treat ‘the most murderous man in history’ 
as a simple referring expression. We could have a device for turning 
definite descriptions into referring expressions, and then (1) would 
have an invalid reading, but if Kripke is right then perhaps we shouldn’t 
have one. I don’t think Kripke would be right to say that there was no 
invalid reading if we replace the description with a name. He doesn’t 
say this, and perhaps this points to a genuine difference between names 
and definite descriptions. Note that if we replace the definite 
description with an indefinite description like ‘a dictator’ then our 
intuitions easily fall into line with Kripke’s and there is little or no 
pressure to treat the description as referring and put it in the scope of 




(2) is harder, partly because it is unclear exactly what our intuitions 
should be, and partly because we have a definite description applying to 
an apparently empty name. To explore our intuitions, let’s see if we 
really want referential transparency by trying it with two co-referring 
names: 
 
(3) The Babylonians worshipped Hesperus. 
 Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
 _________________________________________________ 
The Babylonians worshipped Phosphorus. 
 
I think there’s a reasonably strong non-substitutivity intuition here, 
especially when you contrast ‘the Babylonians worshipped Hesperus’ 
with ‘the Assyrians worshipped Phosphorus’. (As far as I know nobody 
actually worshipped either.) Others’ intuitions may differ. But one way 
of having (3) come out invalid and (2) come out valid is to say that false 
gods exist in the way that fictional characters exist, and there is a 
special usage of ‘worship’ which we use to express the relation between 
people and the false gods that exist in virtue of their erroneous religious 
practices. (This could perhaps be integrated into the account of fictional 
characters given in the next chapter.) It won’t be the normal use of 
‘worship’ for when the object of worship exists, because substitutivity 
fails for that usage. I don’t think that’s a terrible solution. It is hard to 
know exactly what to say about the case though, because it is hard to 
know what the intuitions are that we want to satisfy. We would need to 
try it out with other attitude verbs, other referring expressions and 
other kinds of entity, and ideally use informants who aren’t the people 
who will have to systematize the intuitions. I will have to leave that for 
further work. 
 
Now we have seen that Fregean GPs and the associated semantics do 
quite well with the problems we were talking about. This motivates 
doing the metaphysical work to see if plausible and suitable entities can 
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be found to play the role of modes of presentation, or object senses. I 
can’t do all of that here, but I can say some things about what a proposal 
could look like. 
 
We have a choice about how to classify object senses: metaphysically or 
semantically. A semantic classification would look at their meanings, or 
perhaps their meanings in different epistemically possible scenarios. 
Chalmers [2011] uses two-dimensional intensions in this role, which 
can be seen as representing the different intensions referring 
expressions might have in different possible scenarios. 
 
A metaphysical classification of senses looks at the mechanisms 
presenting objects or determining meanings, rather than at the 
consequences of those mechanisms. Whether our semantics ultimately 
uses the semantic classification or not, we will probably need to think 
metaphysically about modes of presentation anyway to give the 
semantics respectable foundations. One example of a mechanism could 
be drefs, which do well when our main acquaintance with an object is 
via referential deference to better-informed users of its name. Another 
example could be a perceptual mechanism, when we are acquainted 
with an object through perceiving it, or when a group of people are 
acquainted with an object they can all perceive. (These modes of 
presentation are good candidates for being necessarily denoting when 
they exist.) A third example could be something corresponding to 
reference via definite descriptions. Perhaps there are mixed cases, 
where we have co-ordinated beliefs about an object justified by 
evidence from a variety of sources.  
 
The main thing to worry about here is keeping our account general 
enough. We want to be able to ascribe beliefs to people outside our 
linguistic community, without existential commitment or referential 
transparency. We want to allow for non-denoting senses, but we may 
also want some senses to be de re and thus necessarily denoting. 
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Schellenberg’s potentially non-denoting experiential modes of 
presentation look good for our purposes, but they are hostage to issues 
in the philosophy of perception quite far removed from what I have 
been doing here. There is work to do but there is reason for optimism: 
people do think about things and are acquainted with objects in more 
or less similar ways. This has to happen somehow, we already have 
some things to say about the mechanisms involved, and people are 





This chapter was about attitude ascriptions, but that wasn’t all it was 
about: it was about the kind of information we communicate using 
attitude ascriptions. That is information about what people are 
thinking, described in terms which often class different people as 
thinking the same thing. A standard way of thinking about this is to 
classify people has having the attitudes towards the same thought 
contents, and we do this using attitude ascriptions involving a word for 
the attitude and a ‘that’ clause referring to the proposition. Empty 
names cause a problem here, because it is usual to think of the objects a 
proposition is about as somehow entering into the proposition, but the 
propositions in question seem not to be about anything real. We had 
three options: keep the propositions and find some objects for them to 
be about; reject the propositions, and explain what is going on some 
other way; or keep the propositions without saying they are 
propositions about things. 
 
§3.1 looked at some issues we might use to decide between the 
competing views. Propositional attitude ascriptions are supposed to 
communicate information about generalizations between people, both 
in what they think and how this links up to what say. We use 
propositions to understand these generalizations. Our account of empty 
names should do justice to this. There are also some intuitions about 
arguments involving substitution and quantification in attitude 
ascriptions, and we want to get the intuitive truth values and validities 
if we can. Also, a theory of attitude ascriptions should be able to 
smoothly accommodate objectual attitudes, ascribed using intentional 
transitives. Finally, we don’t want an account that leaves us with 
implausible ontological commitments.  
 
§3.2 looked at reifying the objects. This can proceed in two ways. We 
can have the objects be concrete, and much as people mistakenly 
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believe them to be, except for being non-existent. This does quite well 
with the intuitions about validity and truth values, and can incorporate 
intentional transitives. It falls down on the plausibility of its ontology, 
and also could only do justice to role of propositions by demanding a 
revision to the treatment of chapters one and two, where we had 
referential failure, rather than reference to non-existents. The use of 
existent abstract objects is similar, although it scores better on 
ontological plausibility and worse on truth intuitions, especially with 
negative existential beliefs. It also holds that people are radically 
mistaken about the objects of their thoughts, which might sit badly with 
our view on how reference works, if it is anything like Imogen Dickie’s.  
 
§3.3 looked at the most ontologically parsimonious option: avoid 
reifying the constituents by rejecting the contents. We can do this with a 
pretence theory, an error theory or a paraphrasing strategy. This deals 
with attitude ascriptions themselves in a way which people may find 
more or less satisfactory, but it doesn’t really get to the bottom of the 
problem. Attitude ascriptions involving empty names do seem to 
convey some true information about thinkers and how they cognitively 
relate to the world, and if this information is of the right kind then there 
is pressure to say that it is propositional. If we need the propositions 
anyway, then it makes sense to include them in our analysis of attitude 
ascriptions. 
 
§3.4 looked at reifying the propositions but not the objects the 
propositions are about. We could opt for Braun’s Russellian GPs, but 
this did not really capture enough of the information that seems to be 
conveyed, and Millian defences in the case of co-referring names did not 
straightforwardly carry over. I argued that it would be better to opt for 
an ontology of Fregean GPs, perhaps understanding the contents as 
metarepresentational, i.e. classified in terms of how they try to 
represent things rather than in terms of what they represent. There is 
more work to do on this, but early indications are promising, and if it 
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can be made to work then it is probably what we should go for. 
Provided the metaphysics of Fregean GPs can be sorted out, we can 
understand the semantics as laid out informally above and formally in 
the appendix to follow. This semantics gives intuitive results about 
truth and validity, incorporates intentional transitives, and does justice 
to the theoretical role of propositions. 
 
At this point we have a fairly self-contained proposal for treating names 
which are empty because they were introduced in the contexts of 
mistakes or lies. In non-intentional contexts we assign what I’ve called 
pessimistic truth values, preferably according to a two-valued negative 
free logic. In attitude ascriptions the truth values are less pessimistic. 
Nonetheless, the treatment we have so far would take the following 
sentences as untrue, while the man in the street will assent to all of 
them: 
 
 Sherlock Holmes is famous. 
 Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street. 
 Arthur Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes. 
 Holmes is cleverer than any real detective. 
 According to Doyle’s stories, Holmes lives at 221B baker Street, 
but actually nobody does. 
 
The sentences don’t involve names from mistakes or lies. They involve 
names from fiction. The pessimistic truth values can’t be accepted for 
sentences like these, at least not without some explanation. The next 
chapter will try to deal with fictional names in a more optimistic way. It 
will also show how to fit them into an account of attitude ascriptions, 
without contradicting what we have already done. 
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Appendix: Sential Semantics for Attitude Ascriptions 
 
The system is adapted from the semantics in Bench-Capon [MSc]. The 
presentation has been streamlined, and predicates expressing 
intentional transitive verbs have been added. The basic elements are 
that expressions have senses relative to assignments, and there is a 
function from senses to objects. Sential quantification is primitive and 
objectual quantification can be defined in terms of it. A THAT operator 
exploits a function from the senses of sentences to the propositions the 
sentences express. The extension of an intentional transitive verb Ftu is 
a set of ordered pairs <x, y>, where x is the object denoted by the sense 
of t, and y is the sense of u. That is the basic shape; technical details 
follow. 
 
We have a language L containing names, variables, quantifiers, 
(extensional) n-place E-predicates, (intentional) 2-place I-predicates, 
identity, truth-functional connectives, punctuation, a sentential 
operator ‘THAT’, and a predicate ‘BEL’ relating believers to the 
propositions they believe. Here is L’s syntax: 
 
 Names and variables are terms. 
 If F is an n-place E-predicate or I-predicate and t1, ..., tn are terms, 
then Ft1...tn is a formula. 
 If φ is a formula then ¬φ is a formula. 
 If φ and ψ are formulas then (φ&ψ) is a formula. (Other 
connectives are defined in the usual way.) 
 If φ is a formula then THATφ is a proterm. 
 If t is a term and p is a proterm then BEL(t,p) is a formula. 
 If t and u are terms then t=u is a formula. 
 If φ is a formula and x is a variable then ∃xφ is a formula. (∀ is 
defined in the usual way.)  




For the semantics, first we have a total function S from expressions of 
the language and assignments to the expressions’ senses relative to 
those assignments. Sense are members of a set . An assignment is a 
function from variables to senses in a subset α of Σ. If SA(x) is the same 
on all assignments, S(x) takes that value. Otherwise S(x) is undefined. 
 
 Where t is a term, SA(t) must be a member of a privileged subset 
α of . Note that α can have members which are not the senses of 
any name in the language. The members of α will be called object 
senses. α contains no n-tuples. 
 Where t is a variable, SA(t) is A(t). 
 Where t is a name, SA(t) is the same for all A. 
 SA(F) is not in α or an n-tuple when F is a predicate, and it is the 
same for all A. 
 Where F is an E-predicate, SA(Ft1...tn) is <ε, n, SA(F), SA(t1), ..., 
SA(tn)> 
 Where F is an I-predicate, SA(Ft1t2) is <ι, SA(F), SA(t1), SA(t2)> 
 SA(¬φ) is <N, SA(φ)> 
 SA(φ&ψ) is <C, {SA(φ), SA(ψ)}> 
 SA(t=u) is <I, SA(t), SA(u)> 
 SA(THATφ) is <θ, SA(φ)> 
 SA(BEL(t,p)) is <β, SA(t), SA(p)> 
 SA(vφ) is <γ, {SB(φ): B(x) = A(x) unless x=v}>. 
 
Σ therefore contains object senses, which are the senses of names; the 
senses of predicates, which we can call predicate senses, and set-
theoretic constructions out of these and the place-holders ε, ι, N, C, I, θ, 
β, γ, and positive integers, which stand for extensionality, intentionality, 





S represents the function from expressions to senses. Now we 
represent the function from senses to references with a function V from 
 into a set D  E  {T, F}  P. D can be any set but will include the 
things names refer to. D plays the role which on an ordinary semantics 
is played by the domain of quantification. E is the set of n-tuples of 
members of D, i.e. the union of the sets Dn for each n≥145, so it can 
contain the extensions of predicates. T is truth and F is falsity. P is a set 
of propositions. V is allowed to be partial, to allow for non-referring 
names and possibly non-denoting predicates: those expressions will 
have sense but not reference. 
 
 Where defined, V(x)  D if x  α. For every object x in D, V(y) = x 
for some y in α. 
 Where defined, V(S(F))  Dn where F is an n-place E-predicate. 
 Where defined, V(S(F)) ⊆ D ⨯ α  where F is an I-predicate. 
 V<N, x> is T iff V(x) is F; otherwise V<N, x> is F. 
 V<C, {x , y}> is T iff V(x) and V(y) are both T; otherwise V<C, {x , 
y}> is F. 
 V<ε, n, y, x1, ..., xn> is T iff <V(x1), ..., V(xn)>  V(y); otherwise V<ε, 
n, y, x1, ..., xn> is F, including when either V(y) or some of the 
V(xi) are undefined46. 
 V<I, x, y> is T iff V(x) is V(y); otherwise V<I, x, y> is F. 
 V<θ, x> is the proposition represented by x (see below for this 
representation relation). 
 V<β, x, y> is T iff V(x) believes V(y); otherwise V<β, x, y> is F. 
 V<ι, x, y, z> is T iff <V(y), z> ∊ V(x); otherwise V<ι, x, y, z> is F, 
including when V(x) or V(y) is undefined. 
                                                          
45 We only really need to include Dn where there are n-place predicates in the 
language. 




 V<γ, Г> is T iff V(x) is T for some member x of Г; otherwise V<γ, 
Г> is F. 
 
I have used a notion of senses representing propositions, which may 
seem dodgy at first because the senses of formulas are supposed to be 
propositions, rather than just represent them. For this reason the S 
function need not quite be seen as a function from L to senses as 
traditionally understood. Since it is unclear how the proposition 
expressed by a sentence is determined by the senses of its parts, we can 
duck the question by representing propositions with set-theoretic 
constructions out of object and predicate senses, along with some 
placeholders N, C, I, θ, β, ι, ε and the natural numbers. We can say that 
when S(φ) represents a proposition p, φ expresses p. There will be 
some constraints on which senses represent which propositions: 
 
 <ε, 1, y, x> represents an atomic proposition true iff the value of 
x, if any, instantiates the property (if any) corresponding to y, 
and false otherwise. 
 <ε, n, y, x1, ..., xn>, where n is greater than 1, represents an atomic 
proposition true iff the values of x1, ..., xn (if any) stand in the 
relation (if any) corresponding to y, and false otherwise. 
 <ι, x, y, z> represents a proposition true iff the value of y (if any) 
stands to the object sense z in the appropriate attitude relation 
(if any) corresponding to x, and false otherwise. 
 <N, x> represents the negation of what x represents. (It is left 
open whether <N, N, x> and x represent the same proposition.) 
 <C, {x, y}> represents the conjunction of the propositions 
represented by x and y. (We include the case where x=y.) This 
means a pair of propositions will only have one conjunction, so 
the order is not important. Distinguishing between the 
propositions that P&Q and that Q&P would complicate things but 
not in any important way. As with double negations, we leave 
open whether other equivalent truth functional compounds 
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express distinct propositions. It is also open whether <C, {x}> 
represents the same proposition as x (i.e. whether (P&P) 
expresses the same proposition as P). 
 <I, x, y> represents an identity proposition between the values of 
x and y. 
 <β, x, y> represents a belief proposition with the value of x as 
believer and the value of y as proposition believed. 
 <γ, Г> represents a quantificational proposition true iff one of 
the propositions represented by the members of Г is true. 
 
Note that although atomic sentences containing empty names in non-
intentional contexts are false, BEL(a, THATφ) can still be true even if φ 
contains an empty name, as can Ftu where F is an I-predicate. It is also 
worth pointing out that the identity relation still holds between objects 
rather than senses, so it is possible that V(S(t=u)) is T even if S(t) is not 
S(u). Co-referring names will not in general be substitutable salva 
veritate in intentional contexts, though in non-intentional contexts they 
will be. Synonymous names, if there are any, will have the same senses, 
so they will be substitutable everywhere. (If we want Russellian 
propositions we constrain models by having only one non-denoting 
sense and only one sense for each object, which will make co-referring 
names substitutable salva veritate everywhere. If we want Russellian 
GPs too then we can have only one non-denoting object sense.) Finally, 
if we have an existence predicate the value of whose sense is D (the 
domain of objects, or if we are Meinongians then its existent subset), 
then that will give the right answers for positive and negative 
existentials.  
 
That concludes the exposition of sential semantics and quantification. 
Now we can show how to use the sential quantifier to define an 
objectual quantifier, i.e. one which is existentially committing and 
ignores distinctions of mere sense, even in intentional contexts. We 
have to add something to secure the existence requirement, and 
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substitute something for the BEL predicate and I-predicates in the 
scope of the quantifier which ignores distinctions of mere sense. The 
other predicates already ignore the distinctions. In general, oxφx, 
where o is an objectual quantifier, can be taken to abbreviate this: 
 
x(E!x & φ'x), 
 
where ‘E!’ is an existence predicate, and φ'x is φx except with all 
occurrences of BEL(t, THATψx) replaced by z(z=x & BEL(t, THATψz)), 
and all occurrences of Ftx where F is an I-predicate replaced with 
y(y=x & Fty). 
 
We may want to express a relation like identity that also applies to non-
denoting senses, at least relating non-denoting senses to themselves. 
This would allow us to simulate existentially non-committal numerical 
quantifiers. We can partition α into equivalence classes [x]R determined 
by this relation and have a non-extensional predicate ‘≈’ to express it: 
 
 If t and u are terms then t≈u is a formula. 
 SA(t≈u) is <Z, SA(t), SA(u)> 
 V<Z, x, y> is T iff [x]R is [y]R; otherwise V<Z, x, y> is F. 








Suppose that in an ordinary context I say ‘Eddy Merckx was Belgian’. To 
find out whether this is true, you can examine the list of all the Belgians 
who have existed. If my usage of ‘Eddy Merckx’ refers to someone on 
the list then the utterance is true, and otherwise it is false. This is 
consistent with the two-valued negative free logic proposed in chapter 
one, so ‘Santa was Belgian’ comes out false when uttered by someone 
who erroneously thought ‘Santa’ was the name of a Belgian. However, 
suppose that in a similarly ordinary context I say ‘Poirot was Belgian’. If 
you list all the Belgians who have existed, none of the people on the list 
is referred to by my usage of ‘Poirot’ either, so treating my assertion in 
the straightforward way will make it come out false too. 
 
Perhaps it is not the end of the world if we say it is false. After all, the 
stories about Poirot from which we get the information that he was 
Belgian are not true stories. Something should be said though, to 
account for the fact that people saying ‘Poirot was Belgian’ may do so in 
apparent seriousness, without making a mistake. Also, if they say in the 
same mode ‘Poirot was French’, they are making a mistake, but it is not 
the same kind of mistake which a child might make if they said ‘Santa is 
coming’. It is, on the face of it, closer to the kind of mistake someone 
might make if they said ‘Eddy Merckx was Dutch’. The problem with 
‘Poirot was French’ is not one of referential failure; it is just one of 
getting the facts wrong. If we get the result that the sentence is false just 
from the referential failure of ‘Poirot’, we have the wrong explanation. 
We need an explanation which gets the right results for the right 
reasons. Even if we ultimately decided that my utterance of ‘Poirot was 
Belgian’ was not true, we would still need to show how to distinguish it 
from ‘Poirot was French’. In large part, this amounts to distinguishing 
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the good assertions from the mistakes, and since mistakes like ‘Poirot 
was French’ do not always spring from referential failure, the treatment 
of the preceding chapters is inappropriate. 
 
Those chapters treated empty names introduced in the contexts of 
mistakes and lied as similarly as possible to cases where reference 
succeeds, because that is what the speakers and thinkers are trying to 
do. We tried to work out what happens to the treatment designed for 
successful reference when reference fails. In discourse within and about 
fiction, however, it seems that sometimes we are not even trying to 
refer in a straightforward way. This goes some way towards explaining 
why we should not be surprised that the straightforward treatment gets 
the wrong results. There are three main strategies for getting the right 
results. 
 
One strategy says that the utterances can be taken straightforwardly 
after all. The problem with the account of ‘Eddy Merckx was Belgian’ 
and ‘Poirot was Belgian’ was that it told us to look at the list of Belgians 
who have existed. If we looked at the non-existent Belgians too, 
according to this strategy, we would find the referent of ‘Poirot’ among 
them, and he would be Belgian and not French, so ‘Poirot is Belgian’ is 
true and ‘Poirot is French’ is false. Drop the prejudice in favour of the 
existent and we can take the utterance at face value. This strategy is 
associated with Meinong [1960], and it is defended more recently in its 
most unadulterated form by Terence Parsons [1980]. 
 
The second strategy takes utterances like ‘Poirot was Belgian’ to be 
asserting a different content from the one they seem to have at face 
value. There is more than one way of doing this. We could take the 
sentence to have a tacit fictionality operator: ‘According to Agatha 
Christie’s stories, Poirot was Belgian’. This is associated with David 
Lewis [1978]. Alternatively, we might be happy to reify Poirot as an 
abstract object but baulk at the idea of accounting for fictional 
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discourse by reifying additional Belgians, instead saying that ‘Poirot is 
Belgian’ asserts that some relation other than instantiation holds 
between Poirot and being Belgian. This is associated with Peter van 
Inwagen [1977], Ed Zalta [1983, 2000] and Amie Thomasson [1999]. 
 
A third strategy takes ‘Poirot is Belgian’ not to be an assertion at all. We 
are only pretending to assert. This may involve pretending that ‘Poirot 
is Belgian’ has a semantic content when actually it does not, which 
saves us the trouble of finding a content for it, so we do not need to 
include Poirot in our ontology as a constituent of that content. The 
pretence strategy is associated with Kripke [2011b, 2013], Kendall 
Walton [1978a, 1978b, 1990] and Gareth Evans [1982: ch. 10]. 
 
The acceptance of an ontology of fictional characters can be 
incorporated into any of these strategies, although it is more integral to 
some than others. Not all unmistaken discourse involving fictional 
names is like ‘Poirot is Belgian’, though. This can be taken as an 
utterance within fiction, being the kind of sentence which might appear 
in a novel. We also have utterances about fiction, such as ‘Poirot was 
created by Agatha Christie’. Possible intermediate cases include 
utterances asserting relations between fictional characters and real 
things: ‘Poirot is shorter than Obama’ and ‘some real detectives admire 
Poirot’. These can be mixed in various ways. Different kinds of 
utterance generate different problems and lend themselves more 
readily to different treatments. I will argue for two different analyses, 
one primarily for uses about fiction, and one primarily for uses within 
fiction. For mixed cases we will have to mix the analyses. 
 
§4.11 considers an argument from van Inwagen [1977] for an ontology 
of fictional characters, and defends it against some objections due to 
Takashi Yagisawa. I conclude that van Inwagen’s argument is a good 
one, but that it only shows that there are fictional characters, and does 
not show what they are like. In particular, it does not show that they are 
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the way van Inwagen thinks they are. The §4.12 and the whole of §4.2 
are primarily exploratory in character, looking at the kinds of views 
which other people have put forward, and looking at the problems 
which my positive view should be able to solve. I will evaluate and 
criticize positions along the way, but my positive view is laid out in §4.3 
and §4.4. §4.12 outlines some different accounts of what fictional 
characters might be, with particular reference to Amie Thomasson, Ed 
Zalta and Terence Parsons. §4.2 outlines several problems which any 
ontology of fictional characters must deal with. In §4.3 I give my 
positive view of discourse about fiction, by sketching a systematic 
fictional ontology which attempts to address these problems. In such 
discourse, fictional names will refer to objects from this ontology. §4.4 
presents a different, pretence-theoretic account of discourse within 
fiction, and proposes a different semantics for this use of fictional 
names which develops the account of truth in fiction given by Lewis 
[1978]. At the end of the chapter I show how my view of fictional names 
behaves in attitude ascriptions, and argue that the machinery I develop 
for fictional names as used within fiction would not unproblematically 
extend to the names from mistakes and lies, and the treatment of those 
should be left much as it was in the first three chapters. 
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4.1 Fictional Ontologies 
 
 4.11 Van Inwagen’s Argument 
 
Van Inwagen [1977] attempts to establish two main conclusions, which 
should be kept separate. First, that there are fictional characters, or 
equivalently that there are such things as fictional characters. Second, 
that these fictional characters exist. To establish these conclusions, he 
argues for the conditional that if there are fictional characters then they 
exist, and then that there are fictional characters. We will examine the 
arguments separately. 
 
 4.111 ‘If there are fictional characters then they exist’ 
 
Van Inwagen argues that if there are fictional characters then they exist, 
on the grounds that everything exists. He is explicit [1998] that his 
stance on metaontology is heavily influenced by Quine [1948], and 
following Quine he takes ‘there are Fs’ and ‘Fs exist’ to be equivalent on 
the only readings he understands. This makes the claim that there are 
non-existent fictional characters either contradictory or unintelligible. 
Lewis [1990] adopts a similar position towards the Meinongian 
‘noneism’ defended by Richard Routley [1980] and subsequently 
Graham Priest [2005]. Lewis says that anti-Meinongians like himself 
should take noneists as holding that all the things they say there are 
exist, even though they say they do not. Arguments pleading 
incomprehension occupy a strange position dialectically. On the one 
hand, van Inwagen is not going to convince anyone who thinks they 
understand a consistent reading of ‘there are non-existent fictional 
characters’. On the other, if he cannot understand his opponents’ claim 
as anything other than contradictory, even after making reasonable 
attempts to do so, this gives him reason to believe they are wrong, and 
gives other people in the same position reason to agree with him. For 
present purposes, we will take the Meinongian claim that it is 
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consistent for there to be non-existent things seriously. This means 
having a logic which distinguishes between existence and being. We can 
take ‘there are’ as equivalent to ‘∃’, and not existentially committing, 
and translate ‘exists’ as a monadic predicate, whose extension need not 
be the whole domain. In this language, the debate between Meinongians 
and their opponents becomes a debate over whether ‘there are non-
existent things’ is true. This claim is translated as ∃x(¬Exists(x)). Van 
Inwagen may think this expresses something logically impossible, but 
since its negation is not a theorem of the system in which we are 
conducting the debate, that argument will be inadmissible. With these 
rules of debate in place, we can try to argue that the Meinongian 
position is unmotivated even if it is intelligible. This is what we will do, 
although the van Inwagen/Lewis position is still open if the arguments 
we put forward here are found wanting. We now turn to Van Inwagen’s 
argument that there are fictional characters, which does not violate the 
rules of the debate we have set up, and can be used by Quineans and 
Meinongians alike. 
 
 4.112 ‘There are fictional characters’ 
 
‘Are there such things as fictional characters?’ is a question about 
ontology. Van Inwagen takes it that we have a fairly well established 
method for answering questions about ontology, which is mostly due to 
Quine. We take our best theories about the world, and paraphrase them 
into a canonical first-order language. Then we see what must be in the 
domain of quantification for these theories to be true. For example, if 
our canonically paraphrased theory contained the sentence ∃x(x is a 
dog), this could only be true if there were dogs, and we would thus be 
committed to there being dogs.  
 
We need some constraints on what counts as an adequate paraphrase, 
or we could just paraphrase our whole theory as a sentential constant 
and not commit ourselves to anything. Much could be said about this, 
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but instead of arguing about methodology in ontology here we will 
address van Inwagen’s argument on his own terms. He places the 
following constraint on an adequate paraphrase: 
 
(LC) An adequate paraphrase must not be such as to leave us 
without an account of the logical consequences of (the 
propositions expressed by) the paraphrased sentences. 
[1977: 304] 
 
The way he sees this going is that, in the canonical language, formal 
consequence (i.e. consequence in a system such as first-order logic) and 
logical consequence will line up. To see how this works, consider two 
candidate examples of logical consequences which are not formal 
consequences: 
 
Phosphorus is bright. 
________________________ 
Hesperus is bright. 
 
Fred is a bachelor. 
________________________ 
Fred is a man. 
 
The first inference is not formally valid because two different names are 
used, so although the premise and conclusion would express the same 
Russellian proposition, this is not guaranteed just by uniformly 
interpreting the non-logical vocabulary in the argument. The canonical 
language could sort this out by only having one name for each object. 
The second inference is not formally valid for a similar reason, but in 
the canonical language we could translate ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried 
man’, and then it would be formally valid. There is room for arguing 
over both these particular cases, but they illustrate the idea. Within this 
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methodology, van Inwagen argues that there are fictional characters, on 
the grounds that we can make inferences like that from (1) to (2): 
 
(1) There are characters in some nineteenth century novels 
who are presented with a greater wealth of physical 
detail than is any character in any eighteenth century 
novel. 
 
(2) Every female character in any eighteenth century novel is 
such that there is some character in some nineteenth 
century novel who is presented with a greater wealth of 
physical detail than she is. [van Inwagen 1977: 302-3] 
 
Van Inwagen thinks that systematic paraphrases of (1) and (2) which 
did not quantify over fictional characters would be messy if they were 
possible at all, which he doubts. He says that the most promising 
paraphrases would quantify over the names of fictional characters, 
although he does not see how to do it. We will discuss two such 
attempts at paraphrase later in this section, of which one is Yagisawa’s 
and one is new. 
 
We do perhaps have some grasp of the relations which the classes of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century novels would have to stand in to 
each other for (1) and (2) to be true. As such, we could coin words to 
express these relations. He suggests ‘dwelphs’ and ‘praphs’, so the class 
of nineteenth century novels dwelphs and is praphed by the class of 
eighteenth century novels. (We could also use plural reference to put it 
in a way which eliminates talk of classes: the nineteenth century novels 
dwelph* and are praphed* by the eighteenth century novels47.) These 
                                                          
47 This is actually slightly different in truth conditions because one or both of 
the centuries might be novel-free. Strictly we should paraphrase it as ‘there 
are some nineteenth century novels and either they dwelph* and are 
praphed* by the eighteenth century novels or there are no eighteenth century 
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words could be used to give unsystematic paraphrases of (1) and (2), 
but this leaves it unexplained why (1) logically entails (2). It seems the 
only way to explain it is to give paraphrases of ‘dwelph’ and ‘praph’ in 
terms of fictional characters. If the paraphrases revealing the 
ontological commitments of our assertions should also reveal the 
logical relations between those assertions, as LC demands, then this 
would mean (1) and sentences like it commit us to the existence of 
fictional characters. Since some sentences like (1) are true, there must 
be fictional characters. 
 
This argument did not involve any mention of fictional names, but it can 
be extended to cover them. Consider these sentences:  
 
(3) Gulliver is a character in an eighteenth century novel. 
 
(4) Some character in some nineteenth century novel is 
presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than 
Gulliver. 
 
(1) and (3) jointly logically entail (4), and if ‘Gulliver’ was not the name 
of one of the fictional characters (1) quantifies over and whose 
existence van Inwagen argues for, then they would not. So if van 
Inwagen’s argument is right, ‘Gulliver’ is not an empty name in (3). It 
refers to a fictional character. Perhaps it does not always refer to one, 
but in (3) and similar sentences it must to secure the entailment, and 
this should be enough to secure van Inwagen’s conclusion. 
 
Van Inwagen’s view is that fictional characters are abstract objects, of 
the same kind as plots, meters, rhyme schemes and so on. He calls these 
                                                                                                                                                   
novels. See Boolos [1984, 1985] for more on plural reference and its uses in 
nominalist paraphrasing. It is also worth noting that van Inwagen [1990: §2] is 
on board with plural reference too. See Lewis [1991: §3.2] for an influential 
discussion of the innocence of plural reference and quantification. 
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things theoretical entities of literary criticism [1977: 302-3]. He also says 
they could not be merely possible objects, because they are actual 
[1977: n. 11]. Gulliver actually is a fictional character. 
 
Nothing in his argument requires that fictional characters be actually 
existing abstracta, although if we took them to be mere possibilia we 
might still have trouble paraphrasing (1)-(4), since mere possibilia are 
not ordinarily taken to be in the domain of quantification for sentences 
outside the scope of any modal operator. Aside from this possible 
caveat, they could be anything, and in particular they could be a quite 
different kind of thing from the other things he counts as theoretical 
entities of literary criticism. Fictional characters could still be either 
concrete or abstract, and the argument leaves open whether they are 
created by their authors or whether they always existed and their 
authors selected them by choosing to write the stories they did. We will 
look at some competing accounts of what fictional characters are in the 
following three sections, but first we will consider some objections to 
his argument. 
 
 4.113 Yagisawa’s objections 
 
Takashi Yagisawa [2001] objects to a few things that creationists about 
fictional characters tend to say, but two of his arguments are 
particularly pertinent to van Inwagen’s position. One (§6) is very 
simple: being fictional entails not existing. Van Inwagen could avoid this 
problem by saying that there are fictional characters but they do not 
exist, but van Inwagen explicitly makes this Meinongian response 
unavailable to himself, and in any case if the view that there are 
fictional characters can only be accepted in conjunction with 
Meinongianism then we should be aware of it.  
 
Yagisawa also examines two non-Meinongian replies and finds both 
wanting. As Yagisawa notes [2001: n. 40], van Inwagen mentions both 
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of the replies [1977: n. 11] and takes one to be a more precise version 
of the other. Yagisawa takes them to be separate and treats them 
separately, and we will do the same.  
 
The first reply paraphrases ‘Poirot does not exist’ as ‘nothing has all the 
properties ascribed to Poirot in the stories’48. Yagisawa rejects this 
because even if someone did have all these properties, ‘Poirot does not 
exist’ would still be true. We will grant him this for now, although the 
issue is discussed in more depth in §4.22 in relation to Kripke’s 
argument that (in a sense) fictional characters could not have existed 
and fictional kinds could not have been instantiated. 
 
The second reply paraphrases ‘Poirot does not exist’ as ‘there is no such 
man as Poirot’. In general, the strategy says that fictional characters will 
come with a sortal property, and when we assert that they do not exist 
we will be saying that they do not fall under it. Yagisawa [2001: 169] 
rejects this because we cannot provide a suitable sortal to use in 
paraphrasing ‘boojams do not exist’, and in any case it does not extend 
in any obvious way to ‘no fictional individual exists’ and the like49. The 
boojams problem seems soluble, if in a fairly unsatisfying way: it seems 
reasonably clear that boojams are meant to be animals, so we could say 
‘there are no such animals as boojams’. Perhaps this will not do, and 
perhaps a better example could be found. In any case, Yagisawa’s 
problem of paraphrasing ‘no fictional individual exists’ is more acute. 
 
                                                          
48 ‘Ascribed’ is a technical term which van Inwagen introduces [1977: 305] to 
refer to the relation between stories or parts of stories, fictional characters 
and the properties those characters have in those (parts of) stories. We will 
discuss ascription some more shortly. 
49 ‘Boojam’ (sometimes ‘boojum’) is a word used in Lewis Carroll’s poem The 
Hunting of the Snark. A boojam is supposed to be a kind of thing, but there is 
not much information in the poem about what kind.  
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More precisely, the suggestion is that we paraphrase ‘no fictional F 
exists’ as ‘there are no such Gs as fictional Fs’, where G is some sortal 
which Fs all fall under. For the paraphrase to be true, no fictional Fs 
may be Gs. So ‘no fictional individual exists’ must be paraphrased as 
‘there are no such Gs as fictional individuals’, where G is some sortal 
which all individuals fall under. But fictional individuals are individuals, 
since everything is. This means that there will be no suitable choice of G 
available. 
 
Consider also the case of fictional fictional individuals: the characters in 
fictions which stories refer to but do not fully recount.50 One might try 
to evade the problem by saying that fictional fictional individuals are 
really just fictional individuals, and it does not matter whether the 
fictions they appear in turn up within fictions or not. This probably will 
not work. A fictional fictional individual will be ascribed having 
properties ascribed to it. Double ascription is not the same as 
ascription, because while an object will always have a property either 
ascribed to it or not, there will be double ascription gaps. Gridley 
Quayle might be neither ascribed being ascribed baldness nor be 
ascribed not being ascribed baldness.  
 
Since fictional fictional individuals are fictional individuals, we will 
want a true paraphrase of ‘no fictional fictional individuals exist’. 
According to the suggestion under consideration, this will be 
paraphrased as ‘there are no such Gs as fictional fictional individuals’, 
where G is a sortal which fictional individuals fall under. Since fictional 
fictional individuals are fictional individuals, they are Gs too, and this 
                                                          
50 An example would be Gridley Quayle, the hero of a series of detective stories 
written by one of the characters in Wodehouse [1976]. A more common 
example is Gonzago, the victim in a play within a play in Hamlet. However, one 
might complain that the play is fully performed during the performances of 
the play. It is however definitely true in Wodehouse’s story that the Gridley 
Quayle stories contain more detail than Wodehouse tells us about. 
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paraphrase will be false. There are probably some unsatisfying ways of 
dealing with attributions of non-existence to fictional characters51, but a 
satisfactory solution will have to wait until §4.431. 
 
We now move to Yagisawa’s second objection [2001: §4]. Van Inwagen 
wants us to take sentences like (1)-(4) at face value, as assertions of 
literary criticism. However, he also wants us not to take sentences like 
‘Gulliver visited a flying island’ and ‘Poirot has a moustache’ at face 
value. They are just as much platitudes of literary criticism, but taken at 
face value they are false. For Yagisawa this is fine: he holds [2001: 163-
4] that literary criticism aims at improving our appreciation of 
literature rather than accurately describing the world and we should 
not expect its claims to be true. However, if we take that attitude 
towards literary criticism, we need not take (1)-(4) at face value either, 
and this means we have no platitudes from which to infer that there are 
fictional characters.  
 
Yagisawa’s point about the function of literary criticism should not be 
swallowed uncritically. At first pass it seems he might be on to 
something: maybe literary criticism and literature form a nice self-
contained symbiotic package which does not impinge on the real world. 
Literary criticism is just there to supplement the literature, and factual 
accuracy is equally unimportant in a novel and in a work of literary 
criticism. Is that right? Well, perhaps Yagisawa is right that literary 
                                                          
51 I suggest three. (1) We take the first paraphrase, that nothing has all the 
properties ascribed to any fictional object, and stipulate that fictional 
characters all have non-actuality, or non-identity to each actual object, 
ascribed to them. (2) We take the first paraphrase and say that, contrary to 
Yagisawa’s intuition, an actual person having all the properties ascribed to 
Poirot is precisely what Poirot existing would amount to. (3) We deny the 
premise that fictionality entails non-existence, taking van Inwagen (standing 




criticism exists to increase our appreciation of literature, or primarily 
for that. It does not follow from this that it does not mean to state facts, 
though. Consider a book on car maintenance. That exists to help people 
maintain their cars, but it still manages to state facts about how cars 
work and what happens when you do things to them. Is this a 
mysterious coincidence, that when someone writes a book that helps 
people maintain their cars they find themselves stating facts? No. The 
book helps people maintain their cars because the things it says about 
cars are true. Perhaps literary criticism works the same way. Suppose a 
critic writes that a novel has a romantic subplot, or has two heroes. 
Why do these increase our appreciation of the novel? The obvious 
answer is that they are true, and readers will understand the book 
better with the information than without. But if the critic’s statements 
are true, then van Inwagen’s argument applies. Perhaps there is another 
way to explain why literary criticism achieves its aims, but the obvious 
explanation is that it does so by stating facts. Or at least, enough of it 
does to run van Inwagen’s argument. Perhaps some of the more literary 
literary criticism does not work by stating facts, but CliffsNotes and the 
like probably do. 
 
Yagisawa would need to do more to dismiss literary criticism as false, 
then. But even if Yagisawa seizes the wrong horn of his dilemma, both 
horns create prima facie trouble for van Inwagen. If we accept the 
platitudes of literary criticism as true, van Inwagen’s theory is false, 
since it denies the ones like ‘Gulliver visited a flying island’. If we do not 
accept them, van Inwagen loses his data. 
 
I do not think Yagisawa is properly addressing van Inwagen’s argument, 
however. Van Inwagen says that it is a truth of logic that (for example) 
(1) entails (2), and despairs of finding a paraphrase which preserves 
the inference. As such, he thinks we should take (1)-(4) at face value. He 
does not despair of finding a paraphrase of ‘Gulliver visited a flying 
island’, so we do not have to take that at face value. The paraphrase he 
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offers uses a relation of ascription between properties, fictional objects 
and pieces of literature. He takes ascription as primitive, but thinks we 
have a fair grasp of it: fictional objects are ascribed the properties they 
have in the stories they come from. Pieces of literature – he calls them 
places – include works and parts of works. Real objects appearing in 
fictions do not have properties ascribed to them according to van 
Inwagen: ascription just holds between fictional objects, the stories to 
which they are native, and the properties they have in those stories. As 
such, it is not just a relation holding between a property, a thing and a 
story according to which it has that property, since real characters can 
have properties in stories too52. Ascription is a sui generis relation 
grasped by anyone who understands ‘Poirot is Belgian’. I agree that we 
have a fair grasp of the relation and that van Inwagen is justified in 
taking it as primitive for the purposes of his discussion, though it may 
admit of further analysis in principle, and clearly there is room for 
debate as to exactly what properties are ascribed to which characters in 
which places. Now, ‘Gulliver visited a flying island’ is paraphrased as: 
 
FG x[Ascribed(visiting a flying island, Gulliver, x)] 
 
Playing according to van Inwagen’s rules, this is an adequate 
paraphrase only if it satisfies LC. So, what are the logical consequences 
of ‘Gulliver visited a flying island’?  One obvious candidate is ‘Gulliver 
visited an island’. That is paraphrased as follows: 
 
IG x[Ascribed(visiting an island, Gulliver, x)] 
                                                          
52 These properties will presumably not always be purely qualitative: Holmes 
is ascribed living in London; but London, being a real city, is not ascribed 
being home to Holmes or anything else. As such we will have to cash out 
‘Holmes lives in London’ as the ascription to Holmes in Doyle’s stories of the 
monadic object-involving property of living in London, not the two-place 





IG is not a formal consequence of FG, so van Inwagen needs ‘Gulliver 
visited an island’ not to be a logical consequence of ‘Gulliver visited an 
island’ either. Is it? Well, it is an open question whether ascription is 
closed under (multi-premise) logical consequence. The notion of logical 
consequence involved here might be non-classical to deal with 
inconsistent fictions, but pretty much any notion of logical consequence 
will have visiting an island being a consequence of visiting a flying 
island. Certainly it seems like any story in which someone visited a 
flying island would have them visit an island, at least if the story did not 
explicitly say that they did not. We must be careful however to 
distinguish two questions. One is whether ascription is in fact closed 
under logical consequence, and another is whether its closure under 
logical consequence is a truth of logic. Only the latter causes van 
Inwagen a problem, because only the latter makes ‘Gulliver visited an 
island’ a logical consequence of ‘Gulliver visited a flying island’. 
 
To see the difference, suppose we set up a machine which 
systematically prints out the logical consequences of a set of first order 
axioms one by one, and leave it running for ever. We could make sure it 
missed none out, by having it run through an effective enumeration of 
finite sequences of sentences of the language and check whether they 
are proofs from the axioms according to a sound and complete 
axiomatic proof procedure. The output of the machine will be closed 
under logical consequence, but that it is so closed will not be a truth of 
logic; it will be a contingent truth dependent on the way the machine 
was set up53. 
 
                                                          
53 In case some readers are worried, I should point out that this sort of 
machine does not contradict Gödel’s incompleteness theorem or Church’s 
undecidablity theorem. It would not violate incompleteness because for some 
sentences φ the output theory need not contain either φ or ¬φ, and it would 
not violate undecidability because the machine would never be finished. 
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Now, it is possible that ascription is closed the way the output of the 
machine is closed, not as a matter of logic but because of the 
conventions governing the interpretation of literature. Is it likely that it 
is closed under consequence as a matter of logic? The answer to this 
question depends on the metaphysical story we accept about fiction. If 
we thought, with the Meinongians, that for ‘Gulliver visited a flying 
island’ to be true someone had to visit a flying island, we might well 
think that as a matter of logic someone would have to visit an island 
too54. If we thought, with van Inwagen, that for ‘Gulliver visited a flying 
island’ to be true certain literary practices have to take place but no 
flying islands need get involved, then whether it would have to have 
‘Gulliver visited an island’ as a consequence would depend on the 
conventions governing those practices. Fine [1982: 116] says that there 
could be a practice of inert literature whose conventions were that 
anything true in the work was stated explicitly. If he is right, van 
Inwagen is safe, and if Fine is wrong for some reason other than logical 
necessity, then van Inwagen is still safe.  
 
Van Inwagen’s story looks coherent, then. He can coherently maintain 
that if ascription is closed under some kind of consequence then that is 
a contingent fact dependent on how our literary practices work. If 
Gulliver’s visit to a flying island entails a visit to an island, that is 
because we have decided, collectively and implicitly, that logic holds in 
his world, not because independently of our decisions logic holds in 
                                                          
54 Meinongians do not have to think this though: they may hold that logical 
completeness and consistency are constraints applying only to the existent. 
Parsons [1980: 19] holds this (see §3.123, below). Zalta [1983] holds that 
abstract objects must be consistent and complete in the properties they 
exemplify by not in the properties they encode, and Gulliver only encodes 
visiting a flying island. He does in fact encode visiting an island too, but this is 




ours. Van Inwagen’s paraphrase does not fall foul of LC on those 
grounds. 
 
There are however some other kinds of consequence of ascription 
sentences which van Inwagen will need to preserve. For example, from 
‘Gulliver visited a flying island’ and ‘Gulliver is a character in an 
eighteenth century novel’, we get ‘a character in an eighteenth century 
novel visited a flying island’. Van Inwagen has no trouble with this. Here 
are the paraphrases: 
 
x[Ascribed(visiting a flying island, Gulliver, x)] 
 
Character in an Eighteenth Century novel(Gulliver) 
 
 x[Character in an Eighteenth Century novel(x) & 
∃y[Ascribed(visiting a flying island, x, y)]] 
 
Ultimately we should not be so surprised that van Inwagen’s 
paraphrase gets the right entailments if we think that his story about 
fictional characters is a credible one. If assertions like ‘Gulliver visited a 
flying island’ are about literature and not about islands, van Inwagen’s 
paraphrase is more perspicuous. It gets closer to the truth, and so it 
should get closer to the right logical consequences. Of course, if we do 
not accept his metaphysical story then we might well not accept his 
paraphrase either. In general, we can expect paraphrases to fall foul of 
his condition LC when they are trying to eliminate ontological 
commitments by brute force, but not when they are trying to get at 
what is really being talked about. 
 
So Yagisawa’s dilemma should not trouble van Inwagen. Yagisawa 
[2001: 165-7] has another response to the argument, however, which is 
to offer paraphrases of van Inwagen’s data, i.e. sentences like (1)-(4), 
which do preserve the logical inferences. Following van Inwagen’s 
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suggestion, he understands the paraphrases as quantifying over the 
terms used to refer to fictional characters. If these paraphrases satisfied 
condition LC, much of the force of van Inwagen’s argument would be 
lost, but perhaps some would remain. He could hold that the 
paraphrases in terms of names of fictional characters are implausible, 
and that even if they can be made to give the right truth values, they do 
so only artificially and by changing the subject. A related response to a 
paraphrase is to say that even if when you paraphrase something you 
provide a different way of saying it, the original is still true. Here is 
Kripke: 
 
In ordinary language, we very often quantify over fictional 
characters. Perhaps such quantification could be eliminated if it 
were always possible to replace the original (quantified) 
sentence with a sentence describing the activities of people. 
[Footnote: Nevertheless, it is true that there are fictional 
characters with certain properties, and anyone who denies this 
is wrong.] [Kripke 2011b: 63] 
 
I am quite sympathetic to Kripke’s attitude here, and if a viable 
paraphrase was produced then a proper defence of it would be worth 
investigating. That style of argument does however risk resting heavily 
on intuitions, which would need to be balanced against other inputs to 
our reflective equilibrium, such as intuitions about the ontological 
queerness of fictional characters. Van Inwagen’s position certainly 
seems stronger if there is no competing paraphrase in the game. In view 
of this, let us examine Yagisawa’s. To get a sense of how he envisages 
the paraphrases going, here is his paraphrase of (1): 
 
There be (apparent) singular terms, t1, t2, …, tk (1<k), in some 
19th-century novels such that for any (apparent) singular term tm 
in any 18th-century novel the accompanying predicates for t1, t2, 
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…, tk exhibit a greater wealth of physical detail than the 
accompanying predicates for tm. [Yagisawa 2001: 165] 
 
What is wrong with this? Well, one charge which metalinguistic 
paraphrases always have to answer is that of changing the subject. Do 
statements about the detail with which fictional characters are 
described entail the existence of predicates and referring expressions? 
Is this entailment logical? Perhaps the case can be made more plausibly 
here than it can in metalinguistic analyses of attitude ascriptions, for 
example the one Church [1950, 1954] attributes to Carnap [1947: §§13-
15] and criticizes using his translation test, which I described in §1.13. 
Copies of novels and the sentences in them are linguistic tokens, and 
perhaps Yagisawa can claim that discourse about fiction really is 
discourse about language. Since literary translation is a tricky topic, 
perhaps we could also say something to spare Yagisawa’s paraphrases 
embarrassment at the hands of the translation test.  
 
A problem which is probably less tractable is that characters can be 
referred to with more than one singular term (orthographically 
individuated); and singular terms, even proper names, can be used to 
refer to more than one character in the same work. Wuthering Heights 
is a particularly nasty case (spoilers55), but the phenomenon is 
ubiquitous and stops us replacing fictional characters either with 
singular terms or equivalence classes of singular terms. It would be 
foolhardy to say categorically that Yagisawa’s proposal could not be 
patched up without committing to characters or something just as 
                                                          
55 ‘Mr Earnshaw’ refers to three people, ‘Mr Heathcliff’ to two, and ‘Linton’ to 
three, one of whom is a Mr Heathcliff; two people are sometimes called 
‘Catherine’ and sometimes ‘Cathy’, there are two people called ‘Mrs Heathcliff’, 
and three called Mrs Earnshaw. One Catherine/Cathy is variously a Mrs 
Heathcliff and a Mrs Earnshaw. All are of course referred to using various 
pronouns, and a system of nested narrators ensures that several different 
characters are also referred to as ‘I’. 
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unpalatable, but as it stands the proposal will not do, and there are 
reasons to think the prospects are bleak. 
 
We would presumably want to individuate the (apparent) singular 
terms in some non-orthographic way, perhaps along the causal-
historical lines in Kaplan [1990], but without reifying the causal chains 
and histories themselves. The problem is that we want the singular 
terms to be really individuated, because we are really quantifying over 
them, but we do not want to reify the things individuating them. Of 
course it would be quite extreme to reify the causal chains and histories 
involving fictional characters, where one points at another and says 
‘let’s call him NN’, since none of this pointing goes on. (It is fiction.) The 
problem goes deeper, though. We do not even want to reify things like 
novelists’ artistic creations, and maybe not even literary practices 
corresponding to fictional characters, since in doing so we would be 
reifying theoretical entities of literary criticism, which would either be 
van Inwagen’s creatures of fiction themselves or stand-ins which save 
nothing in ontology and just make the paraphrases uglier. Van Inwagen 
is not reifying flying islands or giants or anything like that; he is just 
committing to the objects with reference to which we describe literary 
practices. 
 
There is a reply open to Yagisawa. Whatever van Inwagen says is true 
about fictional characters, we can duplicate it without ontological 
commitment by using a positive free logical56 theory parasitic on van 
Inwagen’s theory. Van Inwagen thinks, presumably, that the way the 
fictional characters are supervenes on the way the concrete part of 
reality is. We can say that, rather than generating a realm of fictional 
entities, this creates some singular terms and determines the truth 
values of sentences containing them. These singular terms need not be 
                                                          
56 A positive free logic is one where atomic formulas containing empty names 
need not always be false. 
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created ex nihilo; the generation process could cause some objects from 
elsewhere in the ontology, e.g. sets, to count as singular terms. This 
option is available to anyone who holds that there are enough things (of 
whatever kind). Then we can understand the quantification 
substitutionally. This ought to successfully mimic the results van 
Inwagen gets, without committing to fictional characters. We can even 
modify van Inwagen’s results slightly if we like, for example by having 
‘n exists’ be false where n is one of the new singular terms. 
 
An immediate response is that if we were allowed to do this sort of 
thing then we could do it everywhere and never have to commit 
ontologically to anything. This isn’t right, though. We still need to be 
realistic about the determining base facts, or there is nothing to 
generate the language and determine the truth values of the sentences. 
The reason we can be parasitic on van Inwagen’s theory is that the 
nature of the fictional realm is determined by that of the concrete 
realm, so we can extract something equivalent to the whole theory 
while only committing ontologically to a part of it. The strategy does 
generalize, but only to other theories where one part is determined by 
another. For example, if the truth of the continuum hypothesis (and all 
the other mathematical undecidables) are not determined by the base, 
this strategy cannot be applied to mimic realism about sets without 
commitment. When the base determines the rest, however, we can 
always make do with just the base, assuming this strategy is legitimate. 
And maybe that is right. Strategies in this vein are offered by Rayo 
[2007, 2008], Williams [2012], Linnebo [2012], Cameron [2010], and 
Melia [1995, 2008]. On the other hand, this kind of radically minimal 
paraphrasing strategy has to say something about ordinary talk about 
tables and chairs, because ordinary talk is not going away, and (what is 
at least as important) ordinary language is useful because it 
corresponds in some way to how things really are. If a paraphrasing 
strategy cannot distinguish in a principled way between the reality of 
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fictional characters and that of medium sized dry goods, then fictional 
characters will probably remain respectable enough. 
 
 4.12 Categorizing Fictional Ontologies 
 
Kit Fine [1982: 97] draws three distinctions between different views of 
non-existent objects: Platonism/empiricism, literalism/contextualism, 
and internalism/externalism. Platonism holds that it is necessary which 
non-existent objects there are, independent of us or anything else, while 
empiricism does not. Literalism holds that the objects really have the 
properties ascribed to them in the literary contexts, while 
contextualism does not. Internalism individuates the objects according 
to the properties they have in the literary contexts, whereas 
externalism does not. That is quite simple. Perhaps some views could 
try to straddle one or other of the distinctions, but most do not. 
 
The three distinctions give rise to eight positions, some of which fit 
together less naturally than others. We could also make finer 
distinctions, and will make two. Platonism/empiricism can be divided 
into two distinctions: whether what non-existents there are is 
necessary or contingent and whether they depend ontologically on 
human activity or not. These come apart if what fictional characters 
there are is contingent on something else. Fine’s distinctions are also 
designed for classifying theories of non-existents rather than fictional 
characters, so to capture van Inwagen’s view about fictional characters 
we would have to add the Meinongian/Quinean distinction, with 
Meinongians holding that fictional characters do not exist and Quineans 
holding that they do. Van Inwagen is on the Quinean side. More 
distinctions will be possible, but we will stop here. These five 
distinctions give rise to thirty-two views, of which some will be quite 
peculiar. Rather than consider all thirty-two, we will look at three 
categories: dependent abstracta, Platonic abstracta, and Meinongian 
concreta. This will let us orient ourselves within the space of positions 
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we have mapped out, and situate the theories people actually put 
forward within it. 
 
 4.121 Dependent Abstracta 
 
Thomasson [1999] puts forward an account of what fictional characters 
are which is close to the spirit of van Inwagen’s position. The basic idea 
is that fictional characters are abstract artefacts. Sculptures and 
screwdrivers are concrete artefacts, and fictional characters are like 
that but abstract. Authors initiate literary practices, and these practices 
give rise to various abstract objects, such as novels, poems and 
characters. They are the same type of thing as other non-concrete 
artistic creations such as musical works. More generally, they are the 
same type of things as other things which are not concrete but exist in 
virtue of the activities of humans, such as political institutions and 
games. John Searle [1995] has explained in more detail how we might 
understand these social entities arising. If we don’t like that view, then 
with some ingenuity of the kind discussed in Lewis and Lewis [1970] 
we can often find concrete things to identify with these things. Perhaps 
the House of Commons is a building or a group of people; perhaps 
nations are pieces of territory and their contents; perhaps games are 
events (or at least mereological fusions of events). If we do accept an 
ontology of dependent abstracta to serve as social entities, however, it 
is not much ontological profligacy to accept that fictional characters are 
among them too. 
 
Kripke [2011b] takes a similar view, and while unpublished his work 
has influenced the development of the position57. He explicitly says that 
they exist contingently, drawing the comparison with nations: 
 
                                                          
57 In particular his 1973 John Locke Lectures, now published as Kripke [2013]. 
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It is important to see that fictional characters so called are not 
shadowy possible people. The question of their existence is a 
question about the actual world. It depends on whether certain 
works have actually been written, certain stories in fiction have 
actually been told. The fictional character can be regarded as an 
abstract entity which exists in virtue of the activities of human 
beings, in the same way that nations are abstract entities which 
exist in virtue of the activities of human beings and their 
interrelations. A nation exists if certain conditions are true about 
human beings and their relations; it may not be reducible to 
them because we cannot spell them out exactly (or, perhaps, 
without circularity). Similarly, a fictional character exists if 
human beings have done certain things, namely, created certain 
works of fiction and the characters in them. [2011b: 63] 
 
Thomasson and Kripke hold that fictional characters exist contingently, 
depend ontologically on human activity and do not literally have the 
properties ascribed to them in the stories (except sometimes 
coincidentally). It is also in the spirit of the view of fictional characters 
as dependent abstracta to hold that if two independent literary 
practices ascribed a character the same properties, there would be two 
different characters. Thomasson takes this view explicitly [1999: ch. 5], 
which places her on the externalist side, although perhaps truth in 
fiction works in such a way that this never happens. (Obvious 
candidates for duplicated fictions involve symmetrical universes and 
simple stories, although symmetrical universes might well ascribe 
different object-involving properties even if they ascribed the same 
qualitative properties. Our Holmes lives in our London, while the other 
half’s Holmes lives in London’s duplicate.) But Thomasson’s 
externalism also involves holding that if an author had told their story 
differently then the same characters would have been ascribed different 




 4.122 Platonic Abstracta 
 
Zalta [1983] puts forwards a systematic ontology of abstract objects, 
and identifies fictional objects with some of these. The view is supposed 
to supply all the abstract objects we need: mathematical objects, 
properties, Fregean senses, possible worlds, and even Platonic forms 
[1983: 41-7] and Leibnizian monads [1983: 84-90] if we want them. 
One advantage of finding a place for fictional characters in this ontology 
is that it is ontologically parsimonious: Zalta can commit to fictional 
characters without committing to anything he was not committed to 
already. Another feature which may be an advantage is that our 
knowledge of a systematic ontology of abstracta will presumably be a 
priori. Since abstracta appear not to be causally efficacious it can be 
difficult to see how we could have a posteriori knowledge of them. 
There are problems with a priori knowledge of abstracta too, but they 
are different problems and perhaps they have solutions, at least if the 
abstract ontology is systematic and independent of what goes on in the 
concrete part of reality. This is the view taken by Linsky and Zalta 
[1995: especially §V]. 
 
There will be more than one way of developing an account of Platonic 
abstracta which could include fictional characters among them. The 
features distinguishing such accounts will generally be that the objects 
are discovered rather than created, they are somehow plenitudinous, 
and they do not literally have the properties ascribed to them in the 
stories. Zalta’s account (with one caveat58) has all these features, and 
we will take it as a representative way of implementing the general 
project and look at some of its details. 
                                                          
58 The caveat is that Zalta holds that there are two kinds of instantiation and 
the copula is ambiguous between them, so while ‘Holmes is a man’ doesn’t say 
the same about Holmes that ‘Obama is a man’ says about Obama, it does still 
say it literally. It is however still contextualism in the sense that the objects do 




Zalta [1983: 11ff] distinguishes two kinds of instantiation. The familiar 
and uncontroversial kind is exemplification, so I exemplify being human, 
the Eiffel Tower exemplifies being tall, and Mercury exemplifies being a 
planet. However, following an idea he credits to Meinong’s student 
Ernst Mally, he distinguishes another kind of instantiation, which only 
abstract objects do. He calls this encoding. For many conditions on 
properties, there will be exactly one abstract object encoding just those 
properties. This will mean that abstract objects can be inconsistent or 
incomplete with respect to the properties they encode. Non-
contradiction and excluded middle apply to exemplification but not to 
encoding.  
 
He symbolizes exemplification in the normal way, like Fa for ‘a 
instantiates F’, and encoding as aF. Properties can also be expressed by 
lambda terms, so the property exemplified by everything satisfying an 
open formula φx is expressed by the term [λx.φx]. He introduces a 
plenitude schema for abstract objects, which is supposed to generate all 
of them59: 
 
∃x(A!x & ∀F(xF ↔ φ)), where x is not free in φ. [1983: 34] 
 
‘A!’ is a predicate meaning ‘is abstract’. Except for the instance 
generating the object encoding all the properties and the object 
encoding none of them, F will be free in φ, so φ picks out a condition on 
properties, just as an open sentence with one free objectual variable 
picks out a condition on objects. For example, we know there is a 
property encoding all and only Obama’s properties, because of this 
instance of the schema: 
                                                          
59 From Linsky and Zalta [1995: 552]: ‘One reason that Platonized Naturalism 
is simple is that a single, formally precise principle asserts the existence of all 




∃x(A!x & ∀F(xF ↔ F(Obama))) 
 
He also defines a third order relation of property identity holding 
between any pair of properties encoded by all the same objects [1983: 
13], so we can have instances of the schema which enumerate the 
properties encoded by an object: 
 
∃x(A!x & ∀F(xF ↔ [F=Round v F=Square])) 
 
This generates Meinong’s [1960: 82-3] notorious round square60. 
Unsurprisingly given the history of naïve set theory, Zalta needs to put 
some constraints on φ in order to avoid paradoxes. We discuss how 
successful this is in §4.234. 
 
He takes it that encoding is a kind of instantiation, and that the natural 
language copula is ambiguous, so ‘a is F’ is ambiguous between an 
encoding and exemplifying reading.  He holds that fictional characters 
are the objects encoding all and only the properties ascribed to them in 
the stories to which they are native, so ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ 
has a true (encoding) reading and a false (exemplifying) reading. 
Assuming that the stories leave open whether or not Holmes likes 
broccoli, Holmes will neither encode liking broccoli nor encode not 
liking broccoli. ‘Holmes does not like broccoli’ will thus be triply 
ambiguous between (using obvious symbolizations) ¬LBh, which is (of 
course) true, ¬hLB, which is true, and h[λx.¬LBx], which is false. Holmes 
                                                          
60 This gives us a round square, but perhaps Meinong had a different one in 
mind. This round square encodes only roundness and squareness, not their 
consequences. Perhaps Meinong thought his round square had straight sides 
as well as being square. The round square presumably does not have the 
properties it encodes closed under classical or necessary implication though, 
because then it would encode every property and be indiscernible with the 
round triangle. We will not explore the exegetical point. 
 175 
 
and Watson will both be abstract objects and encode properties 
involving each other. Holmes lives with Watson and Watson lives with 
Holmes, so we have h[λx.Lxw] and w[λx.Lxh].  
 
An important feature of the account is that abstract objects can and 
often will stand in various relations to concrete objects like us: we think 
about them, draw pictures of them, admire them and so on. Zalta [2000] 
shows how his theory can accommodate a lot of the things we want to 
say about fictional characters. It is impressive if it works, although we 
will examine a possible problem with it in §4.234. 
 
It is worth situating Zalta’s account within the five distinctions outlined 
earlier, and seeing how much variation across these distinctions would 
affect the account’s spirit. It is Platonist rather than empiricist, in Fine’s 
sense: it is not meant to be contingent what abstract objects there are. It 
is contingent which of them count as fictional characters because it is 
contingent which of them get written about, but whether we write 
about them or not they will still exist and be intrinsically unchanged. It 
is internalist, in that the objects are individuated by the properties they 
encode. It is contextualist in that e.g. Holmes is not a human in the same 
way that I am a human. Zalta does however take ‘Holmes is human’ to 
be literally true, because of his view about the ambiguity in the copula. 
The theory is Meinongian, but it does not make a special case for 
fictional characters: it holds that no abstract objects exist. The view 
could however be modified without changing much, instead saying that 
the concreta, contingent non-concreta and abstracta all necessarily 
exist. (Linsky and Zalta [1994: §4] offer just such a modification.) 
 
The issue of whether the objects depend ontologically on us or anything 
else is slightly vexed. Some objects encode object-involving properties. 
Holmes encodes living with Watson, which involves Watson, but he also 
encodes living in London. One might think that these properties 
depended on Watson and London respectively, and that the objects 
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depended on the properties they encoded, making Holmes and Watson 
co-dependent and both dependent on London. Within Zalta’s 
framework there is no danger of this making them exist contingently, 
since he does not think it is contingent whether there is such a thing as 
London. He thinks that mere possibilia are contingently non-concrete, 
along the same lines as Williamson [1998, 2002]. Zalta holds contra 
Williamson that non-concrete things are non-existent, but as we said 
this can be modified without disrupting much else. 
 
Even if we agree about it not being contingent what there is, we might 
still hold that objects encoding object-involving properties depended on 
those objects, even if there could be no non-trivial modal dependence. 
This might create some worries about reciprocal dependence, such as 
that between Holmes and Watson. Perhaps we should not worry about 
this in the case of abstract objects, but something should at least be 
said. If we take ontological dependence seriously, as is becoming 
fashionable61, then saying it is not contingent what there is will not get 
us off the hook. 
 
If we hold that it is contingent what there is, as most people do, then the 
problems could go beyond those of reciprocal dependence. If Holmes 
essentially depends on London62, and it is contingent that there is such 
a thing as London, then it is contingent that there is such a thing as 
                                                          
61 For orientation on this development, see Bennett [forthcoming] and Correia 
[2008]. 
62 By ‘essentially depends’ I mean that he depends on London and could not 
exist without depending on London. There are plausible candidates for things 
which inessentially depend on others, for example an object might depend on 
its parts even though it could have had different parts and depended on those 
instead. The case of Holmes and London looks like essential dependence 
though: Holmes essentially encodes living in London and living in London 
essentially involves London. If encoding and object-involvement entail 
dependence, then Holmes essentially depends on London. 
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Holmes. This would put the view on the empiricist side of Fine’s 
distinction. It should however be noted that the resultant view still has 
fictional characters depend on the concrete world in a very different 
way from how they do in Thomasson’s framework. Contingentist 
Platonism has the domain of individuals generate a plenitude of 
abstracta whatever those individuals are like, whereas Thomasson’s 
view has the abstracta depend on what the individuals do. This kind of 
issue suggests that Fine’s Platonist/empiricist distinction does not 
capture all the distinctions we want to make. We should keep the issues 
of necessity and dependence separate, and note that even dependent 
abstracta can vary in how Platonist or empiricist they are in spirit.  
 
 4.123 Non-existent Concreta 
 
At least in its non-Meinongian form, there is nothing especially pre-
theoretically jaw-dropping about Zalta’s theory. We seem to be talking 
about some things so we introduce some abstract objects to be the 
things we were talking about, and then explain how to cash out what we 
say in terms of them. Taken in the right way, the views of Thomasson, 
Kripke and van Inwagen should also not irritate the ontological scruples 
of anyone already on board with social entities of the kind Searle argues 
for. Maybe our sense of reality is robust enough to get offended by the 
postulation of anything that cannot be kicked, but the view of fictional 
characters as abstract objects is not ontologically extravagant in a way 
that other uses of abstract objects are not. Whether they give an 
adequate account of discourse within and about fiction is a different 
issue, but the accusation of craziness is unlikely to stick. 
 
There is another approach to fictional characters, however, which can 
look a little crazy. Within Fine’s distinctions, this is the literalist 
approach. Literalists hold that creatures of fiction are creatures of flesh 
and blood. Hamlet really is a thinking, conscious, indecisive prince. 
Faust really made a pact with Mephistopheles. Harry Potter is a real 
 178 
 
wizard and Hogwarts a real school. You have to say something in 
mitigation to get a view like this taken seriously. The main options are 
distinguishing fictional characters from us by saying they do not exist or 
are not actual. Lewis [1978] does not quite identify fictional characters 
with concrete possibilia, but a development of it which comes closer to 
making this identification is propounded, though not really endorsed, 
by Frederick Kroon [1994]. Here we will examine Parsons’ [1980] 
Meinongian view that fictional characters are non-existent concreta, 
because that is the most straightforward literalist position. In 
particular, Kroon’s suggestion takes there to be a plurality of Holmeses, 
and suggests a supervaluational treatment of sentences like ‘Holmes is 
cleverer than any (actually) existent detective’. Parsons takes Holmes to 
be one non-existent man, who may well be cleverer than any existent 
detective. 
 
Parsons has a principle of plenitude for objects which, like Zalta’s, 
constructs them out of properties. There is no 
encoding/exemplification distinction: the objects just straightforwardly 
have the properties they are constructed from. However, according to 
his theory there is no golden mountain that exists, no possible round 
square, no television thought about by Socrates and nothing complete 
but not organic or inorganic. (Complete is a technical term Parsons uses 
for objects which, for every property, have either that property or its 
negation.) This means he needs to impose restrictions on how to 
construct objects out of properties. 
 
Parsons distinguishes between nuclear and extranuclear properties, and 
holds that for every set of nuclear properties there is an object which 
has just those properties. Existence, possibility, being thought about by 
Socrates and completeness are all extranuclear properties. They are 
respectively ontological, modal, intentional and technical, which are the 




To get round Russell’s famous problem of the existent golden mountain 
and the like, Parsons [1980: 42-4] says that extranuclear properties 
also have watered-down nuclear versions. The existent golden 
mountain has existence, but does not exist. This was Meinong’s solution. 
Russell was unimpressed, so was Quine [1948], and if I may report an 
intuition, so am I. Going beyond intuitions, we can put the problem like 
this. In the stories, Holmes is a human and he exists. Parsons says that 
Holmes is a human just like me, but he does not exist just like me. I exist 
in the watered-down way and in the neat way, but Holmes only exists in 
the watered-down way. But this raises the question of what being a 
human is supposed to amount to. Why not say that I am a human in the 
neat way and Holmes is only human in the watered-down way? Well, it 
turns out that to make the theory work you need two kinds of existence 
but you can get away with only one kind of humanity. This makes the 
distinction ad hoc and obscure though. Is humanity like the watered-
down properties or like the neat properties? It seems to me to be like 
the watered-down versions, because in itself it does not have any 
existent-world consequences. But that’s unsatisfying, because my 
humanity seems no less watered-down than my existence. This line of 
objection is impressionistic, but the distinction it objects to is obscure. 
More needs to be said, and it is not clear to me that anything much 
illuminating can be said. 
 
Fine [1984] also raises some technical and some philosophical 
objections to Parsons’ view. In response to the technical objections he 
makes some suggestions as to how the view could be fixed in the same 
spirit, while the philosophical objections are to the spirit. Parsons’ view 
is necessitarian, Platonist, internalist, literalist and Meinongian, 
whereas Fine favours a view which is contingentist, empiricist, 
externalist, contextualist and Meinongian. I won’t go through all the 
technical difficulties and suggested fixes, but suffice to say that Fine 




It may be that a literalist theory can be put forward which does not 
need watered-down properties and does not experience the technical 
troubles Fine finds in Parsons’ theory. Yagisawa’s [2010] theory may be 
a candidate, although he may not see it as Meinongian: he holds that all 
the possibilia and impossibilia are (absolutely) real and concrete, but 
that their existence is relative to worlds and times [2010: 49-61]. If 
Yagisawa’s view is not strictly Meinongian then it is presumably 
structurally similar to one which is, and the distinction may be merely 
verbal. In any case, my strategy will try to sidestep the issue of whether 
a version of concrete Meinongianism can ultimately be made to work. 
Instead we can try to undermine its motivation by presenting a 
combination of pretence for discourse within fiction and abstracta for 
discourse about fiction, which includes a straightforward but non-





4.2 Problems for Fictional Ontologies 
 
 4.21 Creations or Discoveries? 
 
If you think there are fictional characters, you need to say something 
about their relationship with their authors. There are three natural 
positions here: 
 
1) Authors create fictional characters: before Doyle wrote his 
stories there was no Holmes, but now there is, as a result of 
Doyle’s activity. 
2) There are some things already out there which authors turn into 
fictional characters by their activities. Holmes was already there, 
but it is as a result of Doyle’s activity that he is a fictional 
character. 
3) Authors discover fictional characters: the fictional characters are 
all already out there, and Doyle discovered Holmes by writing 
his stories. 
 
Thomasson holds the first position, that fictional characters depend 
ontologically on the literary activities of concrete beings like us. For 
Thomasson, our activities bring them into existence, and under some 
conditions they can go out of existence too. For example, if the Earth 
had been destroyed before we started broadcasting radio and TV shows 
into space, all traces of our literary practices would have been 
destroyed, and all the fictional characters depending on those practices 
would have been destroyed with us. Some fictional characters were 
probably destroyed when the library of Alexandria burned, too, or if not 
immediately then soon after when their readers had all forgotten them 
or died. The creationist position has some support from the things we 
ordinarily say: we often talk about authors creating their characters, 
and we seldom talk about them being discovered. Thomasson’s position 
allows us to take this as literally true. There is room for holding that 
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fictional characters can be created but not destroyed or (bizarrely) vice 
versa, but I will ignore this distinction here. 
 
Zalta holds the second position: there is a plenitude of abstract objects, 
and when an author writes a story according to which there is 
something which is a certain way, the abstract object encoding the 
relevant properties becomes a fictional character. This makes fictional 
characters stand to their authors in the kind of relation Marcel 
Duchamp’s famous fountain stands to Duchamp. Before Duchamp’s 
artistic activity the object was just a urinal, and his activity turned it 
into an artwork. He did not cause there to be any objects that were not 
there before, but he did cause there to be an artwork where before 
there was no artwork. Parsons [1980: 188] mentions this suggestion 
and credits it to David Kaplan, without indicating that either of them 
endorses it. 
 
The third position, that fictional characters are already fictional 
characters before their authors discover them, is not so popular. There 
is not much which could make us pick it ahead of the second, and the 
second probably accords better with ordinary talk. This is a symptom of 
the shallowness of the difference between them, though, at least from a 
metaphysical point of view. Perhaps considerations could be brought to 
bear from the details of our literary activities. Interesting as that sort of 
thing might be, I will leave it to other people. The metaphysical question 
is about what there is and what it is like. The second and third positions 
agree about these, except for the extension of ‘fictional character’ (with 
respect to various times), which makes the disagreement between them 
look merely verbal. For present purposes, we will look at the 
disagreement between positions like Thomasson’s, which we can call 
creationist, and positions like Zalta’s, which we can call selectionist, 




As I mentioned earlier, creationism seems to be most in line with 
ordinary talk. We say Doyle created Holmes; we don’t say he found him 
and decided to write about him. Perhaps we’re wrong to say this, or our 
talk of creation is not meant literally, but insofar as ordinary talk is on 
either side, it is on the creationist side. Or so it seems. Presumably what 
goes for Holmes goes for all fictional characters, but ordinary talk can 
be more capricious than our metaphysics should be. It seems to me that 
the best candidates for fictional characters which we might say prima 
facie were discovered are the characters in jokes. Jokes abound with 
characters: rabbis, bishops, Englishmen, Irishmen, and the amusingly 
named callers in knock knock jokes. Jokes are often simple enough that 
people might well think of them independently, and the author’s input 
can often seem more like the discovery of a pre-existing near-
homophone than the ex nihilo creation of a fictional universe and its 
inhabitants. Insofar as there is a pull towards saying jokes are 
discovered and not created, there is some pull towards saying the same 
of their characters. Perhaps the pull is not strong, but if the point is 
conceded for jokes, we can push it to novels, since the case is hard to 
make that they are different in kind. Good novelists discover that if 
words are arranged in a particular order then a good novel results. The 
possibility of so arranging the words was already there, and perhaps 
the characters were there too. 
 
Examination of ordinary talk can shade into discussion of aesthetic 
reasons for saying that characters are created rather than discovered. 
One might think discovery did not do justice to artistic creativity. It is 
perhaps more common to argue in this way about musical works. Here 
is Jerrold Levinson: 
 
The first objection to the view that musical works are sound 
structures is this. If musical works were sound structures, then 
musical works could not, properly speaking, be created by their 
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composers. For sound structures are types of a pure sort which 
exist at all times… 
 But why should we insist that composers truly create 
their compositions? Why is this a reasonable requirement? This 
question needs to be answered. A defense of the desideratum of 
true creation follows.  
The main reason for holding to it is that it is one of the 
most firmly entrenched of our beliefs concerning art… [Levinson 
1980:7-8, discussing a point he credits to Wolterstorff 1975: 
138] 
 
The same sort of thing could be said about fictional characters. Maybe if 
Shakespeare merely worked out that you could write a play about 
someone just like Hamlet that detracts from his achievement. I do not 
see how though, really: writing the play would be just as difficult either 
way. The hard part is writing the right words in the right order, 
whether metaphysics works such that this constitutes creating Hamlet 
or discovering him. To paraphrase Davidson [1971: 23], Shakespeare 
never did more than move his body, and the rest was up to nature. 
Rearranging the furniture of the world can be as artistic as adding to it, 
as with flower arranging. (Doubtless some people will say that calling 
flower arranging mere rearrangement does not do justice to its 
creativity either, but considering concrete artworks at least puts the 
issue about fictional characters in some perspective.)  
 
It is however conceivable that our appreciation of literature would be 
improved if we believed that authors created their characters rather 
than discovering them. Should this affect what we believe? There are a 
few reasons for thinking it should. 
 
First, truth gives a pro tanto reason to believe a proposition, but it is 
probably sometimes rationally permissible to believe in opposition to 
the evidence and arguments, for people who can manage it. (Standard 
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examples involve powerful beings who will punish or reward you based 
on your beliefs, as in one version of Pascal’s wager.) Maybe aesthetic 
concerns could provide such non-epistemic reasons to hold a particular 
position about the metaphysics of fictional characters. 
 
Second, if the metaphysics of fiction is itself fiction, then literature 
might be better off for metaphysics contributing one picture rather than 
another, and it is the job of writers of fiction to improve literature. This 
possibility is a live one: fictionalism is a common view all over 
metaphysics. Perhaps fictionalism is not an option in the metaphysics of 
fiction on pain of some kind of regress, but perhaps it is. I will not be 
addressing that question here because it is more a meta-metaphysical 
issue than a metaphysical one and discussion of it would take us too far 
afield. 
 
Third, it is not uncommon to classify works of art in one genre or 
another according to what genre they would be a good example of, and 
this may even contribute to determining which genre a work actually 
falls under. (For example, Ben Caplan [2011] argues partly on this basis 
that the movie Fight Club is a romantic comedy.) If there is room in our 
metaphysics for both created and discovered characters, we might be 
correct to classify characters one way or another depending on how it 
contributes to our appreciation of the works they appear in. 
 
The first reason can be ignored, because I am only interested in telling 
people what to believe insofar as that matches up with telling them 
where the evidence and arguments point. The second reason will be 
ignored here too, because it is weird and only applies if metaphysics is 
fiction anyway. The third seems only to apply if we adopt a theory 
according to which there are two genres of fictional work, one 
discovering characters and one creating them. I will not defend such a 
theory, and know of nobody who does. Given these considerations, I 
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will ignore the aesthetic reasons for picking one theory over another, 
and look at considerations of a more technical nature. 
 
A style of argument not resting on aesthetic considerations would be 
one like this: suppose that, whether fictional characters are created or 
discovered, it is always possible to create or discover arbitrarily many 
of them, even into the transfinite. To argue for this, suppose for reductio 
that Κ is the limit. We tell the following story: ‘As I was going to St Ives, I 
met a man with 2Κ wives’63. By Cantor’s theorem, this creates/discovers 
more than Κ fictional wives. So there is no limit: however many there 
are, we could create/discover more. If they are discovered, this is a 
contradiction, since you cannot discover more things than there are. 
This means they are created.  
 
A robust line to take in the face of the problem is to say that actually 
there is an upper bound on how many fictional characters we could 
populate our stories with, because of limits on the stories it is 
metaphysically possible to tell. Certainly we could write stories 
containing very large multitudes, but there could be a limit somewhere. 
The limit is however presumably not set-sized, since people do tell 
stories according to which there are more things than would fit in a set. 
It is perhaps orthodox to believe there are that many abstracta, and 
Daniel Nolan [2004] describes worlds in which there are that many 
concreta. 
 
If we allow that there might be too many fictional characters to form a 
set, the argument seems to break down, since 2K is less well defined 
where K is that large. Even if the argument could be made to work 
round this issue though, the creationist should probably not rely on it 
                                                          
63 In case you are worried that spacetime does not have enough room for so 
many wives, consider them living in parallel universes overseen by God, who 
married him to them all at (for the groom) the same time. For further 
discussion of transworld romance, see Sinhababu [2008]. 
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anyway, for fear of seeming to settle questions about the size of the set-
theoretic universe by telling silly stories like ‘As I was going to St Ives, I 
met a man with an inaccessible cardinality of wives.’ It would probably 
be sensible to say that, at least in some cases, multitudes do not have as 
many members in reality as they have according to the story. This is 
what Terence Parsons (1980: §7.5) does. According to the story the 
man may have 2Κ wives, but this does not mean there are 2Κ fictional 
women who are married to him according to the story. Some intuitively 
true sentences will come out false on this view: 
 
There are at least 2Κ characters in 21st century stories described 
with less physical detail than is any heroine of a nineteenth 
century novel. 
 
It is thus a cost to a theory to solve the problem of the multitude this 
way, but this would not be the first bullet people have bitten over 
contradictions in some formulations of set theory. Not much ordinary 
literary critical talk would have to go, and we have an explanation for 
the falsity in the part which would. The explanation would be similar to 
that given for me not having the property of non-self-instantiation, even 
though I do not instantiate myself (there is more on this paradox in 
§4.234). 
 
It is possible that the creation/discovery debate can be defused by 
making space for systems of things structurally like what each side 
thinks fictional characters are. A token fictional character will fall under 
a type, and the types are discovered, even if the characters are not. A 
particular literary practice relating to the type is created, even if the 
character is not. We can sort out the metaphysics of both the types and 
tokens, piggybacking on the systems already put in place by the 
different sides for accommodating fictional characters. Then we can 
leave the debate about where exactly fictional characters fit into the 
picture for another day, secure in the knowledge that whether they are 
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created or discovered they will be able to fit in somewhere. If created 
they will track the authorship events, and if discovered they will track 
the character types. 
 
A related point is made by Zalta [2000: §6], in which he suggests that 
pretence theorists paraphrase their talk in terms of possible patterns of 
pretence behaviour, so they have a more systematic semantics using 
only referents to which they are already committed. Whether or not 
Zalta’s specific proposal works, the discovery/creation distinction may 
boil down to a type/token distinction, in which case we had better be 
able to cope with both. 
 
It does make a bit of difference whether the referents of ‘Poirot’ and so 
on are the types or the tokens, for example the types will in general be 
more famous than the tokens. It may well be, however, that usage does 
not settle the matter one way or the other. We could try to settle it by 
examining intuitions about the modal properties of fictional characters, 
but I suspect this will not work. If we talk about whether the characters 
would have existed if the stories had not been written, this could be 
explained by a selectionist as saying the thing which is the character 
would not have been a character. It might still have existed. If we say 
that the same character could have been given different properties by 
its author, this can be explained counterpart-theoretically, or by 
treating the relevant referring expressions as non-rigid. We have the 
same problem with ‘If I were you’ or ‘If Gandhi had been a woman64’, 
                                                          
64 It is not actually clear that necessity of origins entails necessity of actual 
original sex. We can imagine a sperm having its sex chromosome removed and 
replaced with the father’s other one, producing a person of the opposite sex 
from the same sperm and egg, which the same genetic parents. There is at 
least very little indeterminacy in the genomes of someone’s closest 
counterparts of the opposite sex (as far as high-school biology goes). ‘If I were 
you’ provides a more solid example of an everyday counterfactual whose 
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and we do not draw conclusions about whether ‘I’ and ‘Gandhi’ refer to 
types or tokens. We could have a counterpart relation relating 
characters in different worlds according to the authorship events they 
correspond to, rather than according to the properties they have in the 
stories. This option would to an extent dissolve Fine’s question of 
whether fictional characters should be individuated internally or 
externally. The positions would still disagree over individuation of 
fictional characters within a world, but for transworld individuation we 
could have it both ways. 
 
 4.22 Kripke and Unicorns 
 
Kripke [1963] says that there could have been things that actually there 
are not. This is effectively equivalent to denying that instances of the 
Barcan formula are always true. The Barcan formula says that for any 
condition φ, if there could have been a φ, then there is something which 
could have been a φ. Symbolically, it is this schema: 
 
BF ◊∃xφx → ∃x◊φx65 
 
Some people accept the Barcan formula, such as Williamson [1998, 
2002]; Linsky and Zalta [1994, 1996]; and Bolzano as interpreted by 
Schnieder [2007], who hold that there are contingent non-concreta, and 
if my parents had not met then I would have been one. Nonetheless, the 
consensus is still probably with Kripke. He gave Sherlock Holmes as an 
example of something which does not exist but could have done: 
‘Holmes does not exist, but in other states of affairs, he would have 
existed’ [1963: 65]. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
antecedent is impossible if taken at face value. (Or if you follow Caspar Hare’s 
[2009] egocentric presentist semantics for ‘I’, then ‘if Gandhi was you’.) 
65 It is named after Ruth Barcan Marcus, who used its necessitation as an 
axiom schema in Barcan [1946: 2]. 
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It seems undeniable that there could have been people whose parents 
were Quine and Margaret Thatcher, but there is plausibly nothing that 
could have been a person with them as parents. There will of course be 
combinations of views on personal identity and material constitution 
entailing that some gerrymandered fusions of particles could have been 
such people, but there seems nothing prima facie wrong with denying 
the Barcan formula, and it seems an odd thing to settle questions about 
persons and constitution on the basis of it. In any case, there could be 
other examples; for example, the universe could presumably contain 
more elementary particles than it actually does, in which case some of 
them would have to be non-identical to any actual ones, and it is hard to 
think of anything else which could plausibly have been an elementary 
particle. David Armstrong gives a further example: 
 
[I]t seems very hard to deny that it is possible that the world 
should contain more individuals than it actually contains. There 
is no mouse in my study. Nevertheless, it is possible that there 
should be one. But why does the mouse have to be one of the 
world’s mice? Why not an additional mouse? And, if additional, 
why not made up of particles (assume a materialist theory of 
mice) which are additional to the world’s particles? [Armstrong 
1989: 57-8] 
 
Later, Kripke [1980: 156-8] changed his mind. He still maintained that 
there could have been things that actually there are not, but he no 
longer held that Sherlock Holmes is one of them66. He also holds that 
there could have been things belonging to natural kinds that nothing 
                                                          
66 Kripke [2011b] holds that there is such a fictional character as Sherlock 
Holmes, but this is a different (though of course related) usage of the name, 
referring to an actual artistic creation, not a non-actual but possible person. 
The point at issue is whether the person could have existed, not the abstract 
creation. Trying to avoid Kripke’s conclusion by pointing to the possibility of 
the abstracta is a blind alley. 
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actually belongs to, but there could not have been such things as 
unicorns. In discussing his argument people have mostly focused on the 
brief remarks in Kripke [1980], although he also discusses it in Kripke 
[2011b, 2013] and in Dummett et al [1974b]67. 
 
It seems at first a puzzling claim that Holmes and unicorns could not 
have existed. Kripke [1980: 23] said that his argument ‘doesn’t ever 
convince anyone’, although some people have been convinced since he 
wrote that. Reimer [1997] and Yagisawa [2010] are examples, but there 
are many others and the view is now fairly mainstream. It seems 
puzzling though, because it looks like there is no impossibility in the 
Holmes stories or in the stories about unicorns. Even if there is, the 
stories could be tidied up or simplified to remove the inconsistencies. 
Some stories, like that in Priest [1997], are meant to be inconsistent, 
and some stories presumably contain accidental inconsistencies which 
could not be removed without doing violence to the point of the story, 
but stories like those about Holmes and unicorns are not meant to be 
like that. They recount events which did not happen but could have 
done, or so it seems. These stories certainly appear to say that unicorns 
or Holmes existed, so it is puzzling to say that they could not have done. 
We can set it up as an inconsistent triad: 
 
 Things could have happened as the stories say. 
 The stories say that Holmes/unicorns exist. 
 Holmes/unicorns could not have existed. 
                                                          
67 Dummett et al [1974b] is a transcript of the discussion of a presentation of 
the paper eventually published as Kripke [2011b]. It does not get cited much 
and seems not to be well known, so as a point of both historical and 
intellectual interest it is worth drawing attention to it. The participants in the 
discussion were Davidson, Dummett, Gilbert Harman, Kaplan, Kripke, David 
Lewis, Charles Parsons, Barbara Partee, Putnam, Quine and Sellars. Dummett 





One can just pit Kripke’s arguments and the intuitions to the contrary 
against each other, take a side and leave it at that. I will not do this. The 
problem is to my mind a deep one which would tell us a lot about the 
way fictional reference works if we could get to the bottom of it. In this 
section I will present Kripke’s argument and some choices people make 
in response to it. In §4.4 I will give my own explanation of what I think 
is going on. 
 
 4.221: Kripke’s argument 
 
Considering that its conclusion is so strange, Kripke’s argument is quite 
simple. In view of the sketchiness of his remarks, I will present a 
version which is along the same lines but may not be quite the same as 
Kripke’s intention in the details. It begins from the observation that the 
stories leave a lot open. Insofar as the events of the stories could have 
happened at all, they could have happened in many different ways. In 
these different ways that things could have gone, someone would have 
played the Holmes role, or some species would have played the unicorn 
role. Even if we think no actual person or species could have played 
these roles without changing the story, lots of different non-actual 
people or species could have done. If you dislike this formulation 
because it seems to quantify over possibilia, these are more innocent: 
 
 For some incompatible properties F and G, it is consistent with 
the stories that someone play the Holmes role who was 
necessarily F-if-they-existed, and consistent with the stories that 
someone play the Holmes role who was necessarily G-if-they-
existed. 
 For some incompatible properties F and G, it is consistent with 
the stories that members of the species that plays the unicorn 
role be necessarily F-if-they-exist, and consistent with the 
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stories that members of the species that plays the unicorn role 
be necessarily G-if-they-exist. 
 
If you are a nominalist and also dislike the reference to properties, I 
leave to you the task of paraphrasing these formulations in your 
preferred style. Note that quantification over properties is not needed, 
because Kripke’s argument would still have what force it has if we used 
formulations with specific properties. These formulations can thus be 
seen as schemas, rather than ineliminably quantificational statements. 
The properties in question might be that Holmes be descended from 
Genghis Khan or not, and that unicorns be in the order Artiodactyla, like 
deer, or the order Perissodactyla, like horses. (The example for 
unicorns is from Dummett [1993b: 346].) 
 
Now, it is part of the stories that Holmes is a particular person, and that 
someone who behaved the same way would not thereby be him. We can 
also allow for the sake of argument that it is part of the stories that 
unicorns are a particular species. Just as a species superficially like 
tigers but with a different makeup and evolutionary history would not 
be tigers, fool’s unicorns would not be unicorns. We have noted that 
different people and species could play the Holmes and unicorn roles, 
but which is Holmes and which the impostor? Which are the unicorns 
and which are the fool’s unicorns? Kripke draws two conclusions. First, 
the epistemic conclusion that we cannot know of one particular 
possible person or species that it would have been Holmes or the 
unicorn. Second, that nothing would determine that one particular 
possible person or species was Holmes or the unicorn, and so nothing 
would be. The intuitions can be pressed further by considering worlds 
in which more than one thing plays the role in question, and by asking 
whether, had one version been actualized, the other version would still 
have been possible. There are ways of resisting the argument which we 
will examine shortly, but the straightforward conclusion which Kripke 
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draws is that Holmes could not have existed and there could not have 
been unicorns. 
 
David Kaplan [1973], another architect of the theory of direct reference 
and rigid designation, also saw the view as having similar 
consequences. Here is his statement of the argument: 
 
I have argued that ‘Aristotle’ denotes something which, at the 
present time, does not exist. I could now argue that ‘Pegasus’ 
denotes something which, in the actual world, does not exist. I shall 
not. Pegasus does not exist, and ‘Pegasus’ does not denote. Not here; 
not anywhere. What makes ‘Aristotle’ more perfect than ‘Pegasus’? 
 The ‘Aristotle’ we most commonly use originated in a dubbing of 
someone, our ‘Pegasus’ did not. Some rascal just made up the name 
‘Pegasus’, and then he pretended, in what he told us, that the name 
really referred to something. But it did not. Maybe he even told us a 
story about how this so-called Pegasus was dubbed ‘Pegasus’. But it 
was not true. 
 Maybe he proceeded as follows. First, he made up his story in 
Ramsified form: as a single, existentially quantified sentence with 
the made up proper names (‘Pegasus’, ‘Bellerophon’, ‘Chimaera’, 
etc.) replaced by variables bound to the prefixed existential 
quantifiers; second, he realized that the result was possible, and that 
therefore it held in some possible world, and that therefore there 
was at least one possible individual who played the winged horse in 
at least one possible world; and third, he tried to dub one of those 
possible individuals ‘Pegasus’. But he would not succeed. How 
would he pick out just one of the millions of such possible 
individuals? [Kaplan 1973: 505-6; emphasis in original.] 
 
Kaplan is only making the argument in the case of fictional names, but 
you could run a similar argument for fictional kind terms. The 
Ramsified sentence would need to use predicate variables, but these 
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could be within a many-sorted logic instead of a full-on second-order 
logic, if second-order (modal) logic was considered more problematic. 
The comparison with ‘Aristotle’, whose denotation Kaplan thinks does 
not exist anymore, brings out that Kaplan does not deny ‘Pegasus’ a 
denotation on the grounds of actualism, but because of 
underspecification. Indeed, Kaplan allows that we can name things that 
do not exist and never did or will provided there is not the same kind of 
underspecification; his example is the car which would have been made 
at a particular automated assembly plant if production had been halted 
a few seconds later [1973: 517]68. His argument concerning ‘Pegasus’ is 
essentially the same as Kripke’s and we will not treat them differently, 
but giving his alternative statement of it may serve to illuminate it, as 
well as awarding Kaplan the credit for coming up with it, insofar as he 
did.   
 
 4.222 Descriptivist Responses 
 
One can make various kinds of descriptivist response to Kripke’s 
argument. The most flatfooted says that while some of the data in 
Kripke [1980] and Putnam [1975] seem to tell in favour of proper 
names and natural kind terms as being directly referential or at least 
rigid designators, the results about fictional terms show the view to be 
nonetheless absurd. We fall back on descriptivism, and say that all 
kinds of internally and genealogically different animals could be 
unicorns, and the same goes for horses and tigers and the rest. If 
Holmes had existed he could have had many different origins, and 
actual people could have had different origins too. I take that position to 
be implausible, and in any case part of the project of this thesis is 
                                                          
68 More carefully stated: he thinks we can have terms which refer with respect 




essentially working out how to avoid being pushed into it by the 
problems of empty names. 
 
A less flatfooted descriptivist response agrees that Kripke and Putnam’s 
data make the case that ‘tiger’ and ‘Socrates’ are rigid designators 
unassailable, but maintains that descriptivism still wins out in the non-
referring cases. It might seem ad hoc to go with descriptivism when but 
only when there is nothing to rigidly designate, but perhaps this is 
predicted by an independently motivated metasemantics. A fairly 
popular view propounded by David Lewis [1974, 1983, 1984] holds 
that words take the most eligible meanings in the vicinity of the 
conventions governing their use. If we subscribed to a view like that, we 
could hold that if there were animals fitting the descriptions of 
unicorns, ‘unicorn’ would rigidly designate their species, but since there 
are not, the most eligible meaning is a descriptive one. This does justice 
to the intuition that there could have been unicorns while leaving the 
semantics of other referring expressions alone. 
 
One thing to dislike about this is that when competent speakers do not 
know whether a term is empty or not, they will not know what kind of 
meaning it has. Perhaps we can stomach that, but a more damaging 
objection is that the characters in the stories will still be using the terms 
rigidly, and the stories will consequently still hold that their assent to 
sentences like ‘there could have been fool’s unicorns’ is correct. The 
consequent failures of disquotation could make discussion of such 
works confusing. Related to this, we will not be able to truly say things 
like ‘there could have been both unicorns and fool’s unicorns’. Note that 
we cannot straightforwardly solve these problems with the 
descriptivist device of making the descriptions rigid, with ‘unicorn’ 
meaning ‘the actual occupier of the unicorn role’. While this would 
vindicate the characters’ talk, it would falsify ours, because there is no 
actual occupier of the unicorn role, ‘unicorn’ would have a null 
extension at all worlds, and ‘there could have been unicorns’ will be 
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false. Adopting descriptivism just for empty terms can be saved from 
the charge of being ad hoc by a suitable independently motivated 
metasemantics, but it generates some ugly results.  
 
 4.223: Dummett 
 
Dummett [1993b] agrees with the descriptivists that there could have 
been unicorns, but he still wants to do justice to the position that 
‘unicorn’ is a kind term whose semantics works like those of non-empty 
kind terms and validates Kripke and Putnam’s data. He [1983, 1993b] 
seems to agree with Kripke about proper names but not general terms, 
although he takes it that in many cases a proper name N can be used to 
form a general term ‘such a person/thing as N’ which is treated as he 
treats ‘unicorn’: 
 
Consider a name which everyone in fact believes to have a 
reference, say “Charlotte Corday”; and suppose, for present 
purposes, that there actually was no such person, and that the 
story of Marat’s assassination is spurious. Then our use of the 
name is founded upon a mistaken belief; but still, that belief 
might have been correct, and then the name would have had a 
reference. It is the same with most empty definite descriptions 
or mistaken observations: there might have been something 
answering to the description; the observation might not have 
been erroneous. If a proper name had been introduced on the 
basis of such a mistake, we cannot say that it could not have had 
a bearer. Admittedly, in our hypothetical case, it would make no 
sense to say that that person,  Charlotte Corday, might or could 
have existed; but we could properly say that there might have 
been such a woman as Charlotte Corday. [Dummett 1993b: 334; 




He seems to decide particular cases on the basis of nuances in how the 
name was introduced and whether its fictionality is common 
knowledge. In view of this it is possible his view is not so far off Kripke’s 
in many cases; nonetheless Dummett thinks there is a class of terms to 
be treated as he treats ‘unicorn’ and Kripke thinks there is no such 
class. We will examine the consequences of treating terms as Dummett 
thinks ‘unicorn’ should be treated. 
 
He makes use of the observation that Kripke’s argument relies on a 
problem with tie-breaking: if there were creatures fitting the 
description which were all or mostly of the same kind, then their 
actuality could break the tie, but since there are none, we have a tie 
between many kinds of creature. Dummett then says that if there were 
creatures playing the unicorn role, the tie would be broken and 
whatever kind of thing they were would be the unicorns. 
 
However, since the tie could be broken in favour of many different and 
exclusive kinds, the worlds containing different kinds of unicorns 
cannot be possible relative to each other, though they are all possible 
relative to the actual world. This means that the proper logic for 
metaphysical necessity cannot be S5, because if two possible worlds are 
accessible from the actual world but not from each other then the 
accessibility relation is not Euclidean. The characteristic axiom for a 
Euclidean accessibility relation is ◊φ→◊φ, saying that whatever is 
possible is necessarily possible. The two most standard ways of 
weakening S5 to get round this are denying transitivity, producing the 
logic B, or denying symmetry, producing S4. Dummett decides to deny 
symmetry. 
 
He recognizes that it looks like if the world had contained one kind of 
unicorn then a world non-modally like the actual world would have still 
been possible, but holds that such a world would still have been 
constrained by the metaphysical necessities of the unicorn-containing 
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world. However, it seems odd to say that the world could have been 
modally different without being non-modally different, and Dummett 
admits that perhaps we should therefore also reject transitivity. This 
would leave the logic T, which demands only that accessibility be 
reflexive, i.e. whatever is necessary is true. Now, although Dummett 
does not suggest this, if we are denying transitivity anyway we could 
make the relation non-Euclidean without rejecting symmetry, giving us 
the logic B. Then the unicorn worlds would be possible relative to the 
actual world and the actual world would be possible relative to them, 
but worlds with different kinds of unicorn would not be possible 
relative to each other. The actual world itself would vindicate the 
intuition that even if there had been unicorns the world could have 
been as the actual world is, and we would not need its modally 
discernible duplicates. The modal could once more determine the non-
modal69. I think this is a more promising proposal if we want to take 
Dummett’s side against Kripke. It appears from Dummett [1993a: xv-
xvi] that he was not too wedded to the use of S4 here, and was chiefly 
interested in finding an argument for using any logic of metaphysical 
necessity weaker than S5. The B proposal still gets that. But should we 
want to take Dummett’s side? 
 
Marga Reimer [1997] does not think so. She says that we can accept 
that we would be right to call creatures playing the unicorn role 
                                                          
69 It is hard to express exactly which condition the version of Dummett’s 
proposal with just the logic T violates, because the problem worlds would not 
be possible relative to the actual world. This means that at any given world we 
could have necessary supervenience of the modal on the non-modal. There is 
still something strange about it though, because if the non-modal facts 
determine the modal facts at the actual world, we might wonder why the same 
non-modal facts do not determine the same modal facts at the problem 
worlds. However, since the problem worlds are impossible (relative to the 




‘unicorns’ if there were any, and still deny that there could have been 
unicorns. This is because if there were any such creatures ‘unicorn’ 
might have meant something different. She is right. The point is 
essentially the one frequently attributed to Abraham Lincoln70: 
 
“How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg? Four. 
Calling a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg.” 
 
If we look at things Reimer’s way we can see the tie which needs 
breaking as a metasemantic one: we have lots of possible species and 
no way of making the word ‘unicorn’ refer to one rather than the other. 
If there was a species playing the role it would break the tie and 
‘unicorn’ would refer to it, but there isn’t and it doesn’t. This is an 
uncharitable interpretation of Dummett; Lincoln’s point has been 
acknowledged for a long time now and philosophers of language know 
to watch out for it. (Kaplan [1973: 505] uses the point as the basis for 
his Homework Problem #20.) On the other hand, people do make 
mistakes and maybe Dummett made one here. There is however a more 
charitable interpretation of him, although it does involve some 
substantial commitments about property ontology and essence. 
 
Reimer sees the tie as metasemantic, but we could see the tie as more 
metaphysical. The idea would be that kinds get their essences in part 
from their instances. On this view, whatever charge electrons actually 
have, they necessarily have, but with uninstantiated kinds of particle 
things are more open. If there had been phlogiston it would have had its 
mass, charge and so on essentially, but since there is no phlogiston, 
there is nothing to give it this essence, and it could have been various 
ways. The situation is the same with unicorns. If unicorns had been a 
                                                          
70 There is some doubt as to whether Lincoln actually said it. Rev E. J. Stearns 
[1853: 46] definitely did say much the same, but I will follow tradition and 
refer to the point as Lincoln’s.  
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species of artiodactylae or perissodactylae they would have been so 
essentially, but as things are they are not. 
 
On two fairly plausible assumptions about essences, this picture should 
give us a symmetrical but non-transitive accessibility relation for 
metaphysical necessity. One assumption is that when a kind has a (non-
disjunctive) property which that kind of kind can have essentially it 
does have it essentially. So unicorns are a kind of animal, and kinds of 
animal can have (let us suppose) their genetic makeup and evolutionary 
history essentially, so if unicorns have a particular genetic makeup and 
evolutionary history, they have them essentially. Worlds are possible 
relative to each other when the essences of the properties instantiated 
at those worlds do not exclude each other. Dummett’s example of the 
actual world and the two different unicorn worlds is a counterexample 
to transitivity. Now we try to prove symmetry, at least as far as unicorn 
considerations go. Suppose that at w unicorns are essentially F, v is 
possible relative to w, and at v unicorns are essentially G. It follows that 
at v all unicorns are F and G, and since these are properties that 
unicorns can have essentially, they do. There are no non-F unicorns at 
w, by reflexivity. Could there be non-G unicorns at w? Well, for all we 
have said there could. To secure symmetry we need the additional 
principle that if a kind of kind can be essentially H (for non-disjunctive 
H), it can also be essentially non-H. This has some plausibility, at least 
for some properties like being descended from Genghis Khan, but 
perhaps it is false. With the assumption we get symmetry; otherwise we 
may not. But whichever way we go, denying transitivity allows us to 
keep what is important about Dummett’s position while not allowing 
modal facts to vary without variation in non-modal facts. 
 
Perhaps this kind of metaphysics of essences is not plausible. Perhaps it 
can be cashed out in a less metaphysically heavyweight way, and can 
thereby be made plausible. Perhaps it should not seem wildly 
implausible to someone already sympathetic to kinds having essences, 
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since it would be good if essences came from somewhere, and it seems 
that the properties of a kind’s instances might contribute to that. In any 
case, it looks like something along these lines is the way Dummett has 
to be interpreted to avoid Lincoln’s point. 
 
 4.224: Reimer 
 
Dummett used the premise that if there had been a species uniquely 
filling the unicorn role then ‘unicorn’ would have referred to it. Kripke’s 
tie-breaking argument would break down in that case, so we should not 
deny Dummett’s premise without further argument. However, we have 
seen that Reimer’s explanation of the premise in terms of Lincoln’s 
point means that we can grant it and still keep Kripke’s conclusion. 
Since the attempt to follow Dummett’s conclusion through led to some 
substantial and possibly unwanted commitments about essences, 
perhaps we should accept Reimer’s explanation and accept that 
unicorns are not possible, and similarly accept that Holmes is not a 
possible person. Reimer’s way of doing this treats the terms as non-
referring. 
 
It is actually now fairly clear from Kripke’s own discussion of the case 
that this is his response to the argument as well: 
 
Statements about unicorns, like statements about Sherlock 
Holmes, just pretend to express propositions. They do not really 
express, but merely purport to express, propositions. In the case 
of species, at least, this is true when the myth has not fully 
specified a hypothetical species, as I have mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. One cannot say when these sentences 
would have been true of a counterfactual situation, and therefore 





Of course, just because Kripke thinks this is the proper response to his 
argument that unicorns and Holmes could not have existed does not 
mean it is. We can follow Kripke as far as his lemma but not as far as his 
conclusion. Nonetheless, Kripke’s position is clearly that statements 
apparently about unicorns do not express propositions. Words like 
‘unicorn’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’, when used for flesh and blood things 
and not for abstract artistic creations, are coined for pretending (or 
lying) and not for sincerely asserting. If you try to use them for 
asserting, your utterances get treated like those of someone who uses 
the word ‘Vulcan’. If this is all there is to their meanings, then the 
treatment of chapter one would assign utterances involving them 
pessimistic truth values, and presumably in a modal language they 
would take these pessimistic values at all worlds.  
 
Reimer thinks it is important to take the terms as non-referring because 
otherwise we either have to be descriptivists about the referring terms 
or accept a disuniformity in our semantics. In §3.222 it was suggested 
that such a disuniformity might be defensible, but it is ugly. If we accept 
they are non-referring we get uniformity and treat the referring terms 
the way we want to. Something would have to be said about the 
pretended uses too though, to explain why fictional terms are not just 
semantically defective. In §4.4, especially §4.431, I will try to show how 
we can pin down the way they work in pretence enough that we can 
sometimes piggyback on the pretended use to make genuine assertions 
using fictional terms. 
 
 4.225: Yagisawa 
 
In the absence of an account of the kind I just promised, however, it 
could seem unfair to treat ‘unicorn’ and ‘Holmes’ the way chapter one 
treats ‘Vulcan’. The terms were not introduced by mistake and they 
seem to be meaningful, so they ought to refer to something. But if they 
do not refer to possible things, what might they refer to? The obvious 
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answer is that they refer to impossible things. Unicorns are animals 
which could not have existed, and Holmes is a person who could not 
have existed. A more careful and actualistically acceptable formulation 
could say that the terms refer with respect to some impossible worlds 
but not with respect to any possible world, and behave as referring 
expressions only in the scope of counterpossible conditionals. It should 
be as unproblematic to fit such terms into an actualist semantics for a 
language containing modal operators and counterpossible conditionals 
as it is to give an actualist semantics for any modal language not 
validating the Barcan formula. A plausible metasemantics explaining 
how the terms could come to have the meanings this semantics assigns 
to them would be another story, but if the metasemantics is defensible 
then at least the semantics is coherent. 
 
A particularly committed defender of this view is Yagisawa [2010: 
§10.2-10.4]. It should be noted that the view fits especially well into the 
rest of Yagisawa’s modal metaphysics, since he already has an ontology 
of impossibilia and takes counterpossible conditionals seriously. The 
latter feature is probably essential for motivating the view; the former 
just makes it easier to hold, perhaps for metasemantic reasons. Daniel 
Nolan [1998] has however made it a lot easier for actualists to take 
counterpossible conditionals seriously.  
 
For Yagisawa, fictional characters are impossible because their 
transworld identity conditions violate the metaphysical laws obtaining 
in the local possibility space. Suppose that at some Holmes worlds 
Darwin plays the Holmes role and at others Gladstone does. In 
Yagisawa’s system, this means that Holmes overlaps Darwin and 
Gladstone. Since Holmes is a person, he obeys the transworld identity 
laws applying to people in his local space. If his local space obeyed our 
laws, that would make the Darwin stages and the Gladstone stages 
belong to the same person, so Darwin would be Gladstone. Since he is 
not, the stages must belong to a different space, and worlds in that 
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space are impossible. Since all of Holmes’ stages are at impossible 
worlds, Holmes is impossible. Yagisawa takes himself to have 
established [2010: 273-6] that all of Holmes’ stages are at impossible 
worlds, although as far as I can tell he only establishes that his stages at 
possible worlds, if any, overlap at most one possible person. 
Nonetheless, Kripke’s points that we would not know which and it 
would be unpalatably arbitrary which it was still stand in Yagisawa’s 
framework. 
 
On a slightly more committal extension of Parsons’ theory, Holmes is 
impossible for a different reason, but still one relating to Kripke’s point 
about the stories leaving a lot open. For Parsons, Holmes is actually a 
non-existent incomplete concrete object. He has the properties he has 
in the stories, but where the stories leave it open whether Holmes is F 
or not, he will neither have the property of being F or of being not-F.  
Parsons [1980: 186] is agnostic as to whether Holmes necessarily 
exhibits these property gaps, or only actually. If we hold that he does so 
necessarily, as Fine [1984: 125-6] argues that Parsons really should, 
then he will be necessarily non-existent, since existent objects cannot 
exhibit property gaps. Both of these positions take the impossibility to 
derive from the underspecification of the stories, and as such they are 
in keeping with Kripke’s argument. They go different ways with this 
though: for the development of Parsons we leave the gaps unfilled, 
while for Yagisawa we fill them in too many different ways. 
 
The two main objections to taking fictional objects to be impossible 
objects are that it might be hard to argue for without an implausible 
metaphysics and that it does not do justice to the idea that the stories 
are possible. After all, according to the stories Holmes is not an 
incomplete object, and he obeys the same transworld identity laws as 
the rest of us. It may also be difficult to give a plausible account of how 
reference to impossibilia could be secured. There are things which can 




It is also worth bringing up at this point a possible connection between 
the view that fictional characters and kinds are impossible and a 
superficially similar feature of Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of 
possibility. Armstrong [1989: ch. 4] holds that there could have been 
individuals that do not actually exist (rejecting the Barcan formula), but 
there could not have been universals instantiated which cannot be 
constructed out of actually instantiated universals. Lewis [1986: 158-
65] takes it to be an argument in favour of his modal realism that it can 
accommodate the possibility of such alien universals. Armstrong 
embraces their impossibility as a consequence of his actualism and 
naturalism. Nothing in the world makes them possible, so if there is 
nothing outside the world then they are not possible. He sees no 
impossibility in there having been being fewer universals than are 
actually instantiated though, and if w accesses v iff there are no 
universals in v which are alien to w, we get a transitive non-symmetric 
relation generating an S4 modal logic. (Note that the accessibility 
relation goes in the opposite direction from how Dummett’s went.) 
Perhaps there is some mileage in connecting Kripke’s argument and 
Armstrong’s, although it is unclear to me quite how this would go. Even 
if no connection can sensibly be made it is still worth drawing attention 
to the superficial similarity and pointing out that the positions should 
not be lumped together. 
 
 4.226: Epistemicism and indeterminacy 
 
Kripke divided his conclusion into two, but in view of the previous 
response we should really divide it into these four: 
 
S1  There is nothing that fictional terms refer to. 
E1 There is nothing we can know that fictional terms refer 
to. 
S2  There is nothing possible that fictional terms refer to. 
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E2 There is nothing possible that we can know fictional 
terms refer to. 
 
These have been left in terms of possiblist quantification for the sake of 
simplicity, but we saw above that there are actualist formulations 
getting at the same ideas. Since knowledge entails truth but not 
conversely, S1 entails E1 and S2 entails E2 but not conversely. Since S2 
and E2 restrict the claims to possible things, S1 entails S2 and E1 entails 
E2. Kripke holds all of them, but one could also hold just S2 and E2 or 
just E1 and E2. It is unlikely anyone would just hold E2, because the tie-
breaking problem probably does not apply to impossible things, which 
can be incomplete (following Parsons) or have eccentric transworld 








Kripke suggests that E1 gives a reason for accepting S1, although it does 
not logically entail it. From the quote earlier:  
 
One cannot say when these sentences would have been true of a 
counterfactual situation, and therefore no proposition has been 
expressed. [Kripke 2011b: 67] 
 
This seem to appeal to a principle saying something like this: if we 
cannot know what something means then it cannot mean anything. If 
we cannot know what proposition is being expressed then no 
proposition is expressed, and if we cannot know what is being referred 
to then nothing is referred to. So if we accept E1 we should also accept 
S1, and if we accept E2 then we should also accept S2. Perhaps it is 
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overinterpreting Kripke to attribute this principle to him in any strong 
or general form, but something in the vicinity seems to be at work here 
and something in the vicinity has some plausibility. Successful 
communication involves at least someone knowing what is being said, 
doesn’t it? 
 
This way of taking the argument sees the underspecification in the 
stories as not providing enough information about what is being said, 
which causes communication to fail, which causes reference to fail. 
Underspecification secures the epistemic thesis, which results in the 
semantic thesis. Another way of taking the argument sees the 
underspecification as meaning not enough metasemantic work is being 
done, which secures the semantic thesis, which entails the epistemic 
thesis. We can consider the difference between two ways we might 
think demonstrative reference could fail. One is if I point in the vague 
direction of several men and say ‘him’: perhaps not enough work has 
been done to secure reference, so I refer to nobody, so there is nobody 
anyone can know I am referring to. Another, from G. E. Moore [2004], is 
if I point into a dark room containing an unseen (and unhearing) man 
and say ‘him’: nobody can know who I am referring to, so perhaps I am 
not referring to anyone.  
 
Suppose we grant the epistemic thesis: there are many candidate 
references for a fictional term and we cannot eliminate any of them 
from our enquiries without parity of reasoning eliminating them all. 
Must we accept the semantic thesis too? The entailment is not logical, 
and consideration of other cases of underspecification might lead us to 
reject the move to the semantic thesis. The cases I have in mind are 
those of vague terms. It seems that not enough has been done for us to 
know where the line between the tall people and the rest is, and maybe 
even that not enough has been done to guarantee that the line even is in 
any particular place. The tall people include everyone over two metres 
and no-one under one, but after a point it seems arbitrary to put a cut-
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off in one place rather than another. Do we conclude that reference has 
failed, and that no propositions are expressed by sentences containing 
the word ‘tall’? Well, that is exactly what David Braun and Ted Sider 
[2007] do conclude. Theirs is a minority position though, and even they 
see the need to do some work to explain why we talk the way we do. 
They say that we can mostly ignore the vagueness for practical 
purposes because all the candidate meanings give the same result. This 
pragmatic explanation is much more conciliatory than just saying that 
Sherlock Holmes could not have existed: if all the (salient) Holmes 
candidates could have existed, can’t we just ignore the 
underspecification for the same reason and treat ‘Holmes could have 
existed’ as if it expresses one of the true propositions in the vicinity? 
 
Most people do not even go as far as Braun and Sider, of course. Most 
people say vague sentences do express propositions, because so much 
language is vague that the Braun-Sider position can seem unthinkable. 
We can follow Williamson [1994] and say the line is sharp but we can’t 
know where it is, follow Delia Graff Fara [2000] and add that it moves 
around according to context, or we can say it is indeterminate where 
the line is. If we go down the indeterminacy route, then when a story is 
properly interpreted as presenting events which could have happened 
the candidate meanings will all be possible, and it will be determinately 
true that Holmes and unicorns could have existed. We also get the 
perhaps pleasing result that while we cannot say of any possible species 
that they would be the unicorns, there are also many possible species 
which we cannot (determinately truly) say would not be. 
 
Earlier we stated the principle connecting the epistemic theses to the 
semantic ones as ‘successful communication involves at least someone 
knowing what is being said’. Consideration of vagueness suggests that 
this version of the principle is too strong. We could replace it with the 
following: ‘successful communication involves at least someone having 
some idea what it being said’. If we want to hold on to the strong 
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principle, we will have to either side with Braun and Sider on vagueness 
or explain why not. If we reject the strong principle we do not have to 
take vague terms as non-denoting, and we have a choice to make about 
fictional terms. They can be assimilated to vague terms, and either have 
unknowable or indeterminate reference, or they can be assimilated to 
failed demonstratives. To get specific about what an analogous 
demonstrative would be, we need one which refers to nothing because 
there is more than one thing such that if the other candidates had not 
been there then the demonstrative would have referred to it. It is not 
implausible that there could be such cases, although it might follow 
from some theories of demonstratives that there could not be. A 
possible example would be where you gesture vaguely towards two 
men and say ‘that man’. 
 
The obvious argument for assimilating fictional terms to failed 
demonstratives deploys a historical explanation view about reference-
transmission: you cannot refer to something unless there is a chain of 
communication going back to the thing being named, and the histories 
of fictional terms do not go back to something being named. They go 
back to somebody making up a story. However, we could disarm this 
reasonably simply by saying that in telling the story the author presents 
a way things could have been and refers to the characters in it, but 
underspecifies which way they are presenting, with the epistemicist or 
indeterminist consequences this has. The fictional terms thus do go 
back in a chain of communication to the possible world presented, and 
refer to the relevant objects in that world, with respect both to the 
world itself and to other worlds in which those objects appear. 
 
Another case we might consider, besides vague terms and 
demonstratives, is that of counterfactual conditionals. The antecedents 
of counterfactuals do not typically specify a particular possible world. If 
the consequent is true at some of the candidates and false at others, we 
have to decide what to do. Robert Stalnaker [1981: 90-91] addresses 
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the problem of there being multiple candidate worlds to evaluate by 
supervaluating across all of them. Lewis [1973] takes the counterfactual 
conditional as a kind of necessity-like operator, in that the conditional is 
false if the consequent is false at any of the candidates. We might want 
to bear in mind our response to this problem when deciding how to 
deal with the problem of multiple candidate references for fictional 
terms. In fact, Kaplan explicitly links his version of the argument to 
counterfactual conditionals. He says ‘the critical invalidity is [(φ → (ψ v 
χ)) → ((φ → ψ) v (φ → χ))] where ‘→’ symbolizes the subjunctive 
conditional’ [1973: 517].  The point here is that we cannot speak of the 
world where a fiction’s Ramsey sentence is true, just as with a 
subjunctive conditional we cannot speak of the world where the 
antecedent is true. Some people like Lewis agree that this principle is 
invalid. Stalnaker’s system upholds the principle though, and this is not 
obviously a mistake. It is true that we cannot speak of the unique world 
where the antecedent is true, but it begs the question to say we cannot 
speak of the unique world which would have been actualized if the 
antecedent had been true, and that is what matters. Note that even 
Lewis thinks we can speak about such a unique world in cases where 
the antecedent actually is true: it is the actual world71. Kaplan might be 
wrong that his argument relies on the invalidity of a principle of 
conditional logic, but if he is right, the argument should be controversial 
because the principle is controversial. 
 
Whatever we say about counterfactual conditionals, the case of vague 
terms suggests that Kripke’s argument only forces the epistemic 
                                                          
71 The principle is closely connected to conditional excluded middle: [(φ → ψ) 
v (φ → ¬ψ)], which is entailed by the principle Kaplan rejects and the 
necessity of excluded middle. However, if we modified a system along 
Stalnaker’s lines to accommodate failures of (unconditional) excluded middle, 
for e.g. intuitionist or vagueness-related reasons, it would no longer validate 




conclusion, although it gives reasons for the semantic conclusion. There 
could be other arguments for the semantic conclusion, but these could 
not rely on the underspecification issue alone. It seems that 
underspecification sometimes leads to referential failure, but 
sometimes only leads to either ignorance or semantic indeterminacy. It 
would be good to be able to deal with either case, and my positive 
account in §4.431 will have this feature. 
 
 4.227: Summary 
 
It seems to be agreed by all parties to this debate that for all the stories 
say there could have been various species occupying the unicorn role, 
and various people occupying the Holmes role. Kripke argues that this 
means that not enough has been done to make ‘unicorn’ and ‘Holmes’ 
refer with respect to any worlds, and that even if some arbitrariness did 
pick up the slack then we would not be able to know which referent had 
been selected. He concludes that unicorns and Holmes could not have 
existed, but this is puzzling because it seems that the stories are 
possible and according to the stories they do exist. We have seen 
several ways of responding to Kripke’s argument.  
 
The metaphysical option takes fictional terms to denote impossible 
things. The epistemic option takes them to denote possible things, but 
within the bounds left open by the stories we cannot know which 
things. The semantic option takes the terms either not to refer at all, or 
to refer indeterminately.  
 
If we disagree with Kripke, we could abandon rigid designation 
altogether in favour of descriptivism, but I am trying to avoid going 
down that road. We could however embrace a descriptivist semantics 
just for fictional terms. This can be defended in the context of a suitable 
metasemantics, but it generates some ugly results. Alternatively, we 
could keep the references of fictional terms rigid but allow the modal 
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profiles of the references themselves to vary from world to world. That 
is one way of interpreting Dummett, but involves some substantial 
commitments about the metaphysics of properties. 
 
The situation is complicated, and all the available solutions have some 
prima facie unlovable features, which must either be tolerated or 
explained. Probably some tolerance will be necessary, but hopefully our 
positive account will be able to explain as much as possible, and these 
explanations should improve our understanding of how fictional terms 
work, and what we mean when we use them. 
 
 4.23 Double Lives 
 
 4.231: Caulfield’s fame and other problems 
 
In the last section we alluded to there being at least two uses of fictional 
terms: one to refer to artistic creations, which exist and are abstract, 
and one to either pretend or try (unsuccessfully) to refer to concrete 
things which (in fact) do not. That is Kripke’s way of doing things, but 
not everyone follows him in this. Zalta seems to hold that in all the cases 
the fictional terms are used to refer to the fictional character. However, 
even if we do not make the distinction Kripke’s way, we have to make it 
somehow, to deal with what I will call the double lives problem. That 
problem is the topic of this section. 
 
As we saw in §4.1, different theories of fictional characters have 
different resources to deal with this sort of problem. Zalta’s theory 
makes use of the distinction between two ways objects can instantiate 
properties: encoding and exemplifying. Parsons talks about two 
different classes of properties, nuclear and extranuclear, and gives 
extranuclear properties watered-down nuclear equivalents. Yagisawa 
can distinguish between the properties fictional characters have in 
different worlds. Van Inwagen can distinguish between the properties 
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fictional characters have and the properties ascribed to them by the 
stories they come from. Kripke distinguishes assertions about abstract 
things from corresponding pretences ostensibly about concrete things. 
 
If it was just a problem about whether to say the characters existed or 
not, we could probably just distinguish between two senses of ‘exist’ 
and have done with it. We cannot do that though, because the double 
lives problem is more wide-ranging and systematic than that. It arises 
in a few forms.  
 
First, there is a generalized version of the existence problem: there are 
several kinds of property besides existence which we might want to 
attribute to the fictional characters in their roles as artistic creations 
but not necessarily in their roles as concreta. The artistic creations, 
since they are abstract, will automatically have lots of negative 
properties: not having been kicked, not being alive, not being extended 
in spacetime and so on. These are, at least for the most part, the 
negations of what Priest [2005: ch. 3] calls ‘existence-entailing 
properties’. (Priest holds that abstracta are non-existents.) The 
creations also get attributed some properties they do not have 
automatically by being abstract, though. These are the kinds of property 
Parsons [1980: 23] classes as extranuclear. To recap, he divides them 
into ontological properties like existence, modal properties like 
possible existence, intentional properties like being famous, 
worshipped or thought about by Parsons, and technical properties 
springing out of whatever theory of fictional characters we have 
adopted. Note that these properties are frequently the kind of 
properties that the characters can have in the stories, too. The main 
category of properties which characters can interestingly have or lack 
in either of their roles is the intentional properties. Holden Caulfield, 
the protagonist of The Catcher in the Rye, is a famous creation but not 
famous in the stories. Poirot is famous both as a creation and in the 
stories. Examples of fictional characters who are not famous in reality 
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are necessarily obscure, but it is clear that they are possible, and that 
their fame in the stories is independent of their fame out of them. 
 
This part of the problem is where distinctions like those between 
encoding and exemplifying and between neat and watered-down 
properties are most comfortable. The theories give us two kinds of 
relation which an object can stand in to a property, and we say that 
whether one relation obtains between a fictional character and a 
property is independent of whether the other does. Matters are more 
complicated than this though, and the complicated cases can put 
pressure on the theories. Two pressure points are where objects are in 
danger of appearing in a story both as abstract and as concrete, and 
where fictional characters depend on or stand in relations to other 
fictional characters. These two cases are discussed in §4.232 and 
§4.233. In §4.234 I examine a potential paradox in Zalta’s system 
arising from these issues, and in §4.235 I explain what kind of 
distinction a theory needs to be able to make to solve the double lives 
problem effectively. Then in §4.3 I will be able to sketch a positive 
theory of fictional characters which deals with the problems we have 
discussed so far. 
 
 4.232: Kripke’s story about Sherlock Holmes 
 
Kripke [1980: 157-8] tells a story about Doyle writing his stories and 
their coincidentally matching up perfectly with actual people and 
events. Kripke tells this story in connection with the issue about 
unicorns discussed in the last section, but it also raises an important 
aspect of the double lives problem. Some of the things we say about this 
problem will relate to what we say about the unicorns problem, but 
they are distinct. When we say ‘Holmes could have existed’, we are 
talking about Holmes in his concrete role: as a part of how the concrete 
things could have been. Now, we might think that if there was someone 
who by coincidence actually filled this role, then this use of ‘Holmes’ 
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would refer to him. Kripke does not want to say this, but Dummett says 
this at least about unicorns, and maybe it is what we want to say about 
some cases. Nonetheless, even if we say this, we can still hold that the 
other use of ‘Holmes’ refers to an abstract artistic creation. This is 
necessary to vindicate our saying ‘Doyle created/selected Holmes’, and 
indeed our knowing anything much about how Holmes actually is. 
 
Now, supposing we do want to maintain that in Kripke’s story there is 
still an artistic creation as well as a concrete detective, we have the 
makings of a problem. Everything determinately true in the Holmes 
stories is determinately true in Kripke’s story, but there is the 
additional information that an author – let’s call him ‘Conan’ – wrote a 
story coincidentally matching the events recounted in the Holmes 
stories. Kripke’s story leaves open strictly less than Doyle’s stories leave 
open. Perhaps we want to say that this makes Kripke’s detective 
different from Doyle’s detective, and since Conan’s stories are the same 
as Doyle’s we can say that the two roles are filled by the two detectives. 
To close this loophole, let’s have Conan add Kripke’s postscript to his 
stories, saying that someone just like him coincidentally wrote some 
stories in which all the events recounted played out. To be clear, here is 
the story, which we will still call ‘Kripke’s story’: 
 
The events of Doyle’s stories occurred, and someone called 
Conan unknowingly wrote stories like Doyle’s as fiction, but with 
a postscript adding that an author unknowingly wrote stories 
just like Conan’s (including the postscript) as fiction. 
 
Now we can state the problem. In this story, we have three objects. 
They are a novelist, Conan, a detective we can call Sherlock, and an 
artistic creation we can call Sherlock*. Conan’s story is the same as 
Kripke’s, but Sherlock* must not be the same as Sherlock, because 
Conan created/selected one but not the other, one but not the other is 
concrete and so on. But we might think that Kripke (in reality) and 
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Conan (in the story) are confronted with the same abstract objects as 
each other, and so Sherlock* and Sherlock must be the same. This 
makes sense with numbers: Poirot has the same number of heads as I 
do, viz. one. If, like Zalta, we want to fit fictional characters into a 
system of necessarily existing abstract objects, these abstract objects 
should appear in the stories just as they appear in reality. When Kripke 
writes a story that selects an abstract object, and when Conan writes 
the same story it selects the same object. Or so we might like to say. 
 
Now, this example is a little Byzantine, and there are several fixes one 
could try in response to it. When producing a fully worked out theory of 
fictional characters we might need some sort of fix, and an ad hoc fix for 
this one problem is probably not difficult to find. We want a principled 
fix though, and if we do not understand the problem properly then any 
fix can be expected to run into trouble later. As such, I will try to state 
the problem in a more intuitive way.  
 
The worlds of fictions will contain abstract objects, just like the real 
world does. We might well want to say that these are the same objects, 
imported into the fiction: Holmes lives in London and Holmes has one 
head, so London and the number one are real objects imported into the 
fiction. If fictional characters are abstract objects too, then it seems they 
will be able to be imported into stories too. But if that happens, there 
will be a danger of them running into themselves. In that case it will not 
be enough to say that they have one set of properties in reality and one 
in the stories: they will have one set of properties in reality and two in 
the stories. That might be more than a distinction like Zalta’s or 
Parsons’ can handle. 
 
We should note also that problems might arise even for stories which 
do not involve people writing coincidentally accurate fictions. 
According to Zalta’s theory and any other selectionist theory, Holmes 
would have been out there even if Doyle had not written his stories. 
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Suppose that we precisify Doyle’s stories to say no such coincidental 
stories were written about Holmes. In that story, Holmes the detective 
will be famous and Holmes the abstract object will be unheard of. This 
will not be an issue for creationists, because for them Holmes the 
abstract object exists only if the stories are written. Kripke’s story (or 
our modification of it) might still be a problem for them though, and as 
we saw in §4.21, it is as well to have a coherent plenitudinous theory of 
fictional characters to cope with the available types, even if ultimately 
we want to identify characters with the tokens and be creationist about 
those. Fine [1982: 120] also makes the point that if we can’t have a 
coherent plenitudinous theory, even a creationist theory risks having its 
coherence be contingent on the plenitude of objects, or the incoherent 
parts of it, not getting created. 
 
 4.233: Interdependent fictional characters 
 
Garlic is bad for vampires and kryptonite is bad for Superman. Holmes 
is from England and the Daleks are from Skaro. If we have a theory 
which, like Parsons’ or Zalta’s, holds that fictional characters are 
somehow defined by or dependent on the properties they have in the 
stories they come from, then these properties will probably include 
properties involving other objects. Sometimes these objects will be real, 
like garlic and England, and sometimes they will be other objects from 
the stories, like kryptonite and Skaro. Where the properties involve real 
objects this does not create any obvious problems: we already have the 
objects and on a suitably abundant conception of properties we can 
have the properties too. However, where the properties involve objects 
from the same stories as the characters we are using them to define, we 
might have a problem. Parsons discusses this issue in his [1980: 194-7]. 
 
One of Superman’s properties is expressed by ‘kryptonite is bad for x’ 
and one of kryptonite’s properties is expressed by ‘x is bad for 
Superman’. If we were thinking of the fictional characters as 
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constructed in stages, as with the hierarchy of sets, we would not be 
able to construct Superman until we had kryptonite and we would not 
be able to construct kryptonite until we had Superman. Perhaps that is 
not the way we want to think about fictional characters. We could just 
say that since there are those objects, there are those properties, and 
the objects make the relevant instances of the comprehension schema 
for fictional objects true. There is a worry of arbitrariness here though: 
if neither of two co-dependent objects existed, neither of them would 
have to exist. In fact, since all the objects native to a story will have the 
properties of co-existing with the others, there is a case to be made that 
they would all be co-dependent, and so we could not have any 
guarantee that the arbitrary process supplied them rather than not. Our 
comprehension schema by itself would not supply the objects for any 
story with more than one character native to it. 
 
Perhaps we could get round this with some kind of principle saying that 
the default position was having more objects rather than fewer, 
although this would run into trouble if there were multiple different 
extensions of the theory each of which could not be extended further. 
Even if the technical problem was soluble though, a metaphysical 
problem would remain about dependence. If fictional objects depend on 
their nuclear properties, and object-involving properties depend on the 
objects they involve, then we would have circular chains of ontological 
dependence. We might not want those. Kit Fine [1982: 129; 1984: 118] 
offers to solve this problem for Parsons by defining groups of objects 
together, so that they all depend on the same properties and not on 
each other. The system sketched in §4.3 will deal with the problem 
along similar lines. 
 
We have a further problem about fictional characters being defined by 
properties involving other fictional characters though, and this relates 
more closely to the double lives problem. I think about Sherlock 
Holmes, and Watson thinks about Sherlock Holmes, but what I am doing 
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is different from what Watson does. I am thinking about an abstract 
object in a story, and Watson (according to the story) is thinking about 
a detective. Christopher Boone, the protagonist of The Curious Incident 
of the Dog in the Night-time, also thinks about Holmes, but what he does 
is like what I do and not like what Watson does. It would be good if our 
theory brought this distinction out. 
 
If Holmes and Watson are defined or generated together, we get to 
make this distinction. The set of properties Holmes, Watson and the 
other characters in their stories depend on does not include Holmes-
involving properties or Watson-involving properties. The set of 
properties generating Boone can include Holmes-involving properties 
like thinking about Holmes. However, we have a further complication, 
which is that fictional characters appear in other works not just as 
fictional characters, but as real people72. Suppose Boone met Poirot and 
thought about him. Then Boone would have to be generated from 
Poirot-involving properties too, but to do justice to the way he thinks 
about Poirot being different from the way he thinks about Holmes, we 
                                                          
72 The status of immigrant characters in stories is delicate. It is certainly 
possible to have a fictional character based on an actual person but distinct 
from them; for example Charles Strickland in The Moon and Sixpence is based 
on but distinct from Paul Gauguin. Likewise, fictional characters can be based 
on but distinct from other fictional characters; for example Simba in Disney’s 
The Lion King is based on Hamlet. Giving the derivative character the same 
name as the source should presumably not automatically make the characters 
imported, and it is probably natural to say that Marvel’s Thor is distinct from 
Norse mythology’s Thor, and maybe Philip Roth’s Philip Roth is a fictional 
character distinct from the real Philip Roth. We can argue over cases, but the 
conceptual space is there for fictional characters based on but distinct from 
either real characters or other fictional characters. These create no new 
problems. However, the conceptual space is also there for both real characters 
and characters from other fictions appearing in fiction, and the positive 
account in §3.3 will attempt to accommodate them. 
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should have the two properties playing a different role in the way they 
generate Boone. The theory in §4.3 will try to do that. 
 
Another complication is that we might have two fictional characters 
reading each other’s stories, if two stories were written with sufficient 
co-operation. There the holistic generation of characters seems less 
appropriate. What should we do? Well, let’s examine the scenario a bit 
more closely. Suppose that in Othello Desdemona went to see Hamlet, 
and in Hamlet Ophelia went to see Othello. Then Desdemona would 
depend on Ophelia and Ophelia would depend on Desdemona, or so it 
seems. But this is a very odd case. Desdemona goes to see a play in 
which one of the characters goes to see a play in which she, Desdemona, 
is one of the characters. This would be like me going to a play in which 
the characters see a play in which I am one of the characters. That 
would be bizarre, of course. I could not actually be one of the characters 
in a play, so I cannot be native to the play they are watching, if it really 
features me. Thus we could say that Desdemona watches a play like 
Hamlet but distinct from it, and Ophelia watches a play like Othello but 
distinct from it. In §4.3433 we will see that the system I propose may be 
able to accommodate the particular case a little more smoothly than 
that, but it is unlikely that all cases involving this sort of circularity can 
be fully accommodated. 
 
 4.234: The modesty paradox 
 
Is there a property of non-self-instantiation? You might think there was: 
some things, like the property of being a property or the property of 
being such that 2+2=4, do not have non-self-instantiation, but most 
things seem to. Nonetheless, if there is such a property, it seems to lead 
to a paradox. If it does not instantiate itself then it instantiates itself, 
and if it does then it does not. Perhaps we should try to construct our 
ontology of properties without it; in any case our response to this 
paradox will be informed by our responses to the liar paradox, Russell’s 
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paradox and Grelling’s (heterological) paradox, since it is similar to all 
of those.  
 
Zalta’s theory of fictional characters fits into his general theory of 
abstracta, and that theory includes a theory of properties. He has to be 
careful to avoid the problem of the non-self-instantiation paradox. 
Ignoring the restriction Zalta imposes to avoid the paradox for now, 
let’s try to construct the paradox within his system. Abstract objects can 
encode properties as well as instantiating them. We write a encodes F 
as aF. Properties are typically expressed by predicates, but we can have 
stand-ins denoted by terms. When an object encodes exactly one 
property, we can think of that object as the Platonic form of that 
property. This is just what Zalta [1983: 42] does. He defines property 
identity, written F=G, as holding between two properties whenever 
they are encoded by just the same objects [1983: 13]. We can express 
that x is the form of the property F with this open formula: 
 
x = ιy[A!y & ∀G[yG ↔ G=F]] 
 
Informally, this says ‘x is the thing which is abstract and encodes all and 
only properties identical to F’, or ‘x is the abstract object encoding just 
F’. We can abbreviate ‘[A!y & ∀G[yG ↔ G=F]] as [ΦyF], so ‘the form of F’ 
is rendered as ιy[ΦyF]. We can say that a property F is not instantiated 
by its form: ¬Fιx[ΦxF]. We can also say that an object x is not a self-
instantiating form: ¬∃F[ΦxF & Fx]. Using a lambda formula we can turn 
this into a predicate expressing the property of not being a self-
instantiating form: [λx.¬∃F[ΦxF & Fx]]. Now we can define the form of 
non-self-instantiation, n: 
 
n = ιx[A!x & ∀F(xF ↔ F=[λy.¬∃F[ΦyF & Fy]])] 
 




n = ιx[A!x & ∀F(xF ↔ F=[λy.¬∃F[[A!y & ∀G[yG ↔ G=F]] & Fy]])] 
 
Does n instantiate the property it is the form of? That property is 
instantiated by all and only properties that do not instantiate a property 
they are the form of, so n instantiates its property iff it does not. We 
have a paradox. Zalta understandably imposes a restriction on his 
system in order to avoid this problem. Here is his comprehension 
schema [1983: 34-5]. Where x is not free in φ: 
 
∃!x(A!x & ∀F[xF ↔ φ]) 
 
Ordinarily φ will have only F free, and so express a condition on 
properties. To avoid paradoxes, Zalta imposes a restriction on his 
language which ends up imposing a restriction on φ: lambda predicates 
cannot be constructed from formulas containing either encoding 
subformulas or quantifiers binding predicate variables [1983: 18]. The 
lambda predicate in the definition of n breaks both rules, so no paradox 
arises. 
 
Can we construct a different paradox? Let’s try. Of all the objects there 
are, some will encode liking themselves, and some will not. I do not 
mean encoding self-liking, but rather encoding the object-involving 
property which happens to be liking yourself. In Zalta’s system Holmes 
encodes liking Holmes while Obama does not encode liking Obama. 
Let’s call objects which do not encode liking themselves modest, 
symbolized as ‘M’, and symbolize ‘likes’ as ‘L’. Now we define an object, 
Larry, which encodes just liking all the modest objects: 
 
Larry = ιx(A!x & ∀F[xF ↔ ∃y(My & F=[λz.Lzy])]) 
 
This says that whenever an object does not encode the property of 
liking itself then Larry will encode the property of liking that object, and 
Larry will not encode any other properties. Does Larry encode liking 
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Larry? If not then it is modest, so it will encode liking Larry, but if it 
encodes liking Larry then it is not modest, so it will not encode liking 
Larry. We have a contradiction, so there can be no object defined as 
Larry was defined. But there were no encoding subformulas or 
predicate quantifiers in the lambda formula, so the formula defining 
Larry was an instance of the comprehension schema. 
 
What can we say? Well, ‘M’ was in the formula, and ‘M’ was defined as 




That is banned because it contains an encoding subformula. Does this 
resolve the issue? Not really, for two reasons. First, ‘M’ is just a simple 
predicate. Perhaps we can say that since it is synonymous with a 
banned expression, it is itself banned. I am not sure how we would go 
about hunting down all the banned expressions, since many simple 
predicates were defined long ago, but let us suppose that we can do 
this. We get a problem now though, because ‘Holmes’ is the object 
encoding all and only the properties in the Holmes role, and as such is 
equivalent to an expression with encoding subformulas. We want to say 
that Watson encodes liking Holmes, but now we cannot, because that 




If ‘h’ cannot appear in lambda terms, we cannot say this. If it can, on 
what grounds was ‘M’ banned from the language? But the cases are not 
quite the same: ‘M’ had a banned definition, whereas ‘h’ had an 
allowable definition such that if we replaced ‘h’ with its definition 
would bar the resulting expression from appearing in a lambda formula. 




However, the paradox can return even if ‘modest’ is not synonymous 
with ‘not encoding liking yourself’. Can we deny that a predicate in the 
language could apply, contingently, to all and only the things which do 
not encode liking themselves? The things are out there, and what if they 
all just happened to be God’s favourite things? (Or mine?) The 
comprehension schema has no magical force; it is just something which 
Zalta thinks is true and entails the existence of all the abstract objects 
there are. Since there is no object encoding liking all the objects which 
encode liking themselves, if they are God’s favourite things, there is no 
object encoding liking all and only God’s favourite things.  
 
Perhaps we think it very unlikely that our language contains a predicate 
which could combine with Zalta’s comprehension schema to generate a 
false instance. If we are falling back on that though, we see that it only 
entails the existence of the objects it does because our predicates have 
the extensions they contingently have. It is therefore unlikely that the 
schema entails the existence of all the abstract objects there are, 
although that was supposed to be a point in favour of believing it (see 
the quote in note 46, above). 
 
It seems that Zalta’s theory is in some trouble, and there are two issues 
to think about as a result of that. One is how to fix Zalta’s general theory 
of abstract objects in general in response to the modesty paradox, and 
the other is how to stop our systematic theory of fictional characters 
falling foul of something similar. We will deal with the first issue first. 
 
The modesty paradox is not just a technical thing, and indeed we saw 
that it might contain some technical loopholes. Escaping through these 
loopholes will not do much good though, because it raises a systemic 
worry about theories like Zalta’s. Some of our predicates have 
contingent extensions, and the comprehension schema uses those 
contingent extensions to determine which collections of properties are 
necessarily encoded by abstract objects. If we relied on the contingent 
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extensions we would most probably not get all the collections we 
needed, and if we used all the possible extensions we would run into 
paradoxes. Probably something can be done, but we will not explore 
exactly what works here. 
 
Before leaving the topic though, it is worth drawing attention to some 
similar problems, and in particular Kripke’s [2011c] paradox about 
time and thought. Kripke argues that if we want to say that the times 
form a set then a paradox threatens. For every set and expressible 
condition on objects, there is meant to be a subset of the set containing 
just those members satisfying the condition. (This is just a version of 
the separation axiom for set theory.) Suppose that the set is the set of 
times, and the condition is that t be a time at which he (Kripke) is 
thinking of a set of times of which t is not a member. Since the 1960s, 
Kripke has sometimes thought about the set of times satisfying that 
condition. Are those times in the set or not? They are iff they are not, 
which leads to a contradiction73. In his discussion, Kripke notes that his 
paradox is similar to Kaplan’s [1995] paradox for possible worlds 
semantics. The normal response to Kaplan’s paradox is not to give up 
on using possible worlds semantics, and time will tell how people 
respond to Kripke’s paradox. In any case, the way defenders of Zalta’s 
theory respond to the modesty paradox and the general problem it 
raises should be informed by their responses to Kaplan’s and Kripke’s 
problems. 
 
For present purposes we can scale our ambitions back from a 
systematic theory of all abstract objects to a theory of fictional 
characters. We need to make sure our theory does not fall foul of the 
modesty paradox or something like it. This is where the double lives 
                                                          
73 This technique can be used to generate a predicate to use for ‘M’ in the 
modesty paradox. At t I think – contingently of course – about the set of 
objects not encoding liking themselves, and then we use the predicate ‘x is a 
member of the set I am thinking about at t’ 
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problem comes in. The problem arose from properties involving 
abstract objects. If we think there are such objects at all, then these 
objects will in some sense be already out there and things can have 
properties involving them. The same goes for properties involving 
fictional characters: I have the property of thinking about Holmes. We 
must also allow that fictional characters can have these properties in 
the stories, because of cases like Christopher Boone thinking about 
Sherlock Holmes. However, when Boone has this property it still 
involves Holmes as a fictional character. When we go into Holmes’ 
world and look at the properties of characters in that story, including 
Holmes himself, Holmes is no longer present as a fictional character. In 
that world Holmes is a detective instead, and not among that world’s 
stock of fictional characters. They can have a fictional character a lot 
like Holmes, but Holmes himself is busy being a detective. Larry’s 
problem was like Conan’s problem. Conan thinks about Sherlock* but 
not about Sherlock. Larry is like a character in a story who likes all the 
objects which do not encode liking themselves. There is no 
contradiction there: as a concrete character he does not encode liking 
himself, which places him among the things he exemplifies liking. But if 
he was also in that world encoding qua abstract object all the properties 
he exemplifies qua concrete object, we would have a problem. We need 
an account which takes into account the way different stories’ stocks of 
concrete objects generate different collections of fictional characters, 
and which does not give anything both roles in the same story. We 
examine this desideratum further in the next section.  
 
 4.235: Abstract and concrete natives and immigrants 
 
We need to have a concept of a character being native to a story as 
opposed to being an immigrant, the terminology of Parsons [1980: 51]. 
The idea has been broadly assumed so far, but we should examine it 
more closely. When you tell a story you can import characters, either 
from the real world or from other stories, and you can also make up 
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new characters. The natures of the immigrant characters will not be 
changed by the story, except insofar as having a story about you is itself 
a change. Their intrinsic natures are determined by what they are like 
in reality, if they are real, or what they are like in the stories they were 
native to, if they are imported from other fictions. We can distinguish 
between immigrants and new characters based on old, as with Marvel’s 
Thor, and if we want to do justice to the continuity of Thor’s 
incarnations we can research intertextual genealogies; we don’t have to 
say the characters are strictly identical. The choices to be made in this 
kind of case should not generate problems relevant to the present 
project. (For more on Thor see note 59, above.) 
 
Often conflicts between the properties of characters in different stories 
can be resolved by saying the character is native to one story and an 
immigrant in the other. It may not always be appropriate to resolve 
conflicts in this way, though. Consider Kripke’s story from §3.232. The 
fictional detective determined by Kripke’s story has different properties 
in the story from that determined by Conan’s story, but since they seem 
to be the same story they seem to be the same character. But this seems 
impossible: Conan created one and not the other, one solves crimes and 
one is fictional and so on. We could try to resolve this conflict by saying 
the character is native to one story and an immigrant in the other. But 
should we do this? It seems that Kripke’s story is the origin of Sherlock, 
a fictional detective, and Sherlock*, a fictional fictional detective. There 
is a sense in which both are native to Kripke’s story, but there is also an 
apparent sense in which Sherlock* is native to Conan’s fictional story 
too. How do we resolve that? 
 
I propose we distinguish between two ways an object can be native to a 
story. It can be a concrete native if the story says it is one of the concrete 
objects, and it can be an abstract native if it would be one of the abstract 
objects generated by the world of the story. The plenitude of available 
fictional characters is, according to Zalta and Parsons and perhaps 
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everyone else with a systematic ontology of fictional characters, 
determined by what the world is like and could be like and what things 
it does and might contain. But if Kripke is right about unicorns and 
(especially) Sherlock Holmes, fictional worlds contain objects which do 
not exist in the real world, and could not. These new objects can 
generate new possibilities, which in turn generate new fictional 
characters. The concrete natives are the new concrete objects 
introduced into a story, and the abstract natives are the new fictional 
characters which are generated as a result. Sherlock is a concrete native 
of Kripke’s story, and Sherlock* is an abstract native of the same story. 
 
As well as making a distinction between the concrete and abstract 
natives of a story, we can also make a similar distinction among 
immigrants. Suppose again that Christopher Boone thinks about 
Sherlock Holmes and meets Poirot. Holmes is an abstract immigrant to 
this story and Poirot is a concrete immigrant. Holmes will appear in the 
story by Boone having a property, thinking about Holmes, which is 
native to our world. Poirot will appear by having his own properties in 
the story, although only as an immigrant. The ontology sketched in §4.3 
will be constructed so as to make the distinction fall out of it naturally. 
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4.3 A Sketch of a Fictional Ontology 
 
 4.31: Introduction 
 
We have seen some reasons to think there are fictional characters, some 
of the systems on offer, and some issues and choices those systems have 
to face. Now we are ready to put these things together and sketch out a 
system which should be able to solve those problems. It is only a sketch, 
and as such will have some limitations which will be laid out in §4.34. A 
fuller development of it will be left for further work. The sketch will 
however try to solve the problems we have discussed in a principled 
way, which gives reason to hope that a fuller development along the 
same principles would inherit its solutions to these problems. 
 
Even a full development of the position sketched in this section would 
however have some limits to its ambitions. As already noted, there is a 
distinction between fictional characters as abstract creations (or 
selections) – as theoretical entities of literary criticism – and fictional 
characters as concrete things which we only pretend exist. Van 
Inwagen’s argument that there are fictional characters applies only to 
the former. Once we have them in our ontology, of course, we could 
press them into service in an analysis of the latter kind of discourse, and 
this is, at least to an extent, what Parsons and Zalta do. It is not what I 
will do. I will follow Parsons and Zalta in setting up a systematic 
ontology of fictional characters, but I will follow Kripke in using them 
only as theoretical entities of literary criticism. For the other kind of 
discourse I will offer a pretence account, which I will set out in §4.4. The 
ontology sketched below will include elements from Zalta [1983], 






 4.32: Informal presentation of the theory 
 
The most standard way of avoiding paradoxes in set theory is to have 
the axioms for generating sets apply to the members of a set rather than 
to everything at once. For example, we cannot (consistently) say “for 
every collection of things, there is a set of those things”, since this would 
generate the Russell set of non-self-members, which is a member of 
itself iff it isn’t. But we can say “for every set, for every collection of 
members of that set, there is a set of those members”. This doesn’t 
generate any paradoxical sets, or so we hope: we saw that Kripke 
[2011c] has a puzzle for us even when we adopt this restriction. We will 
ignore that puzzle here, though. 
 
Zalta and Parsons tried to avoid paradoxes in a different way: they have 
a single comprehension schema which applies to everything at once, 
including the objects being generated, to generate their universe of 
objects, but there are restrictions on the schema which rule out 
paradoxical objects like the thing that encodes loving everything that 
doesn’t encode loving itself. There is probably room for debate over just 
how deep the difference is between the two strategies, but my proposal 
will be at least superficially more similar to the standard strategy in set 
theory. We have a way of making new fictional characters from the 
things we have at one level of the hierarchy, and then these new 
characters are included in the things generating the objects at higher 
levels of the hierarchy. 
 
The outline of the theory is as follows. We have a notion of our 
possibility space, which is the set of possible worlds and the set of things 
that can exist at those worlds. These worlds and things give us a set of 
intensions, which are functions from the worlds to sets of n-tuples of 
the things. These intensions stand in as properties and relations. We 
can then generate a story, which is a distribution of these properties 
and relations over some things. These things can be new things native 
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to the story, or they can be immigrants to the story. Immigrants can 
either be non-fictional things, from our possibility space, or fictional 
things from other stories generated at an earlier level than the story 
they are immigrants to. The natives to a story are new characters, 
which can appear as immigrants in new stories further up the 
hierarchy. 
 
We can follow Zalta in having characters in a story encode the 
properties and relations they have in the story, but encoding can be 
thought of as much more specific to this theory of fiction. Zalta takes 
encoding to be a kind of instantiation, but there is less pressure on us to 
say that, because we have a separate analysis of statements like ‘Poirot 
is a detective’ given in §4.4, where ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of ordinary 
instantiation. We can extend encoding to cover relations as well as 
properties, and have it relative to a story. For example, ‘admires’ 
denotes the intension of admiring over our home possibility space: the 
function from worlds w to ordered pairs <x, y> such that x admires y at 
w. Watson admires Holmes in Doyle’s stories, so we can say Doyle’s 
stories[(Watson, Holmes)Admires]. If I write a story about them in which 
Watson doesn’t admire Holmes, we can say ¬My story[(Watson, 
Holmes)Admires]. If we like, we could say that an object or some objects 
encode a property or relation simpliciter iff they encode it relative to the 
story to which they are native. 
 
Now, we must also have a way of letting characters like Christopher 
Boone admire Holmes, in a different way from how Watson does. This is 
because Boone admires Holmes qua fictional character, while Watson 
admires him qua concrete character. Admiring Holmes as Boone does is 
the sort of property that non-fictional characters can have, so now we 
treat it as a monadic property, which will be a function from worlds to 
sets of things that admire Holmes at those worlds. We don’t have to 
take a stand now on whether admiring something concrete (like 
Watson does) or something fictional (like Boone does) are the same 
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kind of admiring, although we will need to address something similar 
shortly when we talk about attitudes towards fictional fictional 
characters like Gonzago. Now we are just trying to generate enough 
fictional characters without running into paradoxes. 
 
A complication arises from fictional properties. The problem is that it 
isn’t just fictional characters that can migrate into other stories; 
fictional properties can as well. Having the characters was relatively 
easy, but having the properties is a bit harder. There are three kinds of 
fictional properties we need to deal with. 
 
First, properties such as being an ewok. Ewoks are a fictional species in 
the Star Wars universe, and while there might be a case for saying that 
unicorns are part of some kind of public domain myth such that they 
are native to a composite of all the stories about them (and so not 
immigrant to any story), you definitely can’t make this case about 
ewoks. Ewoks are native to Star Wars but could appear as immigrants. 
Ewokhood has no non-null intension over our possibility space, 
assuming Kripke is right about unicorns, and ideally we would be able 
to generate it from a possibility space associated with the Star Wars 
universe. 
 
Second, properties such as living with Holmes. This also has no non-null 
intension, but the theory as previously sketched can deal with it. Since 
this is a property which things can only have if Holmes appears in their 
story, we can always give things this property by putting Holmes in the 
story, and having things encode living with to him relative to that story. 
Living with has an intension generated by our possibility space. 
 
Third, properties such as pitying Gonzago. Gonzago is (let us assume) a 
fictional character in the play within a play in Hamlet. Maybe I can pity 
Gonzago, but this is arguably not the same as what Hamlet would do if 
he pitied Gonzago, because when I do it I am interacting with Hamlet, 
 234 
 
whereas when Hamlet does it he is not. Pitying a fictional fictional man 
is thus arguably not the same as pitying a fictional man. So it seems that 
while pitying Gonzago qua fictional fictional man corresponds to an 
intension over our possibility space, pitying him qua fictional man 
corresponds to an intension over a space associated with Hamlet. 
 
The natural solution here is to let stories have possibility spaces 
associated with them, rather than just worlds. Perhaps we should worry 
that stories are not specific enough about what is possible according to 
them, but this is just an instance of a feature already present in the 
basic case. Stories aren’t maximally specific, but just as plenty is implicit 
about what is actual, e.g. Hamlet has ten toes, plenty is implicit about 
what is possible, e.g. Hamlet could have had only nine toes. Now, having 
only nine toes is a non-fictional property which appears in Hamlet as an 
immigrant, but pitying Gonzago qua fictional character appears in 
Hamlet as a native, and corresponds to an intension over the possibility 
space of the Hamlet story. Likewise, being an ewok corresponds to an 
intension over the possibility space of the Star Wars universe. 
 
We ought to say that a story’s possibility space does not have just one 
designated actual world, but a set of actual worlds, and say that what is 
true according to a story is what is true at all the actual worlds. Multiple 
actual worlds are used in a different context by Williams [2008], to deal 
with metaphysical indeterminacy. Here they allow us to reconcile the 
fact that while the possibilities according to a story (unless it is some 
kind of logical fantasy) will presumably be complete, what is true 
according to a story will tend to be incomplete. The simplest thing 
would be to say that what is possible according to a story is whatever is 
true at some world in the space, and what is true according to a story is 
whatever is true at all the actual worlds. We should not say quite this 
though, because fictions can sometimes be underspecified with respect 
to necessary truths. Returning to Dummett’s example about unicorns 
mentioned in §4.221, the unicorn myth might be non-specific about 
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whether they are in the order Artiodactyla, like deer, or the order 
Perissodactyla, like horses. But whichever order they are in, they are 
necessarily in that order, so just as it is not true according to the myth 
that they are Artiodactylae, it is not true according to the myth that they 
could be Artiodactylae. We solve this by having a reflexive accessibility 
relation on worlds in a story’s possibility space, and say (as is standard) 
that something is possible at a world iff true at some accessible world, 
and so it is possible according to the story if every actual world accesses 
at least one world where it is true. All the Artiodactyla worlds could 
access each other, but they would not access the Perissodactyla worlds. 
These relations could still be equivalence relations if possibility obeyed 
S5 according to the story, but if the actual worlds were from more than 
one equivalence class then the story would not fix all the necessary 
truths. 
 
Now that we have clarified how the multiple actualities work, we can 
show that there is no violation of actuality entailing possibility here; 
whenever something is true according to a story it will be possible 
according to it. This can easily be seen since actuality entailing 
possibility is equivalent to necessity entailing actuality, and whatever is 
true at all the worlds accessed by an actual world of a story will clearly 
be true at all the actual worlds of the story, since accessibility is 
reflexive. We have to distinguish between what is [not] [true according 
to S] and what is [not true] [according to S], but this distinction is 
standard. 
 
That is basically the whole thing. We distinguish between objects 
appearing or being involved in properties qua concrete, fictional, 
fictional fictional and so on. Each character and property is native to a 
possibility space, and we can generate new stories and their possibility 
spaces from objects and properties native to a space earlier in the 
hierarchy. In §4.34 we will explain how the theory meets the desiderata 
we laid out, and in §4.35 we will mention some limitations and areas for 
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further work. First, however, we will clarify the theory by presenting it 
in a more formal way. 
 
 4.33 Formal presentation of the theory 
 
Since we are simplifying, we can follow Zalta and Williamson in using a 
constant domain modal logic, and worlds and possibilia of the intended 
model will serve as the base for the rest of the system. So our home 
possibility space contains a set W of worlds and a set D possibilia, and 
the expressions of our actual language pick out members of D (for 
names) and functions from W to n-tuples of D (for n-place predicates). 
Now we can give the general procedure for generating objects. Objects 
aren’t in general generated directly from a possibility space. Objects 
come from stories, and stories are generated by taking some immigrant 
objects and properties and adding in some native objects. At the first 
level all the immigrant objects and properties will be native to our 
home possibility space, but at other levels they can come from different 
places. So we need a way of generating properties and relations from a 
possibility space, and a way of generating stories and their native 
objects from a set of objects and a set of properties and relations. 
 
We begin with our home possibility space P, which is the pair <W, D> of 
possible worlds and possible objects. Let RP be the set of functions Fn 
from W to sets of finite n-tuples of D. In general, RS is the set of relations 
generated by possibility space S, including properties as 1-place 
relations. 
 
Now we can generate a set of stories from the home possibility space P. 
A set of stories is generated from some objects and relations in S. A 
migration M from P is any pair <dP, rP>, where dP ⊆ DP and rP ⊆ RP. A 
story σ generated from M will be a quintuple <Wσ, Aσ, Dσ, Vσ, @σ>. These 
are defined as follows: 
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 Wσ is the set of possible worlds for σ. We impose a limit on the 
size of any Wσ; following Lewis [1986: 118] this could be Beth-2 
(the power of the continuum). 
 Aσ is a reflexive accessibility relation on these worlds. 
 Dσ is dM ∪ δσ, where δσ is the set of objects native to σ. We 
impose a limit on the size of δσ. 
 Vσ assigns each member Fn of rM a function from Wσ to n-tuples 
of Dσ. This says what worlds in σ’s possibility space are like. 
 @σ is a subset of Wσ which are the actual worlds of σ. 
 
The stories’ worlds and natives and are the non-set-theoretic 
commitments of the theory. (If you have set theory and the natives and 
worlds, you get the stories themselves for free.) The selectionist and 
creationist versions of the theories commit to different stories, and I 
remain neutral between them. For a creationist, each story must 
correspond to an actual authorship event, and indiscernible authorship 
events can give rise to more than one indiscernible story, with the same 
immigrants, differing only in their set of natives. For the selectionist, 
each migration generates a plenitude of stories, with one of each kind. 
Indiscernible authorship events would select the same story, instead of 
creating similar ones. Since there is a limit on the size of members of δσ 
and Wσ, there is a limit on the number of possible equivalence classes of 
indiscernible quintuples of this kind that could be constructed out of a 
single migration. The selectionist will have once story from each 
available class. 
 
A story σ brings new objects, δσ. It also brings new relations. Rσ is the 
set of relations native to σ, which is the set of functions from Wσ to n-
tuples from Dσ, excluding those in the range of Vσ, which were 
immigrant properties. Now we need a way of generating new stories 
from migrations including objects and properties not native to the 
home possibility space P. For this we introduce the concept of a 
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universe, which is a pair <O, R> of objects and relations. Universes are 
characterized by these clauses: 
 <D, RP> is a universe. 
 If <O, R> is a universe, then any pair <d, r> is a migration from 
<O, R>, where d ⊆ O and r ⊆ R. 
 If M is a migration from <O, R>, ΩM is a set of objects native to 
stories generated from M, and RM is a set of relations native to 
stories generated from M, then <O∪ΩM, R∪RM> is a universe. 
 If M0 is <O, R>, ΩMi and RMi are sets of objects and relations 
native to stories generated from the Mi as above, and each Mi+1 
for i≥1 is a migration from <⋃ΩM0… ΩMi, ⋃RM0… RMi>, then <⋃ΩMi, 
⋃RMi> is a universe. 
 
These universes generate more migrations, which in turn can generate 
more stories. Note that a migration will in general be a migration from 
many universes. For the selectionist each migration generates a 
plenitude of stories, while for the creationist they generate stories 
corresponding to all and only the actual authorship events. That is 
about as far as we’ll take the formal presentation of the theory. We will 
see in §4.34 how the theory solves the problems laid out in §4.2, and in 
§4.35 we will see some of its limitations and areas for further 
development. 
 
 4.34 How the theory solves the problems 
 
§4.2 raised some issues which any ontology of fictional objects needs to 
be able to deal with. It either needs to have a line on these issues, or 
leave room for a more developed version of the theory to have one. The 
theory just sketched was expressly designed to address the issues, and 
in some places it may be reasonably obvious how it would deal with 
them. Nonetheless, rather than leave them as exercises for the reader, 




 4.341 Creations or discoveries? 
 
I noted that some people think fictional objects are created by their 
authors, and some people think they are out there waiting to be 
discovered. I don’t have a strong line on this, but the theory sketched 
out fits nicely with either view. If fictional objects are out there 
irrespective of our practices, all the objects in the hierarchy defined by 
the theory will exist. If not, only some will exist.  
 
A nice feature of the hierarchical system is that a certain amount of 
independence between the objects in different stories is guaranteed. 
Recall that fictional objects are generated from a migration consisting of 
objects and properties, which can either be native to our possibility 
space or to other stories. Everything native to our possibility space is 
guaranteed to exist, as are the immigrants from other stories, since you 
can’t import Holmes into a story unless the Holmes stories have been 
written. So whatever a given fictional character depends on, if that 
character existed then everything they depend on would have also had 
to exist. Looked at another way, even if some parts of the hierarchy are 
missing, what remains will still be a properly grounded hierarchy. This 
can be compared with an ontology of impure sets: even though Socrates 
and {Socrates} exist contingently, we don’t have to worry about 
{{Socrates}, Plato} existing without {Socrates} existing.  
 
It is probably also worth pointing out that the present theory allows for 
rather a lot of fictional objects, and if we take them to be created rather 
than discovered then our ontology won’t be so quantitatively bloated. If 
we want to allow for distinct indiscernible fictional objects, we can do 
just that: whereas the selectionist asserts that each migration generates 
one of each possible type of story and its natives, the creationist can 
assert that each migration generates as many of each type as there are 




 4.342 Kripke and unicorns 
 
The straightforward response this theory gives to the unicorns problem 
is the same as that given by Reimer and Kripke: Holmes and unicorns 
couldn’t have existed, because in the relevant context ‘Holmes’ and 
‘unicorn’ don’t pick out an object or a species. Holmes and the property 
being a unicorn do exist qua fictional object and property (which is just 
to say they exist and are a fictional object and a fictional property), but 
when we say ‘Holmes could/couldn’t have existed’, we are using 
‘Holmes’ qua name of a person, not a fictional object. Used this way it 
picks out nobody, and so on the negative free logic proposed in chapter 
one, ‘Holmes could have existed’ is false, its negation is true, and 
likewise mutatis mutandis for unicorns. 
 
Since we take ‘Holmes’ and ‘unicorn’ not to pick out elements of the 
fictional ontology, we need a different account of their semantics. We 
could just say they don’t refer, but we won’t quite say that. I will treat 
them similarly to the proposal of Lewis [1978], which I will elaborate in 
§4.43. This will give the fictional names clearly different meanings, 
which lays the ground for the role in attitude contexts I will give them 
in §4.432. In ‘Holmes could have existed’, however, they will still end up 
not denoting anything. 
 
 4.343 Double lives 
 
The present proposal probably distinguishes itself most sharply from 
those of Parsons and Zalta in its treatment of the double lives problem. 
Zalta has both Watson and Christopher Boone encode admiring Holmes. 
Parsons has both of them literally admiring Holmes. My theory treats 
the cases quite differently: Watson and Holmes are generated together 
in Doyle’s stories, and are picked out by their roles, part of which 
involves one encoding admiring the other relative to the story at the 
actual worlds of the story. Boone admires Holmes the way people in our 
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world do: relative to his story and its actual worlds, he encodes the 
function from our possible worlds to things that admire Holmes (in 
whatever sense real people do admire the fictional Holmes) at those 
worlds. That was the problem of abstract and concrete natives and 
immigrants. Now we can look briefly at the other parts of the problem 
raised in §4.23 
 
o 4.3431 Caulfield’s fame 
 
This was just the problem that objects can have incompatible 
properties in reality and in their fictions. Every theory has a way of 
dealing with it, whether by distinguishing encoding from instantiation, 
nuclear properties from extranuclear, or something else. The present 
proposal uses the encoding/instantiation distinction. Caulfield 
instantiates being famous, but relative to his story he does not encode 
being famous at its actual worlds. 
 
o 4.3432 Kripke’s story about Sherlock Holmes 
 
The problem here was meant to be that if fictional characters are 
abstract objects like numbers, then stories should have the same 
universes of fictional objects as we do, and so an object might appear in 
a story both as fictional and as concrete. In Kripke’s thought experiment 
someone writes about someone just like Holmes and there is someone 
just like Holmes, so Holmes seems to appear both ways in the story. The 
way we have set things up, this should not be able to happen. The 
fictional objects generated from the possibility space of a story are 
different from those generated by our possibility space, so the fictions 
within Kripke’s story would contain different characters from the one 
Kripke’s story contains. If you wanted Holmes to be imported into a 
story as a fictional character created either by a fictional author or by 
an (also imported) Doyle, you would do this by importing Holmes-
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involving properties from our possibility space, as with Christopher 
Boone’s admiring Holmes. 
 
o 4.3433 Interdependent fictional characters 
 
The treatment of fictional characters’ interdependence is very explicit 
in the theory, because a story generates all its characters together. We 
do not need to worry about what explains why either Holmes or 
Watson exist, because the migration generating the story explains why 
they both exist. Perhaps we can deal with the problem of Ophelia and 
Desdemona watching plays with each other in relatively smoothly: 
properties like admiring Ophelia and admiring Desdemona (qua 
fictional) are native to our world and so nothing stops Ophelia admiring 
Desdemona qua fictional and vice versa. We would not do so well if 
natives of two stories appeared as concrete immigrants in each other’s 
stories. We can treat at least one as a similar but distinct character, or 
combine the two stories into a single one (as is usual in interpreting 
comic book universes). It isn’t ideal, but it has at least one companion in 
guilt: the same piece of ugliness arises in the view of properties as 
(well-founded) set of their instances, when two properties appear to 
instantiate each other. 
 
o 4.3434   Paradoxes 
 
This ontology of fictional objects ought to be able to avoid paradoxes at 
least to the extent that the set theoretic universes it is modelled on can. 
It does this while still allowing fictional characters to depend on other 
fictions, and to migrate into other fictions either as concrete or as 
fictional. It avoids the modesty paradox, the paradoxes Fine raises for 
Parsons, and the standard set-theoretic paradoxes. Whether it avoids all 
paradoxes without curtailing its expressive capacity too much is an 
open question, as it is with set theory, but avoiding existing paradoxes 




 4.35 Limitations of the theory 
 
I already mentioned one limitation, in dealing with characters migrating 
to each other’s stories. This is the price of a properly grounded 
hierarchy, but an unavoidable price is still a price, and it shouldn’t be 
swept under the carpet. While in fact such cases seem to be mostly dealt 
with by consumers of literature (including comic books) through the 
‘one big story’ approach, our literary practices could have been 
different and made the problem bigger. I won’t go into it further; I’ll just 
flag it up as a limitation. 
 
Another limitation is that it bases the possibility spaces on a constant 
domain modal logic. The orthodoxy, pace Williamson [2010], is that it is 
contingent what exists, and in particular, there could have been things 
that do not actually exist. Formally, to make the scope clear: 
◊∃x¬@∃y[y=x]. This probably means that the intensions we took over 
our possibility space will also not exist, since they are functions from 
worlds (presumably ersatz worlds, which many people are happy to 
accept) to sets of possibilia (which are considerably less popular). 
Zalta’s theory is in the same boat, since he takes himself to be 
committed to the possibilia he quantifies over even if he takes them as 
Meinongian non-existents. I won’t try to solve the problem now. 
 
Another problem arising from the use of intensions as properties is that 
we cannot individuate properties hyperintensionally. Any two 
necessarily co-extensive properties will be treated as the same property 
when they appear in fictions. We can mitigate this to some extent by 
widening the class of worlds in our possibility space to include some 
impossible worlds. Once we have done that, properties may be 
individuated finely enough that it is plausible that they do not come 
apart in fiction. If this solution is not deemed satisfactory, maybe we 
will have to resort to some kind of sui generis property ontology and 
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use those instead of intensions. It is possible that a solution to this 
problem would also provide a solution to the previous one, since it 
gives intensions over non-actual possibilia less work to do. 
 
The last limitation to mention is that the theory probably does not do 
very well with what Fine [1982] calls logical and philosophical 
fantasies, particularly revenge fantasies cast in the terms of the theory 
itself. These are worlds where logic is different, or something like the 
metaphysics of properties or fictional characters is different. Maybe we 
want a fiction where Bob loves Joe but Joe isn’t loved by Bob. It is 
possible that any theory could run into examples like this which it can’t 
really deal with, and you can either provide an unsatisfactory solution 
or add an epicycle to theory. The epicycles in any presentation will have 
to stop somewhere though, and I won’t go any further with mine. 
Hopefully enough has been done to show that the proposal deals well 
with the normal range of cases, and leaves room for epicycles to expand 






So far, this chapter has been about the place of fictional characters in 
our ontology. I argued that there is a role for them, at least as 
theoretical entities of literary criticism. Fictional characters are 
artworks, like novels or musical works. I surveyed different kinds of 
fictional ontology people have put forward, looked at some issues any 
ontology of fictional characters must address, and put forward a 
systematic ontology of my own. The creationist version of the theory is 
less ontologically profligate than the selectionist version, but both 
commit to a lot of things. 
 
There is another point of view which is much less ontologically 
committing. That is pretence theory. The locus classicus of pretence 
theory is Walton [1990], which develops and sets out ideas going back 
to his [1978a] and [1978b]. The central idea of pretence theory is that 
fiction is pretence. Writers of fiction pretend to recount facts, and 
readers join in with this pretence, but it is all just so many make-believe 
games, and none of these things exist in any sense. 
 
 4.41 Leaving your sports car in the garage 
 
Having argued for committing to fictional characters, you might think 
that pretence theory has nothing to offer us. I still think it has. The 
arguments of §4.1 said that we should understand sentences like these 
as being about fictional characters: 
 
There are characters in some nineteenth century novels who are 
presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than is any 
character in any eighteenth century novel. 
 
Every female character in any eighteenth century novel is such 
that there is some character in some nineteenth century novel 
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who is presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than 
she is. [van Inwagen 1977: 302-3] 
 
These sentences are from discourse about literature. They sound like 
straightforward assertions, and wouldn’t do well as paradigm cases for 
the pretence theorist. But sentences like this sound much more like 
pretence: 
 
It was a dark and stormy night; the rain fell in torrents — except 
at occasional intervals, when it was checked by a violent gust of 
wind which swept up the streets (for it is in London that our 
scene lies), rattling along the housetops, and fiercely agitating 
the scanty flame of the lamps that struggled against the 
darkness. [Opening of Bulwer-Lytton 1830] 
 
When Edward Bulwer-Lytton writes that and we as readers go along 
with it in whatever way readers of fiction do, we don’t have to commit 
ontologically to anything, because we don’t think it’s true. If all 
discourse related to fiction was like that, van Inwagen’s argument 
would not work, because we only commit to the commitments of the 
things we believe, not the things we pretend to believe. Maybe we in 
fact need to commit to things to understand the things we pretend to 
believe, but that would involve a separate argument. 
 
Kripke [2013] has been influential in supporting fictional ontologies for 
sentences like van Inwagen’s, but he has also been influential in 
supporting pretence theory for sentences like Bulwer-Lytton’s, while 
others like Nathan Salmon have wanted to make fuller use of the 
ontology they worked so hard to persuade us of. Kripke says this: 
 
In various writings [Salmon 1987, 1998, 2000], he has argued 
that I ought to have made greater and more effective use of the 
ontology of fictional characters I propose. Instead of saying that 
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Conan Doyle only pretends to name any one entity, why not say 
that he does name one entity – the fictional character? [Kripke 
2013: xii; his emphasis] 
 
And here is an example of Salmon making the point: 
 
Once fictional characters have been countenanced as real 
entities, why hold onto an alleged use of their names that fails to 
refer to them? It is like buying a luxurious Italian sports car only 
to keep it garaged. [Salmon 1998: 298] 
 
Salmon goes on to say how he thinks we should view the matter: 
 
The matter should be viewed instead as follows: Conan Doyle 
one fine day set about to tell a story. In the process he created a 
fictional character as the protagonist, and other fictional 
characters as well, each playing a certain role in the story. These 
characters, like the story itself, are man-made abstract artifacts, 
born of Conan Doyle's fertile imagination. The name 'Sherlock 
Holmes' was originally coined by Conan Doyle in writing the 
story (and subsequently understood by readers reading the 
Holmes stories) as the fictional name for the protagonist. That 
thing – in fact merely an abstract artefact – is according to the 
story, a man by the name of 'Sherlock Holmes'. In telling the 
story, Conan Doyle pretends to use the name to refer to its 
fictional referent (and to use 'Scotland Yard' to refer to Scotland 
Yard) – or rather, he pretends to be Dr. Watson using 'Sherlock 
Holmes', much like an actor portraying Dr. Watson on stage. But 
he does not really so use the name; 'Sherlock Holmes' so far does 
not really have any such use, or even any related use (ignoring 
unrelated uses it coincidentally might have had). At a later stage, 
use of the name is imported from the fiction into reality, to name 
the very same thing that it is the name of according to the story. 
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That thing – now the real as well as the fictional bearer of the 
name – is according to the story a human being who is a brilliant 
detective, and in reality an artifactual abstract entity created by 
Conan Doyle. [Salmon 1998: 300] 
 
It is possible that some of this disagreement is verbal: a disagreement 
over whether uttering a name as part of a pretended utterance is a use 
of the name or just a pretended use. But Salmon does say that the very 
same object is the thing literary critics talk about and the thing which is, 
according to the stories, a detective. It isn’t far from this to say that 
Doyle is pretending that this thing is a detective, rather than just 
pretending to use the name to refer to a detective. If that is Salmon’s 
view, then I don’t agree with it. I don’t have any catastrophic objections 
to it, but I will present some minor ones, and it’s worth showing how 
you can dissociate yourself from it without being a full-on pretence 
theorist, and how a version of pretence theory can sit with the ontology 
of fictional characters I put forward in §4.3. 
 
 4.42 Anchored and unanchored pretence 
 
We can distinguish between two kinds of pretence. An anchored 
pretence is when you take something real and pretend that it is a 
certain way. Walking through the woods, I might pretend I was a bear. 
According to my pretence, I am a bear. There’s a thing, me, such that 
according to my pretence it is a bear. An unanchored pretence is when 
the things in your pretence are not real things. Walking through the 
woods, I might pretend there was a bear following me. According to my 
pretence, there is a bear. But there isn’t a thing such that according to 
my pretence it is a bear. That’s a natural way to see things, anyway, and 





The distinction fits nicely into the ontology of fictional characters laid 
out in §4.3, and corresponds to the distinction between natives and 
immigrants to a story. When a pretence is anchored, the real objects are 
imported into the story, and when it is unanchored, the unanchored 
roles generate new objects native to the story. Having admitted that the 
unanchored roles generate new objects, however, we could then say 
that the pretence was anchored on these objects. We can still make the 
distinction between two kinds of pretence, but instead all pretences are 
anchored, while only some are creative. That’s the position Salmon may 
have been pushing, and it’s the position I want to resist. 
 
As I’ve said, I don’t have a catastrophic objection. The most important 
reason to provide an alternative is to show that you can accept a 
fictional ontology and still take creative pretences to be unanchored. 
Even if you’re sure that Doyle and his readers aren’t pretending that an 
abstract object is a detective, you can still accept van Inwagen’s 
argument that Doyle created Holmes, and so there’s a thing called 
Holmes that Doyle created. 
 
So, one minor objection to the view is just that it’s unintuitive. Some 
people will be quite sure that creative pretences are unanchored and 
demand an alternative. But the other minor objections come from when 
the names occur outside of pretences, but with the same meanings as 
they have within pretences. The classic example is ‘Holmes doesn’t 
exist’. If Holmes is an abstract artefact, then he (it?) does exist. I 
mentioned this earlier in §4.11 as a problem for van Inwagen and put it 
to one side, but now we can try for a solution: ‘Holmes’ can refer to an 
abstract artefact (or whatever fictional characters are), but it also has 
another use, coined by Doyle for use in his stories and associated 
pretences, which also appears in the true ‘Holmes does not exist’. I’ll 




Negative existentials are not the only times the pretend use of fictional 
names can occur outside of pretences. There are other statements of the 
same tone as negative existentials: ‘Batman doesn’t live in our city’, 
‘Holmes is not real’, ‘Poirot isn’t a famous Belgian’. There are false 
positive existentials: ‘Holmes exists’, ‘Achilles existed’, and non-
existential statements in the same category. There are also attitude 
ascriptions, where the attitude is itself part of the pretence: ‘Smith 
admires Holmes’ or ‘Charles fears the slime’ [Charles is from Walton 
1978a]. At a pinch we could probably manage to treat the attitude 
ascriptions as referring to the abstracta, but once we have the pretend 
use it treats the attitude ascriptions in a more satisfying way. We will 
give an account of this in §4.432 The problem with treating the other 
uses as referring to the abstract artefacts is that you either get the 
wrong truth values as with ‘Holmes doesn’t exist’, or the right ones for 
the wrong reasons, as with ‘Poirot isn’t a famous Belgian’. 
 
If the pretend use only occurred in pretences and the non-pretend use 
only occurred in serious assertions, then we could presumably gather 
together what we needed from the two kinds of use into one word, 
giving us a theory that worked and a slight feeling of unease. But in fact 
the pretend use does occur outside of pretences, so putting the two 
kinds of use into the same word would mean either understanding 
those non-literally, or in a way that severs the link between truth and 
assertability. This seldom makes for a satisfying final theory. It would 
be better to take unanchored pretence at face value as unanchored if we 
can, and consequently take the pretend use as not referring to anything 
that exists, including when it occurs outside of pretence. This means we 
can’t just use the simple semantics for the names which has them refer 








 4.43 Lewis on truth in fiction 
 
David Lewis [1978] gives an analysis of fictional discourse which does 
not have the names refer to anything at the actual world. I am going to 
modify Lewis’s account to give a semantics for the pretend use of 
fictional names which also explains their behaviour outside of 
pretences. Lewis is doing a few things with his account though, and it is 
partnered with his notoriously implausible genuine modal realism, so 
we should break it down a bit so as not to make commitments we don’t 
have to. 
 
One thing he wants to do is give an explanation of why we can accept 
the premises of the following argument and reject its conclusion: 
 
Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street. 
221B Baker Street is a bank. 
________________________________________ 
Holmes lives in a bank. 
 
We assert the first premise as part of the pretence, and assert the 
second when talking about the real world, but we wouldn’t ever assert 
the conclusion. Lewis explains this by saying that the first premise is 
implicitly prefixed by a fictionality operator: ‘In the Holmes stories…’. 
The second premise is not prefixed by the operator, so the argument is 
invalid, and the conclusion can be false, prefixed and unprefixed. 
 
Another thing Lewis wants to do is give an account of what determines 
what is true in a story. Some things are true in a story although not 
explicitly stated, and some things are left open by stories. Lewis deals 
with this by having what the story explicitly says pick out some but not 
all of the worlds in which the explicit statements are true. I won’t be 
arguing with Lewis over the particular class of worlds a story picks out; 
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we can just follow him in saying that some class is picked out. For 
Lewis, the natures of his concrete possible worlds can do some work 
here, by fixing what similar possibilities are like independently of what 
we think or know about them. If we are not genuine modal realists, we 
will need some other way of fixing the class of worlds, perhaps using 
whatever we do think fixes facts about possibility and counterfactuals. 
 
A third thing he wants to do, related to the other two, is give a 
semantics for the fictionality operators. He takes it that a statement is 
true in the story iff it is true at all the worlds picked out by the story. 
However, since the Holmes role is played by different people at 
different worlds, and even by people who are not counterparts of each 
other on an ordinary counterpart relation (perhaps they have different 
origins), ‘Holmes’ has to refer to different people at different worlds for 
‘Holmes is clever’ to be true at all the worlds. ‘Holmes’ refers at w to 
whoever plays the Holmes role at w, which makes it a non-rigid 
designator. 
 
This account suffers from a technical problem, however, dealing with 
sentences like In the Iliad, Hector could have survived the war. This is 
true: Hector died but he could have survived. The problem is finding a 
world to make this true. We want a world where the person playing the 
Hector role survives, but this is problematic because the Hector role 
includes dying in the war. Mark Sainsbury [2010: 90] takes this 
problem to be unsolved. Let’s try to solve it. 
 
 4.431 Semi-rigid designation 
 
First I should point out that we know full well what we want a model 
satisfying In the Iliad, Hector could have survived the war to look like. 
The problem is getting a way of interpreting sentences systematically 
so that those models satisfy that sentence. The model should be one in 
which for all Iliad worlds w, there is a world v possible relative to w 
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such that the person playing the Hector role at w survives the war at v. 
The difficulty is that since at v the person survives the war, they don’t 
play the Hector role at v, and so Hector doesn’t refer to them at v, and 
Hector survived the war isn’t true at v. 
 
The solution is to evaluate sentences relative to pairs of worlds, one for 
fixing the referents of the names relative to the pair, and one for seeing 
if objects satisfy predicates relative to the pair. Evaluating sentences 
relative to pairs of worlds is not a new idea; it goes back at least to 
Davies and Humberstone [1980] as a device for accommodating an 
actuality operator in modal logic, and has developed into what is now 
known as two-dimensional semantics. For an overview of this area, see 
Schroeter [2012] and Chalmers [forthcoming]. For present purposes, a 
fictionality operator like In the Iliad should shift both worlds, while a 
possibility operator like could have shifts only the world determining 
which objects satisfy which predicates. So we have these clauses: 
 
 V(Hector) at <u, v> is the thing playing the Hector role at u. 
 V(Survived the war) at all worlds is the function f from worlds to 
sets such that f(w) is the set of things that survive the war at w. 
 Where F is a predicate and n is a name, V(Fn) is true at <u, v> iff 
V(n) at <u, v> is a member of V(F)(v). 
 V(In the Iliad, φ) is true at <u, v> iff for all Iliad worlds w 
(relative to v), V(φ) is true at <w, w>. 
 V(◊φ) is true at <u, v> iff for all worlds w accessible from v, φ is 
true at <u, w> 
 V(φ) is true in a model M iff V(φ) is true at <@, @> where @ is 
the actual world of M. 
 
It may be helpful to think of the first world of a pair as determining 
what the names refer to, and the second world determining what goes 
on at the pair. The work gets done by having fictional names like Hector 
behave rigidly with respect to possibility operators and non-rigidly 
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with respect to fictionality operators. Working through the example, we 
paraphrase In the Iliad, Hector could have survived the war as In the 
Iliad, ◊Survived the war(Hector). 
 
 V[In the Iliad, ◊Survived the war(Hector)] in M is 
 V[In the Iliad, ◊Survived the war(Hector)] at <@, @>, which is 
true iff 
 V[◊Survived the war(Hector)] is true at <w, w> for all Iliad 
worlds w (relative to @), which is true iff 
 For all Iliad worlds w (relative to @),  there is a world v 
accessible from w, such that V[Survived the war(Hector)] is true 
at <w, v>, which is true iff 
 For all Iliad worlds w (relative to @),  there is a world v 
accessible from w, such that V(Hector) at <w, v> is a member of 
V(Survived the war) at <w, v>, which is true iff 
 For all Iliad worlds w (relative to @), there is a world v 
accessible from w, such that the person playing the Hector role 
at w survived the war at v. 
 
That is the result we wanted. Note that the framework above can still 
accommodate rigid designators, which refer to the same thing at all 
worlds, and also non-rigidly designating definite descriptions which 
refer relative to <u, v> to the thing satisfying the description at v (not 
u). These will have their references shifted by possibility operators as 
well as fictionality operators, as they should. 
 
We should also note that outside the context of a fictionality operator, 
fictional names will tend not to refer. That looks like a good result, and 
allows Hector to be univocal in Hector does not exist and In the Iliad, 
Achilles killed Hector. But we can run into some difficulties where a 
story is coincidentally played out. We wanted to side with Kripke and 
philosophical orthodoxy in saying that Hector does not exist is true as 
long as the Iliad was made up, even if coincidentally events like it all 
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happened. We can get round this by saying that non-actuality is part of 
the Hector role. We don’t have to worry about sentences like Hector 
could have been Obama’s brother being true either. Even if Obama could 
have had a brother who played the Hector role, Hector could have been 
Obama’s brother is only true if Hector is Obama’s brother is true at <@, 
w> for some world w accessible from @. Hector still doesn’t refer to 
anyone relative to <@, w>, because nobody plays the Hector role at @. 
The only way a fictional name could start referring is if we introduce 
the appropriate fictionality operator, to shift the first world of the pair 
away from @. Outside of fictionality operators, fictional names will 
always be empty, because at the actual world their history of use goes 
back to a block, in the sense of Donnellan [1974]. This will allow such 
uses to be treated according to the negative free logic argued for in 
chapter one, just as if they were straightforwardly non-referring. 
 
 4.432 Fictional names in attitude ascriptions 
 
Now we have a view according to which there are two uses of fictional 
names. In the pretence use they are semi-rigid designators as described 
above, and in the literary critical use they are ordinary rigid designators 
which refer to abstract objects. This should be thought of more as 
polysemy than as straight-up ambiguity; it is of course no coincidence 
that the two uses are homophonic. Now we need to think about how 
they will be incorporated into the account of propositional and 
objectual attitude ascriptions given in chapter three. The literary 
critical use will just treat them as names in the ordinary way, but we 
need to explain how semi-rigid designators work in attitude ascriptions, 
and we need a way of deciding how to classify particular occurrences of 
names in attitude ascriptions. 
 
How exactly we integrate semi-rigid designators into the treatment of 
attitude ascriptions will depend on the details of the proposal for 
ordinary cases, and the metaphysics of the senses involved was not fully 
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worked out. To see how it might go, however, we can take the treatment 
of senses as Chalmers’ two-dimensional intensions as a case in point. 
Two dimensional intensions can be seen as functions from 
epistemically possible scenarios to intensions. Empty names from 
mistakes and lies, like ‘Vulcan’, all have the null intension with respect 
to the actual scenario, and as such will all have the same intension with 
respect to the actual scenario. This means all their difference in 
meaning is meta-representational. 
 
Semi-rigid designators have non-meta-representational differences in 
meaning, but they still have the null intension with respect to the actual 
scenario in the sense that ‘FN could not have existed’ is true for any 
fictional name FN. To deal with this, we can instead think of senses as 
3D intensions, or functions from epistemically possible scenarios to the 
2D intensions used in the semantics for semi-rigid designators. 
Mistaken names do not refer with respect to any world pair, since they 
do not refer in the context of fictionality operators. This means that 
with respect to the actual scenario they will still have the null function 
as on world pairs as their 2D intension, and so any differences in 
meaning will still be meta-representational. However, fictional names 
can have different 2D intensions with respect to the actual scenario. 
This gives a way of incorporating senses for semi-rigid designators into 
an extension of a framework designed to deal with the non-fictional 
case. Once we have these senses, we can treat them just like any other 
names. Propositions constructed out of the new senses will encode 
enough information to assess their truth values with respect to 
different fictions, so if we want to say something like ‘Fred believes that 
Poirot is a detective, but that is only true in Christie’s stories’, we should 
be able to manage it. We should also note that since there are 
sometimes elliptical fictionality operators in attitude ascriptions, so 
really we a say that we believe that in the Holmes stories Holmes is a 
detective, the propositions will often involve the senses of fictionality 
operators. This doesn’t generate any obvious problems though; the 
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fictionality operators pick out a set of worlds and can be ascribed an 
intension accordingly. 
 
A full development of the view would demand a fuller development of 
the ordinary case than we have, but this will suffice for present 
purposes. Now we need to decide how to classify different uses of 
fictional names in attitude ascriptions. The two main factors guiding us 
here were identified in chapter three. They are that the connections 
between propositional and objectual attitudes should be preserved, and 
the proposition referred to in describing the attitude should be the 
content of an utterance expressing that attitude. 
 
Lots of cases will be easy to classify: in ‘I believe that Poirot is a 
detective’, ‘Poirot’ is the pretence use. In ‘I believe that Christie created 
Poirot’, it is the literary critical use. The most interesting cases are those 
ascribing objectual attitudes, and ascribing the beliefs corresponding to 
those attitudes. Walton [1978a] talks about someone called Charles 
fearing some slime while watching a horror movie. Suppose he also 
fears Dracula. Which use is ‘Dracula’ in ‘Charles fears Dracula’? I think 
the most satisfying thing is to say that it is the pretend use, and follow 
Walton in saying that the fear is not genuine fear, but part of the 
pretence. (This explains, as Walton notes, why his fear does not have 
the motivational consequences of fear, although it does have some of 
the physiological consequences.) The pretend propositional attitudes 
which are the reasons for and consequences of his fear would be 
expressed by Charles using the pretend use, and so we should ascribe 
them using the pretend use. It is most satisfying to be able to ascribe the 
objectual attitude that way too. The pretend use could also be used in 
truly ascribing genuine fear, if the subject thought that Dracula was 
real, and really feared him, keeping a supply of garlic, stakes and so on. 
When they expressed the propositional attitudes corresponding to the 
fear, they would not do so using a tacit fictionality operator. Charles 
would, because he is just pretending. It will be possible for the literary 
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critical use to feature truly in attitude ascriptions, but these will 
typically be the kinds of attitudes which people bear to any artistic 
creations, like musical works or novels, because that is the sort of thing 
that fictional characters are. 
 
At this stage, you might think that there is a perhaps unwelcome 
convergence between my treatment of the pretence use of fictional 
names and Meinongianism. We have names which have different 
meanings, not just at the meta-representational level, but which don’t 
refer to anything existent. Where ‘n’ is one of these names, ‘n does not 
exist is true’, and now, to analyse intentional attitude ascriptions, I have 
ontologically committed to the names’ senses. You might worry that the 
superficial similarities point to a deep similarity, and the view is really a 
notational variant of Meinongianism, with the senses playing the role of 
non-existent objects. 
 
You could object to this at the deep level, saying that the superficial 
similarities are just that, and deeper down there are real differences. It 
is part of the explicit view that the senses exist and denote nothing with 
respect to <@,@>, which makes them different from the Meinongian’s 
objects in at least that way. If that doesn’t satisfy, we can add that if we 
accept that there are meaningful fictional names which refer to nothing 
existent, then we are already committed to the senses, Committing to 
the names being meaningful shouldn’t make you a Meinongian by itself. 
The names do refer to non-actual objects with respect to world-pairs 
other than <@,@>, but since these worlds are just the ones we already 
use in our model theory for ordinary modal discourse, my treatment of 
fiction need be no more Meinongian in its commitments than that. This 
was one of the advantages of Lewis’s original proposal, and is part of 




Finally, we can point to an irreconcilable superficial difference between 
my proposal and the Meinongian’s. We saw in §1.12 that we can identify 
a scope ambiguity in negative existentials, and the difference between 
the two readings can be brought out using lambda predicates. If ‘n’ is an 
empty name, then ‘n does not exist’ is true when the negation has wide 
scope, and false when it has narrow scope. The same goes for the 
pretence use of fictional names. ¬Exists(Holmes) is true, but 
[λx.¬Exists(x)](Holmes) is false. The Meinongian can also acknowledge 
both readings, but they will say that both readings are true, because 
Holmes is non-existent (narrow scope) and non-existent things do not 
exist (wide scope). This superficial difference corresponds to the deep 
difference that the Meinongian thinks that there are non-existent things 
and I don’t, so they hold that atomic predications of non-existence are 
sometimes true, and I don’t. There are still superficial similarities, but 
there are bound to be since both views are trying to account for the 
same data. The fundamental difference between Meinongianism and the 
orthodoxy’s robust sense of reality remains, both in the theory and on 
the surface. 
 
 4.433 Note on ‘according to’ 
 
An objection could be raised here that the treatments of ‘according to 
Christie’s stories, Poirot is Belgian’ and ‘according to Leverrier, Vulcan 
is a planet’ are too different74. ‘Vulcan’ is treated as a non-referring 
name which only contributes meta-representational content, whereas 
‘Poirot’ is treated as a semi-rigid designator. The truth conditions of the 
‘Poirot’ sentence involves whatever metaphysics grounds truths about 
possibility (model-theoretically cashed out as possible worlds), while 
the truth conditions of the ‘Vulcan’ sentence just involve Leverrier 
                                                          
74 Thanks to my examiners for raising this objection. 
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standing in a relation to a Fregean GP. They seem similar, so why treat 
them so differently? 
 
My response to this has two parts. First, the treatments are not quite as 
different as they might appear, and the treatment of the Vulcan 
sentence could without contradiction be developed into something very 
like the treatment of the ‘Poirot’ sentence. Second, there are some 
disanalogies between the two kinds of sentence which could justify 
treating them differently, and would at least demand some more work 
on the part of someone who wanted to treat them alike. 
 
What we need from the semantics of an operator like ‘S believes that’, 
‘according to S’ or ‘according to Christie’s stories’ is this: a recipe for 
getting from a point in a model and the semantic value of a sentence to 
a set of propositions (or a sense which determines a set of 
propositions). With ‘according to Christie’s stories’, we do this using the 
machinery of world-pairs and semi-rigid designation. With ‘S believes 
that’ we more or less just look at the propositions which S, or an 
idealization of S, would be disposed to sincerely assent to. Now, we 
could try to make these treatments more similar to each other. We 
could use the THAT operator in the fiction case as well as the belief 
case, and instead of letting it be a black box, we have a structured entity 
encoding all the information of the 2D or 3D intensions of the 
sentence’s parts, in a manner similar to Chalmers [2011]. Then the 
entity in a way parallel to the semi-rigid designation machinery. We 
could also use similar machinery with ‘S believes that’, where the 
operator’s semantic value determines a set of pairs or triples of worlds 
corresponding to S’s global belief state, and ‘Vulcan’ determines a 




This has the makings of a unified treatment of fictionality and belief 
operators, which does not contradict what I have already said in any 
very serious way. So why not do it? The main reason is that what is true 
according to Leverrier should track what (idealized) Leverrier will and 
won’t assent to, whereas there is no analogous set of dispositions for 
truth in fiction to be beholden to. The opposite is true, Lewis’s proposal 
is designed to fill a gap in our theory of truth in fiction, by letting what 
is true according to a story depend on objective facts about possibility 
and counterfactuals. This difference manifests itself in two ways. First, 
we need something to determine truth in fiction, whereas we already 
have people’s idealized dispositions to assent to determine, or at least 
indicate, what they believe. Second, Christie’s stories determine a Poirot 
role which matches the set of world-pairs determined by the semantic 
value of ‘according to Christie’s stories’. It isn’t clear that the A-
intension of ‘Vulcan’ could determine a Vulcan role which matches 
Leverrier’s belief-world-pairs or triples. Different people believe 
different things about Vulcan, and these beliefs all have a bearing on the 
public-currency A-intension of ‘Vulcan’. Where Leverrier’s beliefs about 
Vulcan diverge from the composite Vulcan role, his idealized 
dispositions to assent will diverge from what is true according to him, 
and that’s bad. The difference is that what is true according to a person 
is individualistic, whereas what is true according to a story is public. 
The A-intension, if words are to mean the same thing in different 
people’s mouths, is presumably public, which makes it difficult to mesh 
with a person’s belief state in the way the semi-rigid designation 
machinery demands. Perhaps these problems can be solved, but until 








This chapter was about how to understand fictional names, by which 
we mean names introduced in the context of fictional works, like 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Poirot’. We saw that uses of these names divide 
into two main categories: talking within fiction and talking about 
fiction. Some uses are harder to classify than others, and that could 
motivate a unified semantics which applied to all the uses. Nonetheless, 
I offered two analyses, one for each category, and I suggest we do the 
best we can to classify difficult cases. The use within fiction is not 
confined to fiction, since people can be confused and think things are 
really true when they are actually only true in the stories, or they can 
just remark on how reality and the stories are different. Then the 
semantics for the use within fiction will still apply, and what they say 
will tend to be evaluated pessimistically, at least in non-intentional 
contexts. The use for talking about fiction will always result in people 
talking about fiction in a sense, because it refers to fictional characters, 
and talking about fictional characters is (in a sense) talking about 
fiction. There may however be scope for people talking about fictional 
characters without realizing it, although when people are very wrong 
about what they are talking about this may result in referential failure 
instead. 
 
§4.1 looked at van Inwagen’s argument that there are fictional 
characters, and defended it against some objections. His argument does 
not say anything much about what fictional characters are like though, 
so we looked at different kinds of fictional ontology. These can be 
categorized in several different ways, and we looked at some of the 
more popular options: fictional characters as abstract artefacts, as 
Platonic abstracta, and as non-existent concreta. 
 
§4.2 presented and explored several issues that fictional ontologies 
should be able to deal with, such as whether the characters are created 
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or discovered, Kripke’s problem about unicorns, and problems arising 
from characters from one fiction appearing in another, either as real 
characters or as fictional characters. We saw how different kinds of 
fictional ontology will have to approach these problems in different 
ways. This helps us decide which ontology we should adopt. Ultimately 
I went with a systematic ontology of abstract objects, which can be 
adopted in either a creationist or a selectionist version, and this positive 
view was presented in the next section.  
 
§4.3 set out a simple version of this systematic ontology, drawing on 
elements from work by Zalta, Parsons and Fine, and showed how it 
should have the means to address the issues discussed in §4.2. We also 
saw some of this system’s limitations and some areas which could be 
further developed. 
 
This system is best suited for the use of fictional names for talking 
about fiction, and §4.4 looked for an alternative analysis of the use 
which primarily occurs within pretence. I proposed a semantics for this 
use based on David Lewis’s system. It had to be modified, however, to 
deal with Mark Sainsbury’s puzzle relating to sentences like ‘according 
to Doyle’s stories, Holmes could have been a vicar’. I suggested we treat 
fictional names as semi-rigid designators, which behave non-rigidly 
with respect to fictionality operators, and rigidly with respect to 
possibility operators. This analysis also allowed us to deal with this use 
of names occurring outside of pretence, where the sentences get 
pessimistic truth values in non-intentional contexts, and in particular 
negative existential statements like ‘Holmes does not exist’ could be 
taken at face value and evaluated as true. In §4.432 I showed how 
fictional names would behave in attitude contexts, which was quite 
similar to how ordinary names behaved in chapter three. Finally in 
§4.433 I looked at the possibilities for use the treatment of fictional 
names in fictionality operators to enrich the treatment of mistaken 
names in belief contexts, but concluded that this was probably 
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unnecessary and might not work very well anyway. The treatment from 




Chapter 5 – Concluding Remarks 
 
5.1  What we have learned about empty names 
 
Apparently empty names are used in many different ways and give rise 
to many different problems. It would probably not have been possible 
to solve all the problems here, so that the reader would immediately 
know how to analyse any sentence containing an apparently empty 
name. (Or so that if they couldn’t, it wouldn’t be the name’s fault.) My 
aim has been to get our understanding of apparently empty names into 
a position where we have the means to solve all the problems. This has 
meant treating apparently empty names in one of three ways.  
 
Names introduced in the contexts of mistakes and lies will tend to be 
straightforwardly non-referring, which gives rise to pessimistic truth 
values in non-intentional contexts. In intentional contexts the truth 
values need not be pessimistic, because the names can have 
metarepresentational content even if they do not succeed in otherwise 
representing. Names introduced in the context of fiction are used in one 
of two ways. They can refer to a fictional character, which exists and is 
the same sort of thing as a play or a musical work. Alternatively, they 
might be semi-rigid designators, which don’t refer to anything with the 
respect to the actual world and so give rise to pessimistic truth values 
in non-intentional contexts, but do refer with respect to other possible 
worlds in the context of a fictionality operator. The pessimistic truth 
values in non-intentional contexts allow us to take true negative 
existential statements like ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ at face 
value. The non-trivial 2D intensions also give us more resources for 
assigning the truth values we want in contexts involving attitude verbs 






5.2  What we have learned about other things 
 
Hard cases can make bad law, but sometimes getting your theory to 
account for hard cases can lead to a theory which deals with the easier 
cases better. Hopefully this thesis has involved a bit of that. Much work 
has been done by others on problems arising from co-referring names, 
and they have much in common with the problems of empty names. 
Both involve a mismatch between how things are in the world and our 
attempts to represent them. 
 
Chapter two tried to give an account of how a person’s beliefs can be 
consistent or inconsistent, and how their deductions can be valid or 
invalid, without appealing directly to the logical relations between the 
contents of their beliefs. This was helpful because of the danger that 
some beliefs don’t have propositional contents, or at least not the kind 
of contents which can be true. Our account instead appealed to the co-
ordination relations between belief tokens, and the consequences of 
these for what the beliefs could potentially be about, and what their 
contents could be. We motivated this machinery independently though, 
because it is just as useful for dealing with Kripke’s puzzle about belief. 
That puzzle suggested that the rational relations between belief tokens 
don’t always track the logical relations between the contents of 
utterances expressing them, where contents are individuated so as to 
express useful interpersonal generalizations. Perhaps if we didn’t have 
to deal with empty names we could have tried to get by with just 
publicly accessible and expressible Fregean contents, but the solution 
which can handle empty names best is also the one that does best with 
Kripke’s puzzle. Consideration of empty names helps us draw the line 





Chapter three also had some bearing on puzzles of co-reference. This 
time the issue was about co-referring words appearing in different 
attitude ascriptions. We could probably just about make Millianism 
plausible even where attitude ascriptions were concerned, if we didn’t 
have to deal with empty names, but allowing all empty names to be 
substitutable salva veritate in attitude contexts may push these 
intuitions to breaking point. Maybe everyone who worships 
Phosphorus worships Hesperus, but not everyone who worships Zeus 
worships Thor, Vulcan and Santa. Once empty names have motivated a 
Fregean semantics for attitude ascriptions, however, we can use it for 
non-empty names too, in line with the intuitions the Millians had to 
resist. 
 
The Fregean semantics motivates some metaphysical work as well, 
because we need to see what kinds of thing could play the role of 
Fregean senses and Fregean gappy propositions, assuming something 
could. There is promising work in this area already, which looks at a 
metarepresentational level of content, whether this is in terms of 
Cumming’s discourse referents, Chalmers’ primary intensions, or Gillian 
Russell’s reference determiners. 
 
5.3 What we have not learned about empty names 
 
I said in §5.1 that I didn’t have an analysis for every possible sentence 
containing an apparently empty name, although I hope to have put us 
on the right track in the search for such analyses. There is still some 
work to be done. I just mentioned the metaphysical project of giving a 
full account of what metarepresentational content is like, and until we 
have one of those we won’t know exactly what empty names (or indeed 
any names) are up to in attitude contexts. 
 
Another thing I haven’t solved is how to deal with weird mixed cases, 
where empty names are used in ways which are hard to classify 
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according to the various analyses I have proposed. There is no limit to 
the zeugmatic convolutions that could be made by mixing the pretence 
and literary critical uses of fictional names. Meinongians do well on this, 
but they do worse elsewhere. In particular, anything we do to unify the 
pretence and literary critical uses to deal with mixed cases will also end 
up conflating them, leading to other kinds of ambiguities or demands 
for awkward paraphrases. Nonetheless, disentangling the odd cases 
remains a challenge. 
 
Two final areas for further investigation are mythical names and the 
names used in false scientific theories. These seem to fall somewhere 
between fictional names and the names used in the contexts of mistakes 
and lies. It seems plausible that a name could start out as part of a 
mistake or a lie, but the misconception could live on as fiction after 
being exposed, with the name being used as a fictional name. That 
doesn’t create any immediate problems for my account, as it can be 
seen just as a change in meaning. Perhaps there are problems lurking 
when we deal with intermediate cases, however. Perhaps the 
machinery we already have can accommodate it, or perhaps we need 
some more. Along with metarepresentational content and odd mixed 
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